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Abstract 
This thesis focuses on liberal peace building in the DRC. The thesis takes a criti-
cal approach which emphasises local agencies and their engagements with liberal 
peace building. However, it seeks to bring this critique back to the institutions 
with which liberal peace building is preoccupied, by focusing on the hidden local 
that operates within these institutions. This approach seeks to give new meaning 
to processes of institution building without rendering institutions irrelevant as a 
top-down approach. 
Focusing on the first legislature of the Congolese Third Republic (2006-2011) 
this thesis provides a case study of how local agencies consume liberal democra-
cy within the National Assembly, and make it their own. It discusses current lib-
eral peace building practices as a process of mutual disengagement, in which 
both the local and liberal intervention seek to disengage from each other. Alt-
hough this results in a lack of legitimacy of the peace building project both local-
ly as well as with liberal interventions, it also creates hybrid space in which local 
agencies consume liberal democracy. 
The thesis conceptualises these local agencies as being convivial, in other 
words, they are enabled by people’s relations. The thesis therefore focuses on 
MPs relations with their electorate, as well as with the executive and other MPs 
in their party or ruling coalition. In through these interactions local agencies con-
sume liberal democracy – it is accepted, rejected, diverted, substituted, etc. The 
thesis concludes that through these practices of consumption local agencies nego-
tiate liberal democracy. The liberal democratic framework is kept intact, but it is 
not enabled to function as foreseen, because local agencies are responsive to a 
moral matrix of the father-family. However, the liberal democratic framework 
itself provides new tools through which local agencies also renegotiate the un-
written rules of the moral matrix of the father-family.  
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Introduction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo 1 “Gangsters in a tie against the Congolese population”, by Pepe Mpunga, 2011 
 – author’s picture 2011 
 
This thesis is about democratisation as a central pillar of liberal peace building in 
the Congo and focuses on Parliament and parliamentarians in this process. The 
picture above captures many of the themes that will be discussed in the chapters 
that follow: that of the interaction between Members of Parliament (MPs) and 
2 
 
their electorate, the self-perception and popular perception of MPs in the Congo, 
and the roles of MPs as providers that redistribute. The picture shows a painting 
made by a popular artist from Kinshasa that criticises MPs and by extension Par-
liament as an institution. When I bought it the painter explained to me what he 
intended to express by this image. ‘Kuluna en cravate’ is a reference to MPs 
used by Kinois and refers to the recent phenomenon of Kuluna, violent and thiev-
ing youth gangs. The MP is a Kuluna in a tie (cravate). He gives money to some 
people. He has three ladies by his side, ‘because he is very rich’, and the media is 
present to record his well doing and expose the MP as a provider for the people. 
But the painter also expressed a critical reflection on these practices by mocking-
ly referring to the MP as a Kuluna in a tie. Although the MP appears to do some-
thing for the people, he has in fact stolen his wealth from the people and he is 
acting against them (contre la population congolaise).1  
Liberal peace building in the Democratic Republic of Congo 
Liberal peace building in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC, the Congo) 
started after the signing of the Sun City Peace Agreement (2002). The 2006 gen-
eral elections marked the end of a transitional period and in November 2011 the 
Congolese electorate went to the ballot box to elect a President and Parliament 
for the second time. Until then, results of liberal peace building interventions in 
the Congo have been disappointing and discouraging. Nearly a decade of peace 
building has had a limited impact on people’s daily lives. Freedom House con-
sistently ranks the Congo as ‘not free’ with political rights and civil liberties 
marked six out of seven (one being most free and seven being the most unfree). 
In 2011, the country was ranked as one of the most corrupt countries in the world 
and has sunk to the bottom of the Human Development Index.2  
During the first term of his Presidency, Kabila has firmly established his re-
gime and taken control over the state and its institutions. This has on the one 
hand brought some stability after the turbulent past decades, while on the other 
hand it has been cause for concern. People feel that the regime is developing dic-
tatorial tendencies. It swallows all power and leaves little space neither for the 
opposition nor for state institutions such as the courts or the security forces to be 
non-partisan. Particularly in the pre-electoral period of 2011 the Kabila regime 
has shown a concerning side of itself, that of violence, and intimidation, and 
sometimes magnificent strategies of political and electoral manipulation. Within 
five years after the celebration of the country’s first elections as the launch of a 
new democratic era for the country people already speak of a return to ‘Mobu-
                                                          
1  Author’s conversation with artist, Kinshasa 23 July 2011.  
2  www.freedomhouse.org; http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011; http://hdr.undp.org. 
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tism-without-Mobutu’. The country is as corrupt as ever, the state is malfunction-
ing and there are little signs of any improvement. The armed forces continue to 
be a source of insecurity to an already battered population, and poverty and hu-
man suffering aggravates instead of reduces. The liberal peace seems to have 
derailed and lost its momentum, right under the noses of its agents (the donor 
community, the international community), and with their financial support.   
The liberal peace is founded on the idea that liberal market democracy fosters 
domestic and international peace. Political and economic liberalisation is there-
fore employed as a means to end and prevent violent conflict (Paris 2004, 40-42). 
It thus ‘combines and conflates’ democracy with peace. This has resulted in a 
project of social transformation which aims to transform dysfunctional societies 
into peaceful societies by including them in the liberal world order (Duffield 
2001, 11). This project of social transformation comes in different graduations – 
conservative, orthodox, emancipatory – reflecting graduations in the balance be-
tween coercion, top-down intervention and externalisation on the one hand, and 
local ownership, bottom-up peace building, consensus and social justice on the 
other (Richmond 2005, 214-15).  
Liberal peace building involves democratisation and liberal market reform 
(Richmond 2006, 292). This thesis is concerned with post-war democratisation in 
the Congo, as one of the central pillars of liberal peace building. Democratisation 
in liberal peace building terms prioritises a rights based approach which focuses 
on elections, the institutions of democratic governance, civil society building, the 
rule of law, and human rights. This thesis focuses on the Congolese National Par-
liament as a site of democratisation. Although democratisation as part of liberal 
peace building in the Congo only started after the signing of the 2002 peace 
agreement, the efforts for democratisation in the Congo date back more than 20 
years. The past two decades have been extremely volatile in the Congo. In the 
early 1990s Mobutu’s dictatorial regime crumbled and a process of political 
change towards democracy was launched. Since then the Congolese population 
has been awaiting elections, while undergoing various phases of democratisation. 
They were insecure and turbulent times. The democratic transition of the 1990s 
failed eventually and was overtaken by a civil war. The first Congolese war 
(1996-7) had its origins in the disintegration of the Zaïrian state, the genocide in 
neighbouring Rwanda followed by a security crisis in Zaïre and the inability of 
the Mobutu regime to respond adequately to these developments. Under these 
conditions of weakness of the state, the challenges posed by the crisis in neigh-
bouring Rwanda easily spilled over to Zaïre to become a Zaïrian crisis. With 
support from Rwanda and Uganda, an alliance of four rebellion or opposition 
parties known as the Alliance des Forces Armées pour la Libération du Congo 
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(AFDL), under the leadership of Laurent-Désiré Kabila, launched a successful 
war against Mobutu in September 1996, accessing power on May 17 1997.  
However, it was not long before the Kabila coalition fell apart. In August 1998 
a new war was launched by RCD (Rassemblement Congolais pour la Dé-
mocratie), a new rebel movement with the support of Rwanda, shortly followed 
by MLC (Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo), which was supported by 
Uganda. The Second Congolese war involved many neighbouring countries. 
While Uganda and Rwanda were fighting on the anti-Kabila front, Angola, Zim-
babwe, Namibia and Chad continued to support Kabila. On the side of the re-
sistance another three movements developed in due course: RCD-K/ML (Kisan-
gani/Mouvement de Libération) (also backed by Uganda) and RCD-N (National) 
split away from what now became known as RCD-Goma. In addition, the Mai 
Mai, groups of armed fighters that have existed since the 1960s, became involved 
in the war, as well as various rebel movements from neighbouring countries that 
were operating from in the Congo. In addition, several African countries sent 
their armies in support of Kabila’s regime. Within a short period of time, the war 
had become a complex patchwork of armed rebellions and foreign armies roam-
ing around Congo. 
Although the government remained in control of the western part of the coun-
try, the country was de facto divided into several territories controlled by differ-
ent belligerents. The war has never been characterised by heavy combat between 
the belligerents; the tragedy of the second Congolese war has rather been the 
plunder of the Congo’s wealth by Congolese factions and neighbouring states, 
the extreme brutality towards the civilian population (rape, massacres) and the 
rise of local ethnic conflict in the context of civil war with increasing poverty and 
a deteriorating humanitarian situation in parts of the country. 
Efforts to make an end to the second war had started almost immediately after 
it had broken out. The peace process started with the Lusaka Ceasefire Agree-
ment of July 1999 (République Démocratique du Congo 1999, Rogier 2003). 
Apart from heavy international pressure, the agreement was made possible be-
cause the belligerents realised that this war could not be won militarily, and they 
therefore sought a political solution that could bring political benefits. Some have 
argued that the Ceasefire Agreement was the result of opportunistic calculation 
of the belligerents rather than a commitment to a political settlement (Rogier 
2004). The ceasefire agreement changed little on the ground, as fighting contin-
ued as before, but it was nevertheless an important step on the road to peace. 
Firstly, the agreement separated the internal dynamics of the conflict from the 
external dynamics of the conflict. The agreement was signed by Congolese bel-
ligerents (DRC government, MLC, RCD-K/ML, and RCD-G) and foreign coun-
tries involved in the war – Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. It 
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called for the withdrawal of foreign troops and for addressing the security con-
cerns of these neighbouring countries. The Agreement thus (intended) to deal 
with the regional dimensions of the conflict (Davis and Hayner 2009, 12). It 
took, nevertheless, another few years before foreign troops would finally leave 
the Congolese territory. It was only when the peace process became a reality that 
neighbouring countries decided to withdraw (Prunier 2009b, 285-90).  
Concerning the national dimensions of the conflict, the Ceasefire Agreement 
called for an Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD), in which belligerents, but also 
non-armed political opposition and civil society – les forces vives – were invited 
to participate. The inclusion of not only political parties that had not actively par-
ticipated in the war, but also of civil society marked the inclusive character of the 
ICD. The Dialogue process was in that sense more than a peace negotiation pro-
cess, and shared characteristics with a National Conference (Robinson 1994b). 
The Ceasefire Agreement also called for a UN Peacekeeping mission to monitor 
and observe the implementation of the agreement. It meant the birth of MONUC 
(Mission de l’Organisation des Nations Unies au Congo), a peacekeeping mis-
sion that would develop from a mere observation mission into an enormous mili-
tary and civil peace building mission. The agreement may have been hardly im-
plemented, but it did lay the fundamental foundations for a peace process.  
The ICD itself was a troubled process, mainly because of obstructions the then 
President of the DRC, Laurent-Désiré Kabila (International Crisis Group 2000, 
79-82). This all changed with the installation of Joseph Kabila as President, when 
his father was assassinated in January 2001. The young and politically inexperi-
enced Joseph Kabila was eager to win legitimacy and support with the interna-
tional community and the Congolese people, and sought to achieve this by re-
starting the preparation for the ICD. It was a difficult process, which after several 
failed attempts to come to an agreement resulted in the Global and All-Inclusive 
Agreement, known as the Sun City Agreement of December 2002 between the 
belligerents, political opposition and civil society actors (Apuuli 2004, 73-74, 
Mbata B. Mangu 2003, 164-65). By giving civil society and the international 
community such a prominent role in the transition process, the agreement won 
legitimacy as being more than an elite pact among belligerents, but rather a 
roadmap for the a new DRC. The transitional constitution was adopted in April 
2003 and a transitional President (Joseph Kabila), transitional Government and 
transitional Parliament were sworn in (Mbata B. Mangu 2003, 168). Political po-
sitions were shared among the signatories according to a power sharing formula. 
All signatories were represented in the transitional institutions. The Accord cre-
ated a Presidency structure that was both a necessity and a challenge: all 3 main 
belligerents and the political opposition were included in a model that has been 
called the “1+4” (one President and four Vice-Presidents). The general elections 
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of 2006 completed the post-war transition process. The elections were a land-
mark to end this troubled phase in Congolese history and marked a new begin-
ning. Despite the euphoria of the successful elections– successful in the sense 
that they were declared free and fair, and did not trigger a relapse into war as was 
feared by many – it was only a first step in a process of liberal peace building.   
Research problem 
The query that stands at the beginning of this PhD research rose during that ini-
tial post-electoral period in 2006-7 when I was living and working in the Congo. 
Everybody was talking the talk of peace, democracy and development, but some-
how, already early on in the post-war process, it became evident that these dis-
courses were little more than a pretence that seemed to cover something we ei-
ther did not want to see, or pretended we did not see, or perhaps we never saw at 
all. I am not referring to the extensive accusations and problems of corruption 
that hamper development projects and the rebuilding of country and state nor of 
the infamous interests of the international community in the Congo, both of 
which are often brought up as reasons for why the Congo seems to be stuck in 
cycles of violence and underdevelopment. What I refer to is the notion that de-
spite the mutual talk of democracy and development, there appeared a disconnect 
between the international and the local engaged in these processes, and by conse-
quence, that the labels of ‘democratisation’ and ‘peace building’ seemed inade-
quate and incapable to capture the ongoing processes.  
To speak of peace or the liberal peace in the Congo is paradoxical considering 
the ongoing violent conflict in some parts of the country. The term ‘peace’ is sel-
dom used by Congolese people to describe the current situation in their country. 
Perhaps it may not be adequately described as liberal democracy or peace, but it 
would be unfair to argue that nothing has changed since the signing of the peace 
agreement. How can we define this process, and how can we understand it with-
out resorting to the overtly easy and cynical perspective of a return to ‘Mobu-
tism-without-Mobutu’? But if we are witnessing the installation of a new Mobu-
tist-type regime, how is this possible to occur under the watchful eyes of the 
agents of the liberal peace who even largely fund this process? If the blueprints 
of the liberal peace cannot capture de process the Congo is currently undergoing, 
how can we learn to understand these local processes? 
This thesis aims to explore ways to understand these processes and focuses on 
the National Assembly as a site of liberal peace building. The National Assembly 
is an important site of liberal peace building, but also a site that receives much 
critique for being part of the problem of the failures of democratic governance in 
the country. Besides its important role in the functioning of a democratic political 
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system, it is an interesting institution because of the importance that is given to 
legislative elections in democratising and post-war states. However, despite all 
the attention from donors, INGOs (International Non-Governmental Organisa-
tions) and academia for elections, democratisation and post-war institution build-
ing, there is surprisingly little academic interest in the legislature as an institution 
itself (with the exception of Barkan 2009b, Lindberg 2010c). The legislature in 
newly democratising countries is a much under-researched institution. My re-
search will therefore also add to our understanding of an institution that is con-
sidered to be of prime importance for a new democracy, but of which functioning 
in the case of the Congo and other African countries we know very little. 
Liberal peace building has received much criticism as a top-down elitist pro-
ject. This research focuses on the National Assembly in recognition of the im-
portance of governance institutions, while avoiding reproducing the top-down 
and institutionalist focus of peace building. Engaging with peace building cri-
tique that will be discussed in chapter one, this research focuses on individuals 
that make the institution of the National Assembly function in the way it does, 
and the local agencies that are hidden within. The research therefore engages 
with MPs and their agencies. They are agents not of the liberal peace or of any 
other defined process, but as agents that steer an undefined dynamic of political 
(re-)organisation towards an undefined objective, in the context of the liberal 
peace. This outcome is referred to as ‘democracy’ by international donors as well 
as local actors, but the meaning that this term democracy entails is undefined. 
The objected outcome thus also remains undefined.   
I use a critical lens that emphasises local agencies to focus on the insights of 
how the processes I am interested in take shape and which hidden agencies exist 
beneath and next to the discourses of the liberal peace in the Congo. Being inter-
ested in these local agencies, I have chosen to focus on practices and the discur-
sive frames that shape these practices. It is a query into local agencies in the lib-
eral peace and asks how these local agencies ‘consume’ democracy – how they 
use it, negotiate it, manipulate it, instrumentalise it, but also reject, resist and 
adopt it, and make it their own. It is thus a study in the use of democracy by 
looking at the processes and practices of consumption, not on the ‘outcome’. 
This is a deliberate choice both for practical and ontological reasons. On the one 
hand this ‘outcome’ has not materialised yet, and perhaps will not materialise in 
the near future, or perhaps at all. This study concerns the period 2006-2011, the 
period of the first legislature of the Third Republic. The period is labelled post-
transitional because it followed the transition period (2003-6) but it is in fact any-
thing but ‘post’-transitional. It is itself a period of transition, a time of instability, 
uncertainty and quest towards re-establishing the political. It is inadequate to 
speak of ‘democracy’ as if it is (semi-)stable and thus possible to analyse it as a 
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phenomenon. Instead, we should recognise the instability of the political situa-
tion, the practices of which I seek to analyse. On the other hand, it is an ontologi-
cal necessity to focus on process and practices instead of outcome. Any ‘out-
come’ that may or may not occur in the DRC at some stage can only be meaning-
fully understood through understanding political practices of its agents. An in-
depth study of these practices in this so-called ‘post-transitional’ situation can 
thus provide meaningful insights in the processes of the adoption or installation 
of liberal democracy as part of a project of liberal peace in a post-war country.  
Such an approach demands a consideration of the concepts of the West and the 
local which are used as each other’s opposites. I will use the term ‘local’ to refer 
to that what is Congolese. The term ‘local agencies’ thus refers to Congolese 
agencies – agencies performed by Congolese actors. Although I chose to use 
such a generic term, this does not mean that I do not recognise that the local is a 
multitude of diverse agents and agencies. Although I underline Richmond’s con-
cern with the ‘local’ and its representation of a more authentic local that lies be-
neath the often externalised civil societies and other agencies, I will maintain the 
term ‘local’ (Richmond 2011b, 13-14). Instead of distinguishing a local from a 
local-local, I use the term local while recognising its ambivalence. This ambiva-
lence with respect to its externalisation, co-optation or authenticity is an implicit 
issue in the analysis of local agencies and their engagements with liberal peace 
building.  As will be further developed in chapter two, I understand these agen-
cies as being relational and therefore both temporal and situational. The local and 
local agencies can thus be urban, rural, elitist, popular, mass based, and various 
relational combinations possible. I also use the terms Congolese, the Congo and 
the DRC as if it represents a coherent entity. Evidently, it does not. Each locality 
or region has its own dynamics due to its situational circumstances, its socio-
economic reality, and its political dynamics. Despite this great diversity among 
different regions, I have teased out commonalities in political practices that have 
emerged in the different places I have conducted research. Nevertheless, when I 
speak of ‘the Congo’ and ‘Congolese people’ it should be taken into account that 
this concerns diversity as well as that the scope of my research was limited to 
Kinshasa and the provinces of South Kivu and Bas Congo. However, my obser-
vations have been confirmed in other localities in the country to which I have 
travelled in the context of other projects. 
The West or the liberal is more difficult to define because not only do I use the 
term myself, but so did my Congolese respondents, and not necessarily always 
with the same meaning. Particularly in chapters three and four does the term ‘the 
West’ occur regularly in the narratives of my respondents. The West in this sense 
has meaning as the non-local. Both terms ‘the West’ and ‘the local’ are thus only 
meaningful as each other’s other. My Congolese respondents often referred to the 
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‘West’ to refer to European and American actors, as well as international agen-
cies (UN, IFIs) and locally co-opted actors that represent ideals and pursue the 
liberal peace. In this thesis I will use the term ‘the West’ following Congolese 
parlance when representing Congolese narratives. I will use the term ‘the liberal’ 
instead, to refer not so much to an actor or group of actors but to refer to an inter-
est, namely that of the pursuit of liberal peace building by a variety of actors, 
while recognising that this is far from a unified group of actors or a coherent 
agenda.  
Some comments on the use of the term ‘le pouvoir’ are also necessary. In my 
discussions with people in Congo about politics, people often spoke of ‘le pou-
voir’ (power), often making a sign with their hands indicating something that can 
best be described as ‘up there’. When I asked to what or to whom the term le 
pouvoir refers for them, I would get a vague answer. Le pouvoir in general refers 
those in power, but who or what institution this is, is left undefined. In some con-
texts it means the President, in others it refers to the infamous invisible presiden-
tial clique; but it could also refer to the President’s twin sister, the ruling party, 
the governing coalition, or more broadly the block where power and wealth come 
together. Often people do not actually know, and just refer to that almost mythi-
cal centre of power that is both mysterious and appealing, as well as terrifying. 
Although in the eyes of many members of the electorate MPs are part of the cir-
cles of power, they are in general themselves not part of le pouvoir. However, 
individual MPs can be part of le pouvoir for their specific roles and relations they 
might have beyond being an MP. For instance, some members of the presidential 
clique are also MPs, some high party representatives are MP, and some MPs 
have specific close relations with the Presidency that gives them access to certain 
circles and more gravitas than their fellow MPs. ‘ 
The common use of the notion of le pouvoir means that the concept of power 
is opaque – people do not know who or what institution holds which powers. 
They do not know who speaks when certain messages are given and orders are 
passed, and it confirms a real and present distance between people and their rul-
ers. But what it also tells us is that it is not considered relevant whether le pou-
voir refers to the President or his powerful clique, the party or the executive, be-
cause it is all considered to be one and the same. Power may just be opaque, but 
the term also signifies general ignorance. I will use Congolese parlance and 
speak of le pouvoir instead of forcibly trying to define who or which institution it 
refers to on each occasion and ‘translate’ le pouvoir into those terms. Doing so 
would be inappropriate, and it would alter the meaning of peoples speech and 
understandings significantly. 
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Research design and methods 
Some comments on research strategy and methodology are in place. In order to 
centralise local agencies I have chosen for an approach that focuses on people 
and their practices. In order to do so, I have borrowed ideas from institutional 
ethnography. Institutional ethnography perceives institutions (i.e. institutional-
ised practices) as ethnographic objects that are discursively produced and can be 
ethnographically analysed (Escobar 1995, 107, Smith 2006). This approach thus 
enables an analysis of political practices performed by local agencies that occur 
within the context of the liberal peace. The research thus looks at these practices 
– either performed or discursively constructed – as agencies through which de-
mocracy is consumed by MPs and by MPs in their relations with others.  
Before starting field research in the DRC, I identified and analysed practices, 
and their concepts, repertoires and processes, based on secondary material. This 
was complemented by interview material, observation material, and additional 
(primary and secondary) textual materials collected during field research. A pro-
cess of gradual development of the research was anticipated.  The research was 
in this sense an ‘open ended enquiry’ in which the point of departure and the case 
under investigation was clear, but the direction of the research would unfold 
gradually following threads during the research process (DeVault and McCoy 
2006, 23).  
In order to further navigate through the vast field of political practices, I have 
identified a number of events or cases that I felt were both politically relevant as 
well as rich cases to explore political practices in response to different political 
questions. Although it may have been potentially restricting my data, the ra-
tionale behind this choice was that it would enhance the depth and quality of in-
formation I would gather, although be it on a limited number of cases and events. 
Based on previous experience with conducting interviews with a variety of re-
spondents on political issues in the Congo (2006-7), I foresaw that it would be 
difficult (or impossible) to acquire the kind of responses I am seeking if I asked 
direct questions. Cliché as it may sound, I was aware of respondents’ (particular-
ly Congolese politicians and civil society) tendency to give politically correct 
answers, i.e. speak in an official discourse and say what they would think I want-
ed to hear (Chabal 1996, 46). I also foresaw a problem in the case our discussion 
would move to that politically correct discourse because it would be very diffi-
cult to move to the subjective practices of consumption. Secondly, I expected 
that many of my respondents would be uncomfortable talking about their own 
political practices and opinions directly. Because I had limited time on the 
ground and with the individual respondents, I could not take an ideal ethnograph-
ic approach and slowly but surely win my respondents’ confidence and trust. I 
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therefore needed a more focussed approach while maintaining as much of the 
open ended nature of my approach as possible. Working with cases provided this 
focus. 
Another advantage of discussing cases and events was that by asking respond-
ents to give their interpretation of the events, political practices were indirectly 
discussed. These practices were thus not discussed as such, but featured in the 
context of an event in which they acquired meaning and sense. Also, by discuss-
ing the same events with different people, and different groups of respondents, it 
was easier to compare their take on occurring practices and reflect on them with 
respect to those of others in the field. Finally, it allowed people to talk about how 
they themselves participated in these political practices, without being (feeling) 
directly under scrutiny. It enabled them to talk about others, their colleagues, 
those in power, the electorate, civil society, the international community, as well 
as themselves (albeit often covertly).  Some of the cases I identified seemed very 
relevant beforehand but brought up little material, whereas other cases came up 
during the research in the field. The case study chapters that follow will not dis-
cuss these cases individually, although the case material will be clearly visible 
throughout the text.   
I have spent six months doing research in the DRC, divided over three re-
search visits between October 2009 and September 2010. During the last ten 
months of the writing-up process I was also based in the DRC. Most of my re-
search was done in the capital Kinshasa, where Parliament is based and where 
most international support for democratisation as well as (I)NGO activities are 
located. I have conducted interviews with MPs, Political Party representatives, 
cabinet Ministers, local authorities, local and international NGOs, and members 
of the international community, as well as with villagers and unorganised indi-
viduals in a ‘micro trottoir’ setting. I have also been able to participate in politi-
cal party and NGO activities of various kinds – capacity building workshops, 
mock parliamentary sessions of the youth wing of a political party, political 
campaigning, open air discussion forums. After I was granted access as a re-
searcher, I was able to do much observational research in the Parliament itself. I 
have been able to sit in the audience during parliamentary debates and I have 
spent several weeks working with the parliamentary staff from their offices in 
Parliament, studying documents in the parliamentary archives and learning about 
the inner workings of the institution.  
To research practices of consumption by MPs in their interaction with their 
constituencies, I have selected three sites. South Kivu province (the Capital 
Bukavu and surrounding villages), a province which has overwhelmingly voted 
for Kabila at the 2006 elections and where MPs are all members of the ruling 
coalition. Secondly, Bas-Congo province (the cities of Boma, Moanda, Tshela 
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and the villages of the Bas-Fleuve area), a province which has largely not voted 
for Kabila in the 2006 presidential elections although its parliamentary represent-
atives have joined both opposition as well as majority. Finally, a third site I have 
researched is Kinshasa itself. Kinshasa has overwhelmingly supported the oppo-
sition in the 2006 elections, although a sizable part of its population supports op-
position party UDPS (Union pour la Démocratie et le Progrès Social) and sub-
sequently boycotted the elections.3 President Kabila and its ruling coalition has 
little support in Kinshasa, and as with many other capital cities, people are politi-
cally much more vocal than in most other parts of the country.  
The individual and group interviews I have conducted were of a semi-
structured character in which a number of topics and issues were discussed with 
the respondents, aimed at letting the respondent express himself freely without 
being restricted by questionnaires or my own preoccupations. I have approached 
interviewing in the broad sense of ‘talking with people’, which includes a variety 
of forms of exchange, such as formal and planned one-on-one interviews, to in-
formal ‘on the spot’ discussions, discussions during observation work, as well as 
talking with more than one person at the same time (DeVault and McCoy 2006, 
22). In agreement with respondents I have anonymised my interviews in the ref-
erences. Interviews of an informal nature have been an important source for the 
research process itself. For example, in the reception areas of offices or in public 
transport there are often lively discussions about the news, recent events, or any 
other topic related to the work of the office. Participation in such discussions – 
during the often long waiting time before an official interview – was often a 
wonderful opportunity to gain insights, leads and threads. Although such collect-
ed information and data may not be directly used in the thesis itself, it has been 
an invaluable source of information to help roll the research along.  
Observation also has been a valuable source of information. As with infor-
mation collected from informal interviewing, observations feed further interview-
ing, and vice versa: ‘Experiential data, whether from interviews or observations, 
(…) inform a method, allowing researchers an entry to social organisation for the 
purpose of explicating the experiences’, i.e. ‘to write back into the account of 
experiences the social organisation that is imminent, but invisible in them’ 
(Campbell 2006, 95). Campbell’s argument is that observations can be given a 
formal place in research strategies and data collection. By actively seeking to use 
them when applying other techniques (interviews, text analysis), that is, by fol-
lowing-up observations with other research techniques, they can be an important 
resource and have a place in research techniques beyond a mere field diary.  
                                                          
3  UDPS boycotted the 2006 elections and asked its supporters not to register themselves as voter and 
boycott the elections. 
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Observation is continuous, during interviews, travelling in public transport, 
just walking around in the city, sitting in the audience at parliamentary sessions, 
etc. I have kept a field log in which I have transcribed my observations and to 
which I will occasionally refer in my referencing. I have used a ‘generous con-
ception of work’, the understanding that work can include doing all kinds of 
things, including doing nothing (Diamond 2006, 51). This concerns the research-
er (field research and ethnography in particular is ongoing, as long as you are in 
the field you are always observing, questioning, thinking, and gaining insights) 
but also the people under study. The in Congo common situation of people sitting 
in offices with empty desks, reading newspapers, or proverbially (or even literal-
ly) stare at the ceiling is significant part of work in the Congo that is ‘generously 
understood’. Such a generous conception of work is important because it enables 
a broader conceptualisation of the practices under study than merely one that fo-
cuses on people and their formal functioning. MPs that linger in the entrance hall 
of Parliament building are thus performing their identity as an MP and are work-
ing. 
 
Positionality and reflexivity 
My research in the DRC has thus been a combination of making use of secondary 
sources and a variety of primary sources – data from interviews, observation, 
talking to people, personal experiences. Although such a research method greatly 
enriches research data and analysis, it is not without problems. In November 
2009 I visited a Street Parliament in Kinshasa, where people discuss current po-
litical affairs on the street corner. A Congolese friend and former street parlia-
mentarian himself had arranged the visit and went with me. I was welcome to 
visit, listen, observe, and speak with them during their daily street-corner discus-
sions. Although we had made efforts to arrive as inconspicuous as possible (by 
public transport and casually on foot, carrying no camera or other equipment) we 
had attracted much attention since our arrival. I was a white woman in a part of 
the city where white people are a rarity, talking to a group of only men. A crowd 
had curiously gathered to see what I was doing here, and what I was talking 
about with these political activists. The street parliamentarians did not seem 
afraid to talk to me. They spoke openly about themselves and their activities, and 
the problems they and the country in general faced. Then all of a sudden there 
was some commotion and the talk switched directly from French to Lingala, 
thereby completely shutting me out of what was happening. One of the leaders of 
the group was pulled away by a few people in civilian clothes. My friend whis-
pered to me ‘we’re leaving’. Although I realised quickly that I should really 
leave before things could get out of hand, and that Congolese are better capable 
of sorting these situations out when I do not interfere then when I do, it did not 
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feel right to walk away from this situation. Two street parliamentarians followed 
me while my friend was dragging me away. I thanked them, shook their hand, 
and asked what had happened, and whether their colleagues would be ok. They 
said they were arrested, but that they would be freed either in a few days or a few 
weeks. They said this happens all the time. My friend insisted, ‘we should really 
go now’. He looked concerned. I decided to trust his judgement. It was the sensi-
ble thing to do, even though it felt morally wrong to me.  
The event was a clear case of direct unintended outcome of my research ac-
tivities on my research subjects. They had been arrested. Although this also hap-
pens regularly without my presence, I felt that this time it was directly linked to 
me. My visit was well planned with the research subjects in advance. My inter-
locutor had, as a former member, good connections with the group and trusted 
access. I had asked them whether they would be willing to meet me, and asked 
them to suggest a location where they would feel safe and confident to speak 
with me. I followed their assessments. During the weeks that followed I was very 
concerned and torn apart by feelings of guilt and the urge to do something. My 
friend said there was nothing I could do, nothing I should do and that I was in no 
way implicated in this. It felt different for me and I insisted that he would find 
out what happened to the people concerned, speak to them on my behalf. I knew 
I should not visit again in an attempt to ‘do something’ and get them in even 
more trouble. A week or so later my friend said he had spoken to the street par-
liamentarians, that all was well and that I should stop worrying now. I could not 
get any more details out of him. 
As this example shows, engaging with respondents in their daily activities in 
public makes ethical issues about unintended and uncontrollable outcomes of 
research more pressing than when doing just interviews (Eckl 2008, 188). In the 
events described – visiting the respondents’ activities, observing them and speak-
ing to them on location instead of setting up a more formal interview away from 
the site of action – the issues of positionality of the researcher that always exist 
in research relations, as well as the issue of unintended outcomes, became more 
pertinent and painfully evident. It emphasises the insurmountable distance be-
tween the researcher and his research subject. Although I was participating in the 
Street Parliament and observing events, the notion of participant observation is 
problematic. It presumes that outsiders can become temporal insiders (Bourdieu 
2003, 281). I cannot escape representing the Liberal in my engagements with my 
respondents, irrespective of my personal or political views or my research ap-
proach regarding the liberal peace (Kapoor 2004, 628). Having open relations 
with Congolese friends, and being able to have open discussions with my re-
spondents, elaborating my critical approach and my interest in local agencies 
does not liberate me from this complicity with the Liberal or the West. It is ines-
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capable, if not because of my nationality and skin colour, than in any case be-
cause of the academic tradition I have been educated in and in which this PhD 
research is contextualised. The described events emphasise that becoming an in-
sider was impossible in the context of my research in the Congo and that my 
presence became problematic. There are certain parameters and levels of asym-
metry which prevent this – skin colour, gender, being a foreigner, not speaking 
the street language, relative wealth, being looked-up at because of (perceived) 
social status based on skin colour, etc. There is thus always a distance between 
the researcher and his research subjects which cannot be overcome (Bourdieu 
1996, 19). The events were a direct consequence of my ‘outsiderness’ on the 
street corner.  
The events with the Street Parliamentarians developed more complexity re-
garding my positionality when, by coincidence, I met a member of the group a 
few weeks later in the entrance hall of the National Parliament building. He said 
he was very pleased to see me, because he feared I had not understood what had 
happened that morning in November. I said I had understood that people were 
arrested, and I asked him how they were. The gentleman said that nobody was 
arrested that day. All that had happened, he said, was that some political differ-
ences exist within the political party of the activists.4 An argument had risen over 
the issue among the street parliamentarians, and somebody had attacked one of 
the speakers. When my friend had pulled me away, there had been some fighting, 
but nothing serious. The gentleman asked me when I would come back again, 
emphasising that I was always very welcome.5  
It was a puzzling turn of events. Although I was pleased to hear that nobody 
was affected by my research in a way I had feared, many questions rose in my 
head. Through the interaction with my (politically marginalised, excluded and 
silenced) respondents of the Street Parliament, I had become an actor in my own 
research. Reflecting on the encounter with the gentleman in the Parliament build-
ing made me question my own ability to represent them and the implicit political 
tension that comes with it. For those that knew me, it was well-known that I 
spent my days in the Parliament building and that I could often be found in its 
corridors talking to MPs and staff. The street parliamentarian had no business 
there, and there was no plenary that day. How coincidental was our meeting in 
the Parliament building? Was it true what he said, or did he just want to make me 
believe that nobody was arrested in the same way as my friend had tried to en-
sure me there was nothing I needed to worry about? Did the man want to make 
me believe that things were not as bad as they were; an attempt to hide their 
                                                          
4  In that period, the political party concerned was internally heavily divided over the question whether 
to participate in the elections of 2011. 
5  Field notes, 20 November 2009. 
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shame and embarrassment about the situation in his country? Or did he want to 
take away my concerns hoping I would come back and that my work could be a 
platform for them as an opposition party? Perhaps there had indeed merely been 
a clash among members and I was lead away only because they did not want me 
– an outside observer – to see this, fearing the repercussions it could have for the 
legitimacy of the party. Does everything become politics for me because I am 
seeing everything through my ‘research lenses’ and is the daily reality perhaps 
more banal? And what is the significance of the location? On that chaotic street 
corner where people were shouting in Lingala and pushing each other around 
things looked very different than when reflecting on events in the entrance hall of 
the Parliament building. Why did the man speak to me now and here, and not 
then and there? 
Although I was on the one hand an outsider vis-à-vis my respondents, as an 
outsider I had become an actor in my own research and thus become an insider in 
the research. The complexity of the positionality of the researcher in his research 
goes much further than merely the issue of unintended outcomes. Bourdieu has 
emphasised the importance of recognising the positionality of the researcher vis-
à-vis his research field and subjects and argues for a reflexive approach 
(Bourdieu 1996, Bourdieu 2003, Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992, Wacquant 1989). 
Instead of eradicating the position of the researcher (so one can pretend to be a 
participant observer), or being apologetic (a direction in which Spivak pushes 
(1988)) it is important to recognise and acknowledge the distance between the 
researcher and his research subjects and his simultaneous complicity. It is thus 
important to recognise the complicity of the researcher in his research because 
such distancing is both impossible as well as undesirable (Brigg and Bleiker 
2010, 274). 
Spivak has emphasised the problematique of the general neglect of the com-
plicity of the researcher. Her concern is that by neglecting the central role that the 
researcher himself plays in speaking for and speaking about the research subject, 
the researcher tries to distance himself from the research topic but instead he 
privileges himself (Spivak 1988, 272, 92). By consequence, the researcher’s con-
ceptual codes are also silently privileged. Fabian has argued that anthropological 
research is inherently autobiographical, because the observations and statements 
about the people the researcher is writing about are paired with the observers’ 
experience. The researcher’s own experience is a necessary referent for his abil-
ity to represent the other (Fabian 1983, 88-91). Bourdieu therefore proposes the 
opposite of eradicating and ignoring the researcher himself from the research, a 
practice he finds false. Instead he suggests centralising the researcher by objecti-
fying the self. To ‘objectify’ the self means to pursue a constant critical reflexion 
on the self, the context that has shaped that self, and the hidden structures that 
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define the self (Bourdieu 2003, 282-3). This enables a more objective, honest, 
perspective on the research (which is ultimately a product of the researcher), the 
questions and views that have shaped and defined the research, and the rapport 
between the researcher and his research subjects. It means a recognition of the 
fact that there remains an unsolvable intellectual distance between the researcher 
and his research subjects, because research questions, interests and analytical 
frames are those of the researcher and not of the research subjects. The research-
er should thus ‘avoid putting the problematic that (he) construct(s) about them 
and the theory (he) elaborate(s) to answer it in their heads’ (Bourdieu 2003, 283).  
This does not only concern the more obvious aspects of the impact (intentional 
or non-intentional) a researcher has on his field. My meeting with the street par-
liamentarian in the Parliament building highlights that there is another level of 
complexity here as well. Not only should the researcher be aware of his own 
presence and the impact it has on the research process. He should also be aware 
of the reflexive capacity of his research subjects. They are not merely passive 
respondents shaped in the discursive frame of the researcher and as a referent to 
researcher’s experience. They also have the ability to act and to manipulate, to 
respond and be reflexive to the researcher, his work and themselves as partici-
pants in it. When asking questions the respondents have not asked themselves 
before, it triggers them to reflect which has an impact on them and possibly their 
future actions (Amborn 1993, 136). I am in no way inclined to overestimate the 
impact of my research or of myself as a researcher, but it is important to 
acknowledge the reflexive capacity of the respondents not just with respect to the 
topic of the research, but also with respect to themselves and their encounters 
with me or other researchers.  
In recognition of my own positionality as an outsider in the field I am re-
searching, as well as my complicity as an actor in my own research and the im-
pact this has on my engagements with respondents, I have strived to be reflexive 
about myself, my respondents, and about our interaction. What is the impact of 
my presence on people’s behaviour and what they say? Why are some people 
very keen to speak to me, while others aren’t? How do my respondents perceive 
me, and how does that impact our relation? What is being said, and what is not 
being said, and why? What shapes what I consider to be interesting and relevant, 
and how does this differ from what my respondents find relevant? I have con-
stantly asked myself reflexive questions with regard to my research experiences, 
data collection and analyses as an additional layer of analysis. Like with observa-
tional data, I have fed these reflexive data back into my research and it has been a 
very important source that shaped my research and helped me identify relevant 
themes and leads.  
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I would like to make two additional comments about myself vis-à-vis my re-
search field. A common reflex when thinking about the Congo is the notion of 
‘doing something to help’. I have often been asked the question how my work 
will help the Congo, or heard the suggestion that it is good that I am working on 
such research issues because there is the assumption that it will help. Let me 
straight away make it clear that I do not intend to help. I do not consider this an 
appropriate expectation of academic research as such, although if people that 
work in the business of ‘helping’ find my work useful to improve theirs, I would 
of course consider that a positive outcome. I am personally not convinced that 
Congolese people need ‘us’ and our (well-intended) help. My research is driven 
by curiosity, and intends to shed some refreshing light on things we in general do 
not understand well. Whether this ‘helps’ anybody is another matter. This notion 
of ‘helping’ is part of what Spivak is concerned with when she talks about the 
epistemic violence and violence to the subaltern as an unavoidable effect of so-
cial research (Spivak 1988, 280). One would then almost feel guilty about re-
searching a country like the Congo. Kapoor however emphasises that the argu-
ments from Spivak can help improve research practice without denouncing re-
search as a whole. He emphasises the need to ‘learn to unlearn’, that is, learning 
to listen and to establish an ethical relationship with the research subject (Kapoor 
2004, 641-2). This is my intention when rejecting the reflex of feeling the need to 
help. By not positioning myself as somebody that has something to give (help, 
either financially or in the form of ideas and knowledge), my engagements with 
my respondents were not corrupted by the notion of help. And more importantly, 
it meant that there is no need to listen to me, but that I should to listen to them. In 
other words, I did not have to speak, I had to listen, and learn how to listen. 
Finally, I have spent some time in the Congo before I started my PhD re-
search, am currently based in the DRC as a practitioner and have been able to 
travel extensively through the country. I have noticed in my own reflections how 
my conceptual understanding of and engagement with the people I am studying 
have grown and developed over time as a result of growing insight, more experi-
ences, but also of events, personal experiences, meeting new people and deepen-
ing friendships. This experience emphasises Fabian’s concern with the epistemo-
logical significance of time which enables for the researcher and researched to 
(to a certain extent) become part of each other’s past (Fabian 1983, 90). I can 
only emphasise how valuable a longer engagement with a country of study is, 
and hope that I will be able to continue to build on my experiences in the future. 
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Outline of the thesis 
The thesis has a conventional structure. The first chapter is dedicated to a review 
of literature. Situating the liberal peace in the Congo within liberal peace cri-
tique, the chapter discusses these critiques and explores routes to analyse peace 
building interventions in a more meaningful way. It discusses the liberal peace as 
a hegemonic structure, and as a top-down and elitist practice. It further discusses 
literatures that have emerged in response to these critiques, which have focused 
on local forms of peace building, local agencies and the emergence of hybridity.  
The following chapter brings the critique of the liberal peace as a top-down 
and institutionalist project and the demand for a primary concern with the people 
in whose name liberal peace interventions take place to Parliament as one of the 
institutions at the heart of liberal peace building. The chapter develops an ap-
proach that enables a perspective on what goes on beyond the institutional focus 
of mainstream approaches and that centralises local agencies in peace building 
processes. However, as opposed to most liberal peace critique, this focus on local 
agencies does not mean the deeming irrelevant of institutions and the elite level. 
Instead, the chapter develops an approach for the study of local agencies that are 
hidden within these institutions as a meaningful way to engage with these sites of 
liberal peace building. It develops the concept of convivial agency in processes 
of the consumption of democracy, and establishes an interest in agents’ practices 
as a level of analysis for engaging with questions of the local consumption of the 
liberal peace.  
The third chapter is a history chapter that continues the line of argumentation 
developed in the second chapter. It does not narrate history based on western 
produced historiographies on the Congo, instead it allows for Congolese to nar-
rate their own historiographies. Using the concepts of myth and mythistory, the 
chapter describes two narratives, that of the heroic victim and the tragic victim, 
as two central themes in Congolese reflection on their own history in respect of 
the present. In the chapter that follows (chapter four), the meaning of these narra-
tives for the present is emphasised. Through these narratives Congolese seek 
emancipation not from their own political leadership but from the West. The nar-
ratives produce disengagement from the liberal peace. The chapter also engages 
with a disengagement from the local which is implicit in the discourses of the 
liberal peace. These mutual narratives of disengagement produce what I, follow-
ing Homi Bhabha, call ‘hybrid spaces’. It is in these hybrid spaces that local 
agencies consume democracy and reinvent a political, within or outside the liber-
al peace.  
The final two chapters are analyses of these practices of the consumption of 
democracy in these hybrid spaces. The focus is on the National Assembly as a 
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site on which different actors come together either directly or indirectly (elec-
torate, MPs, Executive, IC). As such, it is a site of interaction, where convivial 
agency occurs. The chapters discuss the political practices performed by MPs as 
practices of a moral matrix of the father-family. Chapter five is concerned with 
the consumption of democracy by MPs and their electorate. It discusses the ex-
pected role of MPs as providers for their constituencies, and the preference for 
the informal in this interaction. By consequence, formalised and institutionalised 
practices of liberal democracy are irrelevant, and MPs parliamentary tasks are 
marginalised. Chapter six looks at the consumption of democracy at the internal 
organisation of the National Assembly and through the practices of the consump-
tion of democracy between the legislature and the executive. Using the father-
family logic and the rules of the political family, the chapter discusses the func-
tioning of the National Assembly and MPs relations with le pouvoir in terms of 
the rights and obligations of the political family. Both chapters emphasise a pro-
cess of the negotiation of the liberal peace through local agencies, while simulta-
neously the liberal peace provides new means and tools for the renegotiation of 
these local practices. 
  
2 
The liberal peace and critique  
– a literature review 
Despite its global dominance, the liberal peace is not without problems. Whereas 
Ikenberry agrees that the liberal global order is in crisis, he argues that the crisis 
is one of the governance of this order, not of the liberal order itself because it is 
as such not contested by any major powers nor do its members seek to overturn it 
(Ikenberry 2010). Critical perspectives on the liberal peace have argued the con-
trary and that the liberal peace is in crisis because of its underlying assumptions 
and praxis (Cooper 2007, Jahn 2007b, 227). The liberal peace is based on the 
assumption that enduring and self-sustaining peace can be achieved through po-
litical and market liberalisation (Paris 2004, 6, Richmond 2006, 292). Originating 
in a western tradition of utopian and apocalyptic thought and the belief in social 
engineering (Gray 2007), the liberal peace is thus highly idealistic. Liberals be-
lieve that they represent the better world that can be created (Williams 2006, 5). 
Because it intends to transform states, governance and whole societies, it is a po-
litical project that requires deep intervention at state as well as society level 
(Duffield 2001, 11, Richmond 2006, 295). Through what Duffield calls the ‘radi-
calisation of development’ development aid has become an important strategic 
tool in this project of liberal idealism (Duffield 2001, 39, Duffield 2002). Be-
cause underdevelopment has come to be understood as the main cause for con-
flict – itself a contested understanding (Cramer 2006) – development has become 
a peace building strategy that enables intervention at every level of state and so-
ciety, much beyond its original intervention levels of the stimulation of economic 
growth (Duffield 2001, 32).  
The liberal peace prioritises state- and governance institutions (Richmond 
2006, 299) – ‘building states to build peace’ (Call and Wyeth 2008). State build-
ing as a peace building practice works on the assumption that sustainable peace 
and development requires a functioning state in terms of ‘capable, autonomous, 
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and legitimate governmental institutions’ (Paris and Sisk 2009, 1-2). The argu-
ment is that peace building often fails because the institutional foundations that 
can manage conflict and maintain peace are not in place. The political and eco-
nomic liberalisation processes as part of the liberal peace can themselves be dis-
ruptive for vulnerable post-war states (Paris 2004, 168). The weakness of the 
state and its institutions is understood as a factor in the failure of peace building 
strategies (Call 2008, 12). Elections as a post-war transitional mechanism were 
particularly seen as problematic, such as the experiences in Angola (1992), Libe-
ria (1997) and Rwanda (1994) confirm (Lyons 2005, 61, Snyder 2000). The ar-
gument thus is that post-war peace building depends on a functioning state (Paris 
2004, 173, Paris and Sisk 2009, 3). State building seeks to reinstate state authori-
ty and build effective state institutions that can execute the core tasks of a liberal 
state (Fukuyama 2004, 135). Liberal state institutions have to be depersonalised, 
formalised and rationalised to perform their tasks (Chesterman et al. 2005, 2). 
Building effective state institutions is expected to make the state receptive for 
development and peace building strategies (Duffield 2007, 176, Whaites 2008).  
Although many studies regarding the liberal peace concern technical aspects 
of intervention strategies to achieve peace (Richmond 2005, 156), a more funda-
mental critique is concerned with its western ethno-centrism, its top-down and 
institutionalist approach and its subsequent disregard for the local context and the 
people in whose name liberal peace interventions take place by depoliticising 
interventions, silencing local voices and prioritising institutions over people and 
local agencies.  
The liberal peace as a hegemonic project 
The liberal peace has been criticised as a hegemonic project that (re-)produces 
power relations and seeks to discursively dominate the recipient post-war or 
failed state. It is a framework for relations of power between the West and the 
developing world in which the liberal democratic West dominates in terms of 
knowledge and morality over the developing world which only aspires to be lib-
eral democratic like the West. This global hegemony is performed through 
norms, political and economic structures, culture and ideology which originate in 
the West but which penetrate and dominate the rest of the World (Abrahamsen 
1997, 148). Peacekeeping, conflict resolution and –management are practices 
aimed at reproducing and enforcing this hegemony (Brigg 2008, 58, Pugh 2004, 
41, Zanotti 2006). It assumes superiority and practices hegemony over the ‘Oth-
er’ which it deems inferior, and which needs to be converted to adopt the liberal 
democratic identity and to become part of the liberal community. It has an inher-
ent sense of self-superiority and intolerance of difference (Hughes 2006).  
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The liberal peace, and the liberal idealism on which it is founded, assume that 
a better (safer, more peaceful and prosperous) world can be constructed. It is 
founded on European knowledge systems and history which it aims to export and 
repeat in other parts of the world (Darby 2006a, 6, see also Mudimbe 1988) to 
‘save it from itself’ (Harrison 2006). Although the liberal peace is itself a fairly 
recent phenomenon, it is founded on the same underlying assumptions that have 
defined Western intervention in the non-western world throughout most of the 
twentieth century. The liberal peace should be understood in its historic context 
of a long tradition of practices to modernise and westernise non-Western coun-
tries since the colonial period. The liberal peace and its core element of democra-
tisation and peace building-as-governance (Richmond 2006, 299) follow the 
same assumptions as modernisation policies did a few decades ago (Jahn 2007a).  
Following independence in Africa, countries have been expected to reproduce 
a European experience of modernisation and development. Political modernisa-
tion was seen as the only way forward by African political leadership of the in-
dependence era, as well as by the former colonial masters that had become do-
nors for development. It meant the incorporation into the western dominated po-
litical and state system (Davidson 1992, Huntington 1968, Meredith 2006, 143-
45). Post-colonial regimes failed to bring political and economic modernisation 
to their countries and instead turned the dream of independence into economic 
crisis, conflict and the establishment of authoritarian regimes. Structural Adjust-
ment Plans were introduced as a response, but failed and thereby further weak-
ened the state and its legitimacy. It was an attempt to force Africa to adopt west-
ern economic values, enforced by disciplinary measures. The historical narrative 
of economic development is paternalistic, arguing that (pre-modern) Africa 
should learn from the (modern) West and follow the economic development path 
that the West has already experienced, as if there exists only one modernity and 
one route towards it (Kapoor 2008, 25-29). After the fall of the Berlin Wall and 
the end of the Cold War, the Third Wave of democratisation in Africa made dic-
tatorial regimes fall, making place for (nominal) democracies. It did nevertheless 
not result in stable liberal democracies on the continent. On the contrary, many 
countries found themselves either in renewed dictatorship or in civil war, or a 
combination of the two (Huntington 1991, Ihonvbere 1996, Young 1999).  
The good governance agenda that followed expanded moralistic and paternal-
istic thinking over economic development in Africa to the level of governance 
and politics. It is built on ideal typical or romanticised (Richmond 2009c) notions 
such as that of ‘state’ or ‘civil society’, and has little attention for how such con-
cepts are socially embedded and given meaning (Chabal & Daloz 2006, 43). 
Moreover, what ‘good’ governance is, is not determined locally, but defined in 
the West. It thus not only implies that the West is the model, but also that the 
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West is the arbiter (Abrahamsen 2000, 32-36, Kapoor 2008, 29-31). The same 
counts for international treaties that set standards for respect for human rights. 
They emphasise western (cultural) notions of individual rights that are presented 
as universal and hegemonic (Kapoor 2008, 33-37). Such norm setting was also 
characteristic for colonial domination, that functioned simultaneously as authori-
ty and morality by introducing a totalitarian understanding of what was right (the 
colonial norm, its morals, its authority) and what was not-right (anything that did 
not recognise the norm) (Mbembe 2001b, 26). 
Postcolonial1 critique emphasises power in the practices of western interven-
tion in the non-western world and the inter-dynamics between the interveners and 
the intervened, with a perspective that is concerned with the centrality of the pe-
riphery and its agencies (Slater 2004, 20). Using Foucault’s notion of discourse 
and power, Said has argued that the West uses orientalism as a practice of domi-
nation over the non-Western Other (Said 2003).2 He argues that the Orient has 
for the West been ontologically stable. It has no authority over itself because it 
only exists in the way the West knows it. The West thus owns the Orient and ex-
ercises power over it. This western knowledge has changed only at the surface, 
but its ‘principle dogmas’ and ‘attitudes of cultural hostility’ have essentially 
always been the same (Said 2003, 3, 300, 290). Postcolonial emphasis on contin-
ued patterns of domination should not be mistakenly seen as essentialising the 
experience of colonial domination (Bayart 2010, 6). Instead it is an emphasis on 
patterns of cultural domination (Jabri 2007, 159). Said has emphasised that there 
is much more continuity in the relations between the West and the rest of the 
world than can be captured by the simple parameters of the colonial era (Said 
2003).  
Following Said’s critique on the discursive ownership of the non-western 
world, Spivak speaks of the ‘epistemic violence’ of the attempt to create the 
‘Other’ as the shadow of the self (1988, 280). The identity of the West as being 
modern requires an opposing identity of the other that is not modern. Modernisa-
tion theory thus translated a historical condition into a geopolitical one, and vice 
versa, i.e. the historical condition of pre-modernity is being projected on, and 
equated with, a spatial condition of the non-West or the Global South (Fabian 
1983, Ferguson 2006, 178, Slater 2004, 29-62). This raises questions about limits 
of accessibility to modernity for non-westerners (Ferguson 2002). Such epistemic 
violence has an impact on the non-Western Self. Mudimbe’s work highlights 
                                                          
1  Without taking position in the ’hyphen-debate’ about postcolonial/post-colonial (Shohat 1992), I will 
use the hyphenated term (post-colonial) to refer to the historic post-independence period and the un-
hyphenated term (postcolonial) to refer to postcolonial theory, studies and critique.  
2  Although Said and Fanon (1967) are considered to be the founders of postcolonial critique, its roots 
go back to resistance during the colonial era, such as for example the work of W.E.B, Dubois or Sol 
Plaatje and the Negritude movement of the 1940s and 1950s. 
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how it has affected African epistemologies and self-understanding (Fraiture 
2009, Mudimbe 1973, Mudimbe 1988). It turns the West into a source of self-
rectification for the non-West (Shih 2011). To emphasize this point, Chakrabarty 
suggests to ‘provincialise Europe’, to turn Europe into the periphery of moderni-
ty (Chakrabarty 2000a). The concern is that the non-European Other, has always 
been and will always remain an ‘Other’, never will it become ‘part of us’. Char-
krabarty points to exactly this problem inherent in the liberal assumptions that 
were the foundations of modernisation policies and the liberal peace.  
The liberal peace continues practices of orientalism that dominate, restructure 
and claim authority over non-western societies (Said 2003, 3). It is an orientalist 
practice of power and domination, a Foucaultian regime of truth that attempts to 
‘discipline’ and control the non-West (Abrahamsen 2000, Jabri 2010, 52, Zanotti 
2006). Critical perspectives that emphasise the power relations captured in the 
liberal peace offer a counter-hegemonic discourse that can critically engage with 
the way in which liberal democracy has become the ‘unchallenged regulative 
norm in relation to which all other forms of political community are to be 
judged’. Postcolonial critique emphasises the normative aspects of liberal demo-
cratic political modernity and enables a conceptualisation of political modernity 
in its own, local terms (Scott 1996, 18). Postcolonial studies as a critical ap-
proach is part of a broader critique of power and hegemony, domination, inequal-
ity, injustice, and bring valuable additions to the study of domination and rela-
tions of inequality anywhere in the world, whether it in the global West or the 
global South (Moore-Gilbert 2000, 12, Quayson 2000, 11).  
The essentialisation of the non-West as non-Modern and the West as modern 
enables and justifies a need to intervene, police and control (Slater 2004, 82-3). 
Dunn’s study of western conceptualisation of the Congo shows how perpetuated 
images of the Congo as continued ‘Heart of Darkness’ have had a profound im-
pact on international policies towards the Congo and have cumulatively enabled 
the shaping of the Congo in its current condition (Dunn 2003). The Congo has 
been constructed as a savage other that needs to be civilized. The liberal peace is 
therefore highly interventionist and imposing. It assumes power over the non-
liberal other which requires a form of temporary imperialism, a form of liberal 
democratic hegemony, without formal colonies (Chandler 2004, Ignatieff 2003, 
vii). This tension between the practice of far reaching intervention to enable the 
objective of self-determination and liberal freedom is a problematic contradiction 
within the liberal peace (Donais 2009, 16, Jahn 2007a, 90, Jahn 2007b, 222, 
Lidén 2011, 276). Emancipation and self-determination is to be achieved through 
the building of state. This means an interpretation of emancipation in terms of 
rights and freedoms, which ignores emancipatory claims based on needs, culture 
and custom (Richmond 2005, 150, Richmond 2011b, 12).  
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By temporarily filling the ‘sovereignty gap’, international interventions pro-
vide capacities that are perceived to be missing locally and which are required for 
a transition to liberal market democracy (Ghani and Lockhart 2008). Such an 
‘illiberal peace’ may be based on an international peace building consensus, but 
often lacks legitimacy locally (Richmond 2005, 175). Chopra’s (2000, 2002) 
work has shown that such ‘UN Kingdoms’ lack the essential local legitimacy and 
are highly problematic as a form of peace building. Ellis therefore argues for in-
novative forms of trusteeship in which local and international actors cooperate in 
the reconstruction of socio-political organisation, and the recognition of indige-
nous political structures as potential positive agents for reconstruction. The trus-
teeship formula will tackle the immediate issues of legitimacy and governance, 
while the recognition of indigenous structures as agents for state building is like-
ly to enhance local support for the state building project (Ellis 2005).  
The liberal peace is thus not a project of peace as such, but one of disposses-
sion that denies self-hood and agency in the name of assumed universally agreed 
and shared norms (Jabri 2010, 48, Richmond 2005, 112). The objective of self-
determination is kept discursively alive through the notions of ‘local ownership’, 
‘empowerment’, ‘stakeholders’ and ‘participation’ (Cornwall and Brock 2005). 
However, the use of such terms to legitimise practices of liberal peace building 
has received much criticism as merely paying lip-service to fundamental prob-
lems within the liberal peace. Ownership is not about autonomy but about shift-
ing responsibility for the implementation of externally designed policy solutions 
to local actors (Hughes and Pupavac 2005, 883). The same counts for the notion 
of ‘African solutions for African problems’. African solutions are expected to fall 
within internationally established norms (Ottaway 1999, 115). As such, it is more 
disempowering than empowering (Donais 2009, 7). Such terms are used to ‘sof-
ten-up the rougher edges of peace building’ (MacGinty 2010b, 352). These terms 
are merely aspirational, and have become cliché and meaningless because of 
overuse (Chesterman 2007). Because of these internal contradictions, some con-
sider state building as a practice of ‘organised hypocrisy’ (Egnell 2010). 
The use of buzzwords like ownership and participation serve a purpose in 
denying the power-relation between intervention and host communities. It pre-
tends that the West transfers its accountability and responsibility to domestic ac-
tors, while international actors merely play a facilitative role for capacity build-
ing and empowerment (Chandler 2004, 65, Chandler 2006, 8-9). Ownership is an 
essential part of a hegemonic project such as the liberal peace. Hegemony re-
quires coercion and persuasion to construct and govern it. The notion of owner-
ship is a tactic of persuasion of the hegemonic project of the liberal peace 
(Cornwall and Brock 2005, Slater 2004, 98, 103). Filling the ‘sovereignty gap’ is 
thus ‘empire in denial’, a practice which conflates the right to self-determination 
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with the capacity of the state in terms of good governance and which enables a 
highly invasive form of intervention through international organisations and in-
stitutional frameworks to establish the liberal peace (Chandler 2006, 32-6).  
Whereas Richmond draws attention to the silencing of local needs and wel-
fare, Chandler argues that institutionalist peace building practices ignore local 
societal demands that constitute politics and thus depoliticise an essentially polit-
ical process. The assumption is that the political process towards democracy in 
non-western states can be influenced and shaped by foreign intervention. But this 
is a radicalisation of external intervention into domestic policy making and ‘facil-
itates the erosion of ties linking power and accountability domestically’ 
(Chandler 2006, 48-50, Chandler 2008, 339-41). Liberal peace building consen-
sus thus undermines liberal peace building objectives. 
Top-down peace building in the Congo 
State Building is the most common practice of the liberal peace. It is problematic 
because it fails to build liberal democratic states (Richmond and Franks 2009). It 
relies on a mechanical metaphor that assumes that like broken machines, African 
states can be repaired (Ellis 2005, 136). Englebert and Tull (2008) argue that 
state building failures are caused by fundamentally flawed assumptions on which 
state building efforts are built. One of these flawed assumptions is the expecta-
tion that western institutions can be successfully transferred to Africa (Englebert 
and Tull 2008, 110). An argument prevalent with practitioners is that expecta-
tions of liberal democratic state building are unrealistically high and that more 
time is required – we expect too much and too soon (Brown 2011).  
However, liberal peace critique has emphasised more fundamental problems 
with state building. The international community’s ‘urge to engineer’ (Pugh 
1999) assumes that it has the capacity to bring peaceful transformation and re-
generation, where local people have failed to do so. But as Pugh points out, such 
processes result in strategies concerned with measurable output (e.g. DDR (Dis-
armament Demobilisation and Reintegration), elections, reconstruction projects, 
legal framework) and is less concerned with developing a reconstructing scheme 
that interacts with local norms and values (Pugh 2000, 3-4). It is a top down and 
technocratic intervention strategy (MacGinty 2011, 42). In addition to the already 
mentioned tension between the liberal ideals of self-determination and freedom 
and its need for far-reaching intervention to achieve this, the interventions itself 
are top-down and privilege institutions above people and communities 
(Heathershaw 2008, 607). The institutional approach to peace building assumes 
that people’s needs are best responded to by putting in place institutions that give 
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them rights (Richmond 2011b, 27). In effect, this privileging of institutions si-
lences and ignores local needs and cultures.  
The disconnect with local realities impacts on the local legitimacy of peace 
building. Various country case studies have shown that top-down interventions 
not only exclude the local population, but also fail to connect with the reality of 
social life. They lack legitimacy locally, may contribute to the reproduction and 
repetition of conflict, and hide problems at the societal level that continue to exist 
but do not connect with the institution oriented practices of liberal peace building 
(Cahen 2005, Chopra 2002, 995, Chopra and Hohe 2004, 292, Fanthorpe 2006).  
As MacGinty has observed, liberal peace building aims to put something in place 
that enables interaction with Western states. But although this drawing of states 
into the liberal world order may enhance international legitimacy, there are im-
portant legitimacy problems at home which are ignored by the liberal peace 
(MacGinty 2011, 41).  
Similar experiences occurred in the Congo. As the work of Autesserre has 
pointed out, the liberal peace in Congo has structurally ignored local needs, most 
notably those of an end to violent conflict. The liberal peace had a national level 
focus and ignored local level conflict, which was either deemed irrelevant for 
national level peace or expected to be ended as a consequence of national level 
peace. Autesserre argued that contrary to these assumptions, local level conflicts 
are not irrelevant for national level peace but actually sustained national level 
conflict. The main problem lies at the approach and perspective of the interna-
tionals on Congo, which enabled some practices while making others irrelevant 
(Autesserre 2006, Autesserre 2007, Autesserre 2009). These problems of ongo-
ing local conflict and the inability of outside interventions to respond adequately 
persisted in the post-transitional period, and continue to be a matter of great con-
cern as well as much frustration. There is thus a paradoxical situation in which 
there is talk of post-war peace building amidst conflict (Abass Ahamed 2006, 
Swart 2011) – a ‘violent peace’ (Aust and Jaspers 2006) – while silencing and 
ignoring these local conflicts to enable a perspective on the national agenda. Lo-
cal conflicts in Eastern Congo have come to be understood as normal and ac-
ceptable (Autesserre 2009) while simultaneously this savagery is unquestioningly 
constructed as a consequence of a lack of state. Peace and the improvement of 
the human condition of people in the Congo is considered to be only possible 
through the building of a liberal state through the liberal peace (Kabamba 2010). 
The elections were therefore a key instrument for ending the war and creating an 
enabling environment for post-war reconstruction, democratisation and state 
building (Chivvis 2007, 32, Lyons 2002).  
Much of the critique of the liberal peace in the DRC is concerned with the elit-
ist and exclusive nature and model of the peace building strategies. Mehler 
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(2009) argues that the power sharing agreement in the Congo reflected the nego-
tiators’ will to end the war rather than the population’s interests. Daley (2006) 
has thus described the peace building failures in the Congo as a failure due to the 
peace building model which is exclusive and relies too much on elites and politi-
cal leaders while excluding the masses of the population. She argues that rather 
than blaming the political leaders for the failure, the basic mistake lies with the 
model that relies on these actors. The power sharing agreement that was at the 
heart of the peace agreement has been criticised for being merely a short term 
solution to end the conflict that turned out to be a source of conflict during its 
implementation. It was shaky at best, only partly implemented, did not foster 
confidence among the former belligerents (Rothchild 2005) and was over-
ambitious (Lemarchand 2007). In addition, Lilly (2005) has argued that the pow-
er sharing formula in effect created political fiefdoms with each group trying to 
maintain control over their own circle of power. The power sharing formula on 
which peace building was to be founded in practice enabled ex-belligerents to 
behave in office the same way as they behaved during the war. Such power shar-
ing deals recycle elites and as a consequence stimulate violence and conflict 
(Tull and Mehler 2005). The political institutions of the transition period were 
dominated by ex-belligerents who distrusted each other (Kabemba 2005, 168) 
and resembled a ‘coalition of the unwilling’ (Vircoulon 2007, 35). The apparent 
unwillingness of the political leadership of the transition to implement the transi-
tional agenda has been a main concern during the transitional period. They want-
ed to maintain their positions and were united only in their interests to share the 
spoils, profiting from the no-war-no-peace situation and the lawlessness in the 
business of natural resource exploitation (Fatal Transactions 2006, Rogier 2003, 
Smis and Trefon 2003). According to Englebert and Tull local elites do not nec-
essarily see reconstruction as a new beginning after crisis and failure, but rather 
as ‘ongoing competition for power and resources’, now ‘facilitated by power 
sharing agreements, increases in foreign aid and lax international oversight’ 
(2008, 121). Relying on them may not necessarily help the objectives of the lib-
eral peace. Because such power sharing models are elite oriented, they exclude 
the population at large from peace making deals.  
Recognising the potential difficulties of working with Congolese belligerent 
leadership to implement the liberal peace, the international community applied an 
intervention model of close engagement without directly assuming government 
tasks. The most clear example of this form of intervention is CIAT (Comité In-
ternational d’Appui au Transition), a committee of foreign Ambassadors that 
supported the transitional institutions and transitional leaders in the implementa-
tion of the transitional agenda, but that in effect was in constant battle with the 
Congolese political leadership over these matters (De Goede and Van der Borgh 
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2008, 121). CIAT is a telling example of how local actors are considered to be 
without capacity and ability for self-government and therefore require supervi-
sion (Richmond 2011b, 59).  
In the Congo, much international engagement for state building has so far re-
sulted in little tangible improvements in the daily lives of the majority of the 
population. This results in struggles over statehood and the reconstruction of the 
state between central and peripheral actors. The continuous postponing of the 
implementation of the plans for decentralisation, particularly of tax revenues, 
with the approval of the donor community is a source of contestation between 
central and peripheral actors which destabilises the country on occasion and un-
dermines efforts of state building, such as the case of Bas Congo province (Tull 
2010). Bøås argues that the conventional approach of post-war state building that 
seeks to build from the capital into the peripheral areas ignores this dynamic of 
the formation political organisation in these peripheral areas. He thus argues that 
instead of ignoring these, existing power structures such as developing in eastern 
Congo should be reviewed and considered a reality that requires engaging rather 
than ignoring (Bøås 2010).  
An underlying argument in these studies that emphasise the importance for 
state building to recognise local, existing political realities instead of dismissing 
them to make place for state building blue prints and models, is that international 
interventions need to be more responsive to local contexts and needs if they want 
to be successful. Eriksen identifies this as one of the main reason for internation-
al failures of state building in the DRC. He argues that the standardised approach 
is not sufficiently adapted to local contexts while the objective state to be built is 
based on a non-negotiable concept in which Congolese political elites have no 
interest (Eriksen 2009). In addition, it has been argued by others that the effect of 
western interventions has at best been ambiguous, has had little impact on long-
term stability and even had a negative impact on domestic politics. According to 
some, this is mainly due to the fact that western interventions are driven by self-
interest and risk-aversion which enabled conflict to continue (Gegout 2009, 
Marriage 2010). 
Critique on the liberal peace in the Congo is thus either concerned with the 
model of the liberal peace, arguing that it is exclusive and does not take local 
needs and local context sufficiently into account because it is based on a general 
blue print, or that it is short-sighted and prioritises short term needs over long 
term perspectives. It focuses on the main actors, be it unwilling political and mil-
itary leaders or the failure of the donor or international community to recognise 
and understand the local context. A general underlying argument in the critique 
of the focus of state building as a practice of the liberal peace is thus that it is 
disconnected from the (political) cultures and socio-economic structures of the 
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host societies.  Despite this critique and the recognition of the need for better un-
derstanding of or adaptability to the local context is important, there are surpris-
ingly little studies that actually engage with this problem and aim to provide the 
missing analyses of forms of local engagements and local agencies.  
In Congo, as well as in other countries, these top-down interventions thus fail 
to deliver the liberal ideals of emancipation and self-determination. Post-
developmentalist critique has argued how development practices that are part of 
the liberal peace objectify the developing world and its people. The ‘reductive 
repetition’ of development discourse reduces the diversity and different cultures 
of the developing world into a homogenous set of essential deficiencies 
(Andreasson 2005). It turns the people that occupy the developing world into 
‘objects of knowledge and management’, that are re-invented as the ‘assisted’ 
(Escobar 1995, 23). They are perceived in their relation vis-à-vis de liberal peace, 
that is, in terms of what they have to contribute to the liberal project as a partner, 
a friend (e.g. civil society) or an obstruction, a foe (e.g. elites) (Heathershaw and 
Lambach 2008, 273). This objectification defines the developing world by its 
negatives – what it lacks, what it needs, what it is not. It is not liberal democratic, 
not peaceful, not developed, not modern, and it is consequently in need of assis-
tance to become so. Ferguson’s study on Lesotho shows how the conceptualisa-
tion of Lesotho as a Less Developed Country constructed a country ‘with all the 
right deficiencies, the sort that “development” institutions can easily and produc-
tively latch on to’. The constructed deficiencies justified the answers the West 
was willing to give, instead of producing an analysis of Lesotho’s problems that 
responded to the way in which the Basotho experienced them (Ferguson 1990, 
66,70). The West consequently becomes the necessary provider and assistant, 
while the partners are mere objects in their own development. Interventions that 
are aimed at assisting the non-West in acquiring what it lacks thus become justi-
fied and legitimate (Abrahamsen 2000, 18, Escobar 1995, 45).  
The objectification of the people concerned denies their political agency in 
these processes (Jabri 2010, 42). The answers to the needs of the objects of assis-
tance are not to be found in domestic (the object’s own) political agencies. The 
non-West is defined as an object that is in need of assistance and that requires 
fixing and constructing which is provided by the West. The liberal peace thus 
becomes an instrument of control which, as a hegemonic discourse, controls, dis-
ciplines or pacifies, contestable political orientations (Slater 2004, 102). This 
facilitates a ‘depoliticised problem-solving approach’ (Chandler 2006, 8). Such 
an approach is concerned with designing technologies and mechanisms to fix the 
needs of non-western countries and that develop them into the blue print of west-
ern liberal democracy. This technocratisation of development perceives devel-
opment to take place in isolation of processes of social change (Escobar 1995, 
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52) and indeed of domestic political agency. It does not allow for development to 
be seen in political terms or for political agency and a free will of local people to 
be a factor in these processes.  
Local peace building as a corrective for top-down liberal peace 
interventions 
Although the argument that peace needs to be grounded in local communities has 
been established (Azar 1990, Azar and Burton 1986, Lederach 1997), the critique 
of the liberal peace as a top-down practice that silences local agencies, voices 
and needs has lead to a call for the more genuine inclusion of local population in 
peace building activities, and emancipatory methodologies of peace building 
(Patomäki 2001, 725). Likewise, the failure of the liberal peace to establish 
peaceful liberal democracies and the emergence of a range of alternatives has 
also given rise to a renewed interest in the local and its role in the shaping of the 
outcomes of liberal peace interventions (Acharya 2008, 7). According to Rich-
mond, liberal peace building misses a peace building contract between the inter-
national and the local which could provide peace building interventions with le-
gitimacy locally, a legitimacy current peace building interventions are missing 
(2011b, 12).  
Based on a series of case studies, Richmond and Franks show how state build-
ing fails as a practice to deliver peace because it is extremely slow and it is una-
ble to engage with the recipient societies and their needs. While state building 
has legitimised top-down peace building, it fails to deliver this peace because it is 
unable to build a locally legitimate peace. A relapse into violent conflict is not 
unthinkable in many countries that have undergone peace building interventions 
for long periods of time and people’s daily lives have not been significantly af-
fected. They therefore suggest to separate state building from peace building, 
where the former is concerned with the political, economic and security architec-
ture of the state, while the latter focuses on the rights and needs of individuals 
living in the (post-) conflict environment (Richmond and Franks 2009, 181-85).  
After many years of liberal peace building, only a virtual liberal peace has 
been achieved in Cambodia, one which is perhaps only recognisable to interna-
tionals but that does not connect with local populations. This has enabled inter-
vention, conditionality and dependency, which has established norms which are 
not grounded in local custom and people’s lives (Richmond and Franks 2007). 
Perhaps the best illustration of how a top-down institutional approach fails to 
build peace is that of Kosovo, where liberal peace intervention promoted a plural 
democratic society, while establishing the institutions on which a singular Koso-
var-Albanian state would be founded on. In doing so, the top-down peace build-
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ing strategy had an inbuilt bias with regard to the question of the status of Koso-
vo and against its own peace building discourse. This enabled Kosovar Albians 
to co-opt the liberal peace building interventions for their own nationalist objec-
tive (Franks and Richmond 2008). Similarly, in Sri Lanka local actors have in-
strumentalised liberal peace building in pursuit of their own interests which has 
resulted in local peace building practices that were equally exclusivist as liberal 
peace building. Using this case, the author’s draw attention to the importance of a 
critical assessment of how legitimacy is locally constructed and how the liberal 
peace may influence these processes (Goodhand and Walton 2009, 319).  
Where local populations have been more actively involved in and consulted 
for the intervention strategy, peace building interventions have a better chance of 
success than when local populations have not been actively included, even 
though they might sympathize with the objectives (Boege 2011, Gizelis and 
Kosek 2005). Including local voices and grass roots initiatives may make outside 
interventions more legitimate and meaningful for the citizens concerned (Alger 
1989). Local peace building practices can counterbalance the technocratic and 
top-down nature of liberal peace building practices, because they are often partic-
ipatory and operate on a community level that is beyond the reach of liberal 
peace building practices (MacGinty 2008). They are also assumed to be more 
effective because they draw on local resources and are assumed to connect better 
and easier to local norms and expectations and are therefore expected to be more 
effective (MacGinty 2010a, 350). An exemplary case is that of the Rwandan 
Gacaca courts, originally an instrument to deal with community justice for small 
crimes and disputes, but turned into community courts to deal with genocide cas-
es after the 1994 genocide. This has compromised the authenticity, legitimacy 
and ultimately the effectiveness of these practices (MacGinty 2010a, 356-58).  
Local civil society organisations are co-opted in peace building strategies to 
complement the actions of external actors and represent the local. However, in-
stead of supporting local initiatives, peace building seeks civil society structures 
that resemble the western example and often engage in a patronising and asym-
metric relation with their local partners, which potentially compromises local 
support (Lemarchand 1992, Pouligny 2005). They are co-opted in liberal peace 
building practices, and adapted to fit the norms, framework and objectives, 
thereby often outstretching their meaning and legitimacy (Bebbington 1993, 278, 
MacGinty 2011, 61). In a study on regional peace building initiatives in the Great 
Lakes Region, the author found that local civil society organisations were as-
sumed to be in favour of peace, to be politically neutral or apolitical and to repre-
sent the local population (Van Leeuwen 2008, 396). They were therefore consid-
ered to be no party to the conflict and have no other interests than ‘peace’. The 
study shows how local NGOs are considered to be part of the project of the liber-
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al peace and its objectives of a regional approach despite the fact that ‘many or-
ganisations found it difficult to analyse the regional character of conflict, and to 
establish how to take account of it in their programmes’ (Van Leeuwen 2008, 
410).  
In an attempt to be inclusive and make the peace agreement more than a ‘war-
lords’ peace’, Congolese civil society were included in the peace process in 
recognition of the important role it has played in political developments in the 
country since the early 1990s (Boshoff and Rupiya 2003). It may have initially 
increased the legitimacy of the peace agreement, but this extreme co-optation of 
civil society in liberal peace building is not without its problems. Not only was 
civil society co-opted in the institutions and could therefore no longer play its 
role as watch dog, it also made civil society elitist, thereby disconnecting it from 
the community level. Paradoxically, the all-inclusive peace agreement also meant 
that the few parties that did not participate (UDPS and PALU - Parti Lumumbiste 
Unifié) were almost completely sidelined and silenced (Willame 2007, 81-2). 
The peace process was thus disconnected from the Congolese people and became 
an elitist project that was seen as a collaboration of Congolese elites and the in-
ternational community thereby silencing the needs and aspirations of ordinary 
Congolese people (De Goede 2011).  
This inclusion of local civil society excludes the far majority of local popula-
tions as well as important changes that occur (Pouligny 2005, 507). Such en-
gagements with local civil society does more harm than good as it pretends to be 
inclusive of local voices while it is little more than instrumental. This ‘romantici-
sation of the local’ is the definition and identification of the local to locate it 
within the framework of the liberal peace building. It can mean the perception of 
the local as exotic and unknowable, as without agency, as devious and uncivil, or 
as a repository of indigenous capacities that can be co-opted in liberal peace 
building (Richmond 2011b, 57-59). This practise of including local voices by co-
opting local civil society organisations in a top-down intervention model, not by 
accepting them as alternative voices, reproduces a blind spot in liberal peace 
building. Richmond therefore differentiates between the local and the local-local 
to highlight the difference between the co-opted local elites and civil society that 
has become a disconnected elite in itself and that what lies beneath these local 
structures. The local-local then refers to communities that constitute a political 
society beyond the co-opted structures, and where the everyday takes place and is 
‘most powerful as a critical tool’ (Appadurai 1996, 178, Richmond 2011b, 13-
14). 
Various authors have argued for more inclusive practices of peace building 
(Papagianni 2009). Chopra suggests ‘participatory intervention models’ which 
are based on anthropological assessments of local perceptions of the conflict and 
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context, of needs as well as perceptions of international intervention (Chopra 
2002, Chopra and Hohe 2004). Basing peace building interventions more on lo-
cal (as opposed to external) knowledge and understanding of the conflict and its 
causes may enhance the success of peace building efforts (Woodward 2007). 
Such an approach would focus on how local ideas about state and governance 
perceive a peace to be built, even if these ideas do not comply with the liberal 
state and its functions. An important source for designing peace building strate-
gies should be how local people ‘fill in the blank spaces’ (Nielsen 2007). This 
means a primacy of local instead of external initiatives (Donini 2007, Pouligny 
2005, 499). MacGinty speaks about hybrid peace building as a peace building 
practice based on the interaction between local and liberal peace building prac-
tices (MacGinty 2011, 8-9) as a way to meaningfully ‘bring the local back in’ 
and potentially fill the liberal blind spot (MacGinty 2011, 210). 
But there is an understandable reluctance in the Congo to rely on local custom 
and political culture for peace building. In Congo, political culture is often un-
derstood in terms of clientelism, patronage, and corruption whereas ethnicity is 
seen to play an important role in social (and political) organisation. Consequent-
ly, local political culture and tradition are often understood as problematic or 
causes of conflict in the first place. Several studies about political organisation in 
the context of conflict in Eastern Congo have argued that war and political transi-
tion do not seem to fundamentally change political structures. Instead, the con-
text of conflict gives new opportunities for local warlords to establish their fief-
dom, based on violence, elite pacts, illegal trade, and clientelism (Aust and 
Jaspers 2006, Bellagamba and Klute 2008b, Jourdan 2008, Raeymaekers 2007, 
Raeymaekers and Vlassenroot 2006, Tull 2003, Tull 2005, Vlassenroot 2008, 
Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2005, Vlassenroot and Raeymaekers 2007). In this 
context, peace building challenges concern fundamental questions about state-
hood and its practices in the Congo, and the reluctance to build peace building 
practices on local existing structures or adapt them to problematic political cus-
tom is understandable (Raeymaekers 2007).  
Much has been said about the failures of peace building in the Congo due to 
the peace building intervention missions inability to appreciate, understand and 
respond to the local context (Mathe 2007, Tull 2009). An often heard argument 
to explain the little results of liberal peace building in Africa is that liberal de-
mocracy is an alien concept to Africa and will not work because it does not relate 
to African political traditions and social organisation. Africa’s traditions and so-
cio-political structures, ethnicity in particular, are also seen as constraints for the 
building of liberal democratic states. The argument is that the ethnic tensions 
inherent in African societies are triggered by political liberalisation (Berman 
1998, Snyder 2000, Young 1999, 31-32). This leads to more pressure on fragile 
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recovering states, creates political and social instability and stimulates the rise of 
violent conflict (Ake 1993, 72). In addition, political parties often remain based 
on ethnicity, which is understood as a constraint for democratic consolidation 
(Carey 2002, Randall and Svåsand 2002). Ethnic tension is considered to be both 
a cause and consequence of conflict in the Congo, and continues to be a source of 
instability in the east (Mamdani 2001, Prunier 2009b, Vlassenroot 2002). 
Taylor has argued that the liberal peace in Africa is faced with the problem of 
applying an approach that is fundamentally dependent on the distinction between 
private and public, in societies in which the public and private spheres are 
blurred. The liberal peace will therefore be obstructed by well-established gov-
ernance modalities such as clientelism and patronage (Taylor 2007). Case studies 
of democratisation in Africa have shown how processes of the local appropria-
tion of democracy have reinforced clientelism and patronage, and built ‘clien-
telist democracies’ and electoral authoritarian regimes (Banégas 2003, 
Bierschenk 2006, Bratton and Van de Walle 2004, Reno 1995, Robinson 1994a, 
Szeftel 2000, Van de Van de Walle 2002, Van de Van de Walle 2007) . 
This draws attention to the problem of African elites, who are considered 
predatory and self-interested, even criminalised. Eriksen (2009) has argued that 
although the liberal peace may privilege elites, it does neglect domestic interests 
and the interest regimes and elites may have in state building. Because it is a top-
down and elitist project, state building requires domestic elite cooperation 
(Eriksen 2009, Meierhenrich 2004). There is therefore an inherent paradox in 
peace building practices. By predefining the objected outcome of state building 
as a liberal democratic state, it refuses local elites to determine the nature of the 
state and acquire a stake in the state building process. Donors undermine their 
state building objectives by disempowering local elites (Eriksen 2009). Added to 
this, external aid bypasses the state (its structures, agencies and national budget) 
because it deems the state problematic, predatory and obtrusive. In doing so, it 
undermines the state in the eyes of the population. In addition, the external agen-
cies recruit the more qualified local staff that prefers the higher salaries at the 
international agencies compared to the state, which undermines the state at a hu-
man resource level (Moolakkattu 2011). 
In 2011 the Congo was ranked 168 out of 182 in Transparency International’s 
Corruption Perceptions Index, scoring a meagre 2 out of 10.3 From a donor per-
spective, sidelining predatory elites and corrupt bureaucracies makes sense. In 
the Congo, as in many other countries in Africa, the state is a resource, which 
makes political elites problematic partners for peace building. Elites’ interest in 
the state is only for the spoils it has to offer (Herbst 2004, 310). Even in its failed 
state, the state is a valuable resource for political elites because it offers opportu-
                                                          
3  http://cpi.transparency.org/cpi2011, accessed 17 January 2012. 
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nities for self-enrichment (Bayart et al. 1999, Newbury 1984, Oliveira 2007, 
Reno 1998a, Reno 1998b). The regimes Bayart et al, Reno and De Oliveira de-
scribe are often considered to be the reason for conflict and state failure in the 
first place. It is exactly this type of capturing of the state by local predatory elites 
that liberal democratic state building, and its emphasis on democracy and justice, 
seeks to prevent or turn around. In this respect, the negative role of African (po-
litical) elites has been emphasised. African political elites are associated as caus-
al factors of the crisis of the state, being seen as the core of the problem, the crea-
tors of the criminalised state and the profiteers of the successful failed state that 
have their interest in maintaining the profitable status quo rather than leading the 
nation on a path to democratic reconstruction and development. Political transi-
tions and democratisation processes have been corrupted and manipulated by 
these self-interested elites who are held responsible for halting the Third Wave in 
Africa, leading their countries to chaos rather than a democracy (Baker 1998, 
Brown 2001, Brownlee 2002, Ihonvbere 1996). ‘There is no reason why entrust-
ing the creation and preservation of lasting peace to former warlords is a viable 
strategy. The recurrence of violence is far more likely’ (Allen 1999, 381). There 
is therefore a reluctance to ground peace building strategies in local political cul-
ture, local tradition and in forms of political and social organisation.  
Hybridity 
The critique of the liberal peace as a hegemonic project which is institutionalist 
and fails to deliver its liberal ideals, as well as the emphasis on local peace build-
ing practices has led to the development of an interest in alternative forms of po-
litical modernity that have risen in the non-western world. These are shaped by 
local agents and are often responsive to local custom, culture and needs. The 
concepts of (political) hybridisation, or creolisation or grafting, have been used to 
describe these processes of the interaction between local and liberal, or more 
general between what is autochthonous and that what is allochthonous. When 
considering modernity in spatial instead of temporal terms (African modernity 
instead of modernity as a historical state of being) modernity can be understood 
in local terms without measuring it to western historical trajectories (Probst et al. 
2002, 11). From this perspective, European expansion and post-colonial devel-
opment, neo-colonialism, state building and other forms of international en-
gagement in Africa, are influences in African modernities, imported concepts in 
Badie’s terms (2000), and not necessarily the leading example.  
This means that when liberal peace building interventions do not deliver its 
liberal ideals and objectives, the outcomes should be better understood as alterna-
tives that are shaped by local agencies than as liberal peace building failures. 
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Perceiving these alternatives as failures is a result of a tunnel vision which can 
only understand societies that are not liberal democratic as being in transition 
towards it (Carothers 2002). From the different angles of critique of state build-
ing, peace building and western engagement in the rest of the world in general, 
has developed a growing set of literature that is concerned with the emergence of 
such alternatives, or hybridisations. The term hybridity or hybridisation is gener-
ally used to refer to the process and outcomes of co-existence and mutual en-
gagement of different cultural systems – ‘local’/’foreign’, ‘imported’/ ’indige-
nous’, ‘traditional’/’modern’, ‘western’/’non-western’. In the context of the lib-
eral peace and its practices of state building and democratisation, it can be easily 
seen how the concept of hybridisation reflects the engagement between western 
state building and democratisation intervention in local contexts.  
Although the term might have only recently become popular in the context of 
post-war state building analysis, hybrids themselves are nothing new in African 
politics and society (in the case of the Congo, see Mobutu 1975, 100-1, Vansina 
1990, Young and Turner 1985, 208-11). Different systems and organising princi-
ples can co-exist in parallel to each other. They can also blend and turn into 
something new. The argument goes that imported foreign political systems can 
never be fully copied, and at best result in a form of grafted statehood. Conceptu-
alisations that were formed in a foreign political tradition cannot completely re-
place local conceptualisations of politics and state (Bayart 1996b). The African 
state is then a hybrid state, in which elements of the imported conceptualisation 
of state are shaped by autochthonous conceptualisations which are rooted in his-
torical traditions of politics and state (Badie 2000, Bayart 1996a). It also creates a 
heterogeneous political culture, in which ‘two semantic and evaluative horizons 
are in fact mixed’ (Bayart 2005, 111). The contemporary African political organ-
isation is then a mixture of exogenous structures and institutions and endogenous 
customs. The exogenous institutions justify the regime internationally to a certain 
standard of ‘modernity’ and institutionalise the new political elite and regime. 
These imported models are adapted to local cultural frameworks in order to pene-
trate local societies and claim authority (Badie 2000, 143-4, 163).  
A well-known example of an outcome of the grafting of western models on an 
essentially African core is that of neo-patrimonialism. It is an example of a sys-
tem of governance and rule in which modern political systems and their institu-
tions are organised according to a set of logic and rules that relates to the political 
custom of the country concerned rather than the political custom from where the 
political system originated. The distinguishing feature of the patrimonial state is 
the absence of real distinction between public and private domains which is for-
mally recognised but not respected (Médard 1994, 328-34, Médard 1996, 84). 
The concept of the neo-patrimonial state as a hybrid has also been used to de-
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scribe the process of the patrimonialisation of the recreated centralist, corporatist 
and authoritarian African colonial state in the 1970s and 1980s (Callaghy 1987, 
89). Another example is the recognition of legal duality as a system in which 
codified, often western-modelled law coexists with customary law (Von Trotha 
1996, Woodman 2005, Yakubu 2005).  
This grafting, or hybridisation, may seem to be an almost unguided process. 
However, Badie emphasised that these processes are subject to not only a politics 
of exportation (the West exporting its concepts and political systems to Africa) 
but also a politics of importation (Africa strategically importing ideas and con-
cepts), as was also the case in the mentioned study on liberal peace building in 
Sri Lanka (Goodhand and Walton 2009). In this blend of exogenous structures 
and institutions and endogenous customs, the exogenous institutions justify the 
regime internationally to a certain standard of ‘modernity’ and institutionalise the 
new political elite and regime. These imported models are adapted to local cul-
tural frameworks in order to penetrate local societies and claim authority. But 
rather than exporting/importing concepts, ideas and institutions with their origi-
nal meaning, Badie argues that in the process of exportation/importation political 
concepts lose their meaning and therefore their effectiveness and their power. 
The grafting process creates new meanings that reconstruct the political scene. 
Importation thus disrupts systems of meaning and gives rise to new political 
practices and political innovations (Badie 2000, 171). The loss of meaning cre-
ates opportunities for creative deviation and the reshaping of the political scene 
into political alternatives and hybrids.  
Schaffer provides a very insightful example of what the loss of meaning of 
imported concepts produces in practice. He explains how democracy has been 
‘translated’ into demokaraasi in Senegalese Wolof society and that this transla-
tion is not merely one of pronunciation but also entails a translated meaning. He 
argues that the translation of democracy to demokaraasi  
‘(…) relied on a set of cultural premises grounded in the everyday life of the unschooled 
populace because the presuppositions that provide meaning to the French term démocratie 
are missing in Wolof. The transfer of meaning from French to Wolof involves a shift of ref-
erence points and corresponding metaphors. The absence of equivalent cultural frames in 
Wolof has, (...), required the various factions of the Senegalese political elite to generate 
frames of interpretation that fit the cultural frameworks of non-French speaking Wolofones.’ 
(Schaffer 1998, 53) 
Demokaraasi is related in meaning but fundamentally distinct from liberal 
democracy in its emphasis on collective economic security, consensus and group 
conformity, community solidarity and an emphasis on treating others as equals. 
Consequentially, these diverted meanings of democracy and demokaraasi result 
in different institutions and political practices (Schaffer 1998, 85).   
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The recognition of grafting in processes of modernisation in Africa is perhaps 
nothing new. But what is relatively recent is that these locally invented creative 
deviations have become recognised as a political reality that are not necessarily 
the core problem for African states and politics, and may be valuable for pro-
cesses of reconstruction and political organisation in post-war and failed states. 
What is important to recognise is that earlier studies on grafting, duality and im-
portation analysed these processes as part of a process of African modernisation 
that imitates the modernisation process of the West, and thus as forms of ‘fail-
ure’. The Third Wave of democratisation in the 1990s raised questions about the 
outcomes. ‘Failed’ democratisation that has resulted in ‘illiberal democracies’ 
(Zakaria 2003), and a plethora of other ‘democracies with adjectives’  that intend 
to describe their problematic nature (Collier and Levitsky 1996). These are often 
hybrid regimes which are democratic in name, and may hold elections, but lack 
the civil and political rights and freedoms of democracy (Levitsky and Way 
2010, 5, Robertson 2011, 4-5). In Africa, analysts have drawn attention to the 
phenomenon of ‘clientelist democracy’ or ‘patronage democracy’ as a system in 
which clientelist practices continue to operate within a democratic institutional 
framework (Banégas 2003, 430, Chandra 2007, Van de Van de Walle 2007). 
Such hybrids have existed since the 1960s in Africa (Huntington 1991, 21) but 
the Third Wave gave rise to a new interest in how these regimes could contribute 
to further democratisation. These studies focused on questions about whether 
certain states could qualify as a democracy based on their level of electoral com-
petitiveness (Diamond 2002), how to typify them (Bogaards 2009), whether their 
current in-between state could be fruitful for further democratisation (Brownlee 
2009, Carothers 2002) and how the donor community finds excuses for the pro-
duction of hybrid regimes as failed democracies (Brown 2011). These studies 
have engaged with the concept of hybridisation as a combination of two neces-
sary ingredients, the blending of two political systems – democracy and authori-
tarianism – resulting in ‘pseudo-democracies’ (Diamond 2002, 24), dictablandas 
and democraduras  (O’Donnell and Schmitter 1986, 9).  
In studies that emphasise hybrids as an outcome of political modernisation 
processes that follow the western model, the colonial state and western moderni-
ty was the referent of importation and grafting. Arguments about hybridisation in 
the process of post-war state building takes the liberal hegemonic project as its 
referent. MacGinty argued how peacemaking practices on the one hand do seek 
standardisation, they also seem to increasingly include indigenous peacemaking 
practices (2008, 157). The outcomes of such peace building practices are hybrids: 
the liberal peace distorted by local practices (MacGinty 2010b, 392). Based on a 
series of case studies that each focus on a different core aspect of liberal peace 
building (governance, state building, economic reform, civil society, security) 
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MacGinty argues that local agencies cannot be ignored in peace building inter-
ventions because they invariably have hybridised peace building practices which 
have blurred the distinction between local and external (MacGinty 2011). Peace 
building in Cambodia has established a hybrid polity that combines elements of 
the pre-democratic political system and elements of the externally driven democ-
ratisation programmes. Roberts describes it as a pragmatic outcome of the con-
flicts between indigenous political systems and the imported democratic system 
(Roberts 2008). 
Case studies have suggested that these hybrid outcomes may be a more prom-
ising starting point for post-war reconstruction, as they may enjoy much legiti-
macy locally, in which elements of the western democratic state model are com-
bined with traditional forms of governance, such as councils of elders, chiefs, 
clan systems, and customary institutions (Boege et al. 2008, 13-15, Clements et 
al. 2007).  
Hybrids can also be a phenomenon that develops not within the existing state 
but ‘beside’ it (Bellagamba and Klute 2008a). Rather than seeing these alterna-
tive systems of political organisation and authority as challenging the (weak, 
failed) state, or as specifically ‘African’ alternatives forms of state, the notion of 
political authority beside the state points to a situation in which ‘the state and the 
alternative to state power have shown themselves to be mutually constitutive and 
interdependent.’ Such local authorities may develop themselves as part of a com-
plex state structure in which they are simultaneously part of and parallel to the 
state, and even help to maintain the state. In such a heterarchy, there exists a plu-
rality of competing powers in which the central state is one of them, but not hier-
archically standing above and controlling other power groups (Bellagamba and 
Klute 2008b, 9-11). A case in point is the Democratic Republic of Congo, partic-
ularly in the eastern part of the country, where, as discussed earlier, during the 
war a form of heterarchy or ‘mediated statehood’ (Raeymaekers & Vlassenroot 
2006, 5) between various state and non-state actors has developed.  
These studies and arguments on hybridity all see hybridity as an outcome, as 
the result of the interface between liberal and local. Although they use different 
terminology, it is very similar to the earlier discussions about Bayart’s grafting 
and Badie’s transplanted state. Postcolonial theorist Homi Bhabha rejects this 
idea of hybridity as an outcome. Hybridity for him ‘is not a third term that re-
solves the tension between two cultures, or the two scenes of the book, in a dia-
lectical play of “recognition”’(Bhabha 2008, 162). He does not see hybridity as a 
combination of one and the other, but rather as a space in which movement and 
dynamics are enabled. For post-war state building, this means that instead of us-
ing the term hybrid to describe neither-democracy-nor-authoritarianism, hybridi-
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ty means a dynamic space in which the liberal peace is being negotiated through 
local agencies.  
This then draws attention to engagement between the liberal democratic heg-
emonic project and its recipient society, but not on the level of political systems 
but rather looking at people themselves – their agencies, culture, power and re-
sistance. Instead of seeing hybrids in negative terms or as an in-between state, 
hybridity is then not mirrored as a diversion from the model, but rather as an op-
portunity for actors to negotiate the liberal and the local. This conceptualisation 
of hybridity offers a more nuanced understanding of processes of conflict and 
peace which overcomes the hegemonic narratives of the liberal peace but also 
avoids the traps of romanticising the local as the normatively good, peaceful, and 
ultimately more successful means of peace building (MacGinty 2011, 207).  
Local agencies 
Through the practices of the romanticisation of the local, local agencies are si-
lenced (Richmond 2011b, 51). Postcolonial and feminist critique have argued 
that there is no place for traditional, non-rational and generally non-western as-
pects of people’s everyday life in the worldview that is exported by the liberal 
peace (Chatterjee 1998, 65). It has sought active participation in knowledge pro-
duction to make it more representative (Gandhi 1998, 43-4). The world is framed 
in strict binaries of traditional/modern, rational/non-rational, etc. To become 
modern, ‘the postcolonial subject had to let go of these authentic, local or cultural 
aspects of his everyday life’ (Chakrabarty 1995). But this captures only part of 
the daily reality of postcolonial life: on the one hand it captures only a small part 
of the local society that conforms to western style modernity (Chatterjee 1998, 
62); on the other hand, it captures only part of the complexity of modernity as 
such, only those aspects of modernisation that fit within westernised modernisa-
tion thinking, ignoring local elements and trajectories of modernity (Chakrabarty 
1995, 758). 
However, the above discussed studies on the emergence of hybridity draw at-
tention to the significance of local agencies in the shaping of peace building pro-
cesses in local contexts and that these local aspects of people’s everyday lives 
cannot be ignored in peace building processes. Chabal et al. draw specific atten-
tion to African agencies as the driving force behind the creative process of social 
transformation that takes place within, but also challenges, the parameters of Af-
rica’s current challenging conditions (Chabal et al. 2007, 3). The Africa-Europe 
Group for Inter Disciplinary Studies in its project on ‘African Alternatives’, un-
derstands agency as being produced by the interaction between actor and struc-
ture, thereby generating a ‘reflexive and negotiating moment between the two’ 
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and the ‘promise of agency’, which emphasises the significance of local agencies 
as the creative driver behind local alternatives and hybridity (De Bruijn et al. 
2007, 13). 
Societies such as the Congolese, where, in the context of decades of decay 
practically a whole society is condemned to resorting to popular strategies and 
tactics of survival, have drawn attention from researchers interested in practices 
of everyday life in the context of conflict and state failure. De Boeck and Plissart 
have made a fascinating study of how the Kinois use their inventiveness and cre-
ativity to imagine and create a world that is materially non-existent (De Boeck 
2006, De Boeck and Plissart 2004). Trefon has put together a valuable collection 
of studies on Kinois’ responses to failures of the state by focusing on the ‘leg-
endary cleverness and inventiveness of peoples’ practices and mental construc-
tions’ (2004, 3). The essays show how through inventive practices people find 
their access to health care, water, education, transport and other basic services 
that have for long been practically non-existent in the country. Similarly, Mac-
Gaffey has made a fascinating study on coping mechanisms of ordinary people’s 
household economies in a context of economic collapse, where people consume 
two to three times as much as their actual income (MacGaffey 1991, MacGaffey 
and Bazenguissa-Ganga 2000).  
Such studies thus draw our attention to everyday practices beyond the parame-
ters of what is conventionally considered as the political that can help us gain 
new insights in the political of contemporary Congo. What is politically relevant, 
and in what way it is relevant, can only be determined locally because political 
relevance is determined by cultural and identity aspects (Chabal & Daloz 1999, 
156, Chabal & Daloz 2006, 122) while culture and identity are in itself an expo-
nent of a specific historical context (Bayart 2005). This then brings alternative 
perspectives on how important political concepts such as legitimacy are con-
ceived and how they operate (Bayart 2005, 155, Chabal & Daloz 1999, 42-4, 
Lonsdale 1987, 347). The insight that what is politically relevant (and relevant 
for political analysis) in Africa often occurs beyond the parameters and catego-
ries of western political analysis therefore highlights the significance of other 
political categories. Martin therefore draws attention to ‘non-identified political 
objects’ or expressions of indirect politics, that contribute to, and open up new 
fields of research for political analysis (Martin 2002, 14-15).  
This brings the study of peace and conflict to other disciplinary fields, in par-
ticular those of anthropology, sociology, area studies and cultural studies 
(Richmond 2011b, 140, Viktorova 2008). There is a wealth of studies on every-
day political practices and on the interpenetration of the everyday and politics. 
This rich literature focuses on the encounters between people and politics in their 
everyday lives to understand political practices and political organisation in Afri-
44 
 
can countries. Bayart has discussed how politics is materialised in people’s eve-
ryday lives by analysing practices of hair-styles, cuisine and clothing (2005, 181-
232). Chabal has argued that political analysis should be driven by the immedia-
cy of everyday and death (2009). Geschiere’s work on witchcraft in Cameroon 
emphasises the significance of these cultural practices for modern day politics 
(1995). Daloz’s work on political elites in various cultural and historical con-
texts, focusing on practices of, for example, ostentation, clothing and eating cul-
ture, shows how this elite behaviour is reproduced by social expectation and in-
strumentalisation which are historically and culturally informed (Daloz 1999b, 
Daloz 2002, Daloz 2003b, Daloz 2010).  
Introducing the concept of agency to these political acts make these practices 
relevant, beyond an anthropological interest in local cultures as such, for political 
change, and, in the context of peace building processes, for a locally constructed 
peace. Critical peace studies do not see these agencies as operating in a void in 
the sense of creativity and production in the absence of state, state services or 
formal economy. Interests in the local from critical analysts have drawn attention 
to local agencies as expressions of the interaction between people and dominat-
ing structures such as the state, power, and in the context of peace building, the 
liberal peace. The notion of an interaction between the everyday and hegemony 
has also been highlighted by others. Bierschenk and Oliver de Sardan discuss 
how the ‘idea of the state’ informs everyday practices of politics (2003). Similar-
ly, Gupta and Ferguson have argued that the state in relation to the everyday 
should not be merely seen as a structure of bureaucracy and power, but also as a 
site of cultural and symbolic production (2002, 981). On the way in which people 
relate to the state in Africa, analyses have focused on the non-horizontal but web-
like or rhizomatic structures, which are based on complex systems of social or-
ganisation, and which often take place in the informal (Bayart 1993, 220-1, 
Migdal 1988, 28-39).  
These studies focus on how structures of power, such as the state, shape eve-
ryday practices of people. However, the concept of everyday agency draws atten-
tion not to how people’s agencies are shaped by structures of power, but to eve-
ryday agencies as resistance to power. The everyday of the ‘little people’ has 
been long recognised as a source of historical knowledge. ‘History from below’ 
emphasises the often unseen role of the ordinary people in the course of history 
(see for example Alexander 2000, Van Deursen 1996, Jewsiewicki and Moniot 
1988, Lüdtke 1989, Ranger 1985). As Scott has shown in his study on peasant 
resistance in a South East Asian village, resistance of seemingly powerless peo-
ple should be understood beyond open rebellions, demonstrations and conflict. It 
takes place in interaction of people’s daily life activities with the structures of 
power, through ‘passive noncompliance, subtle sabotage, evasion and deception’ 
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(Scott 1985, 31). Bleiker’s work has focused on a discursive level of this kind of 
mundane resistance by focusing on verbal expressions of dissent in everyday 
speech and writing. In response to Foucaults discursive conceptualisation of 
power, Bleiker draws attention to discursive resistance through which people 
seek to escape discursive domination. Such discursive dissent operates through 
daily and mundane verbal practices (speaking, talking, writing, singing, gossip, 
rumour) and has, according to Bleiker, a relevance to processes of social change 
in the sense that it lays the necessary foundations that prepare for and enable 
more debate and openly expressed forms of dissent (Bleiker 2004, 210-11). This 
type of discursive agency generates a public debate that challenge norms and 
values and are thus an essential form of agency in the process to bring about so-
cial and political change (Bleiker 2003, 44). An interesting example of these 
forms of resistance is Mbembe’s study on Christianisation in Africa, which ana-
lyses this process of Christianisation as a ‘logic of conquest’ to which African 
societies responded with indiscipline and indocility as a form of revenge to chal-
lenge the hegemonic structure of the Christian church (Mbembe 1988).  
Such discursive and material practices that occur in the everyday lives of peo-
ple criticise and challenge power. Several studies have encountered such practic-
es of resistance and critique in the Congo. An interesting example is that of the 
phenomenon of radio trottoir (pavement radio) as a popular response to a lack of 
trustworthy information which challenges power by defining its own truths 
shared by the masses (Ellis 1989, Sabakinu Kivilu 1988). Similarly, in Kinshasa 
people that feel excluded from the political debate because of its elitist nature 
have challenged democracy by organising informal and popular ‘street parlia-
ments’ that challenge the formal governance institutions as representing the pop-
ulation (De Goede 2011, Kabungulu Ngoy-Kangoy 2008). A study on ‘proximity 
reports’ in Congolese media provides an insightful example on how people’s 
creative use of the media to expose their suffering becomes a political act that 
mobilises shame and consequently establishes a channel of communication and 
interaction between state and society (Pype 2010, Pype 2011). Studies on admin-
istrative reform have shown that a lack of recognition of the complexity of the 
state institutions that are not merely failed and therefore vacuous, as well as a 
misunderstanding of the strategies and practices of survival of its employees, re-
sults in the failure of these reform programmes (Titeca and De Herdt 2011, 
Trefon 2009). 
This emphasis on the relevance of people’s everyday lives and their everyday 
practices in the context of domination is relevant for peace building because it 
draws attention to the fact that people are not passive recipients of liberal peace 
building interventions. Rather, there is a dynamic interaction between ordinary 
people and the liberal peace, beyond the elitist engagement with host societies of 
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liberal peace building practices. The studies discussed above on popular respons-
es to state failure and popular political practices are a wealthy source of insight in 
local political dynamics and cultural practices, but are often written in isolation 
of questions concerning the liberal peace. There is an emerging literature on the 
interaction of local agencies and liberal peace building practices. Ellis’ (1999) 
and Richards’ (2005a, 2005b) studies on the Liberian civil war have provided 
much needed anthropological analyses of armed conflict. Pouligny’s work on 
how UN peace missions have been experienced by host societies has argued that 
host communities are not passive recipients but actively interact with internation-
al interventions in pursuit of their own agenda’s (2000, 2006). An anthropologi-
cal study on recurring acts of violence (rape, massacre) in Eastern DRC engages 
with the perpetrators and their narratives to make sense of their own acts pro-
vides a fascinating and rare study of such events (Eriksson Baaz & Stern 2008).  
Based on field research in East Timor and the Solomon Islands, Richmond’s 
work on everyday agencies shows the importance of the recognition of local eve-
ryday agencies for peace building interventions. An interaction between local and 
liberal peace building is a foundation for a post-liberal peace, which has interna-
tional as well as local legitimacy (Richmond 2011b). This is what made the 
peace process in Papua New Guinea successful. State building was a process of 
institutional bricolage, in which a liberal model was used, which housed custom-
ary elements of governance, thereby simultaneously constructing local and inter-
national legitimacy. What made this process successful, was the domination of 
local agencies in a bottom-up process, and an openness towards local agencies 
with the ‘top-down’ level of the process (Boege 2011). As other case studies in 
for example Somalia, East Timor, Cambodia and the DRC show, the experience 
in Papua New Guinea between local and liberal leading to peace building success 
stories is an exception to a more general practice of disregard for the local and 
the everyday (Richmond & Mitchell 2011).  
Defining the interaction between local agencies and peace building, Richmond 
argues for a post-liberal peace as a local-liberal hybrid. It is based on the notion 
that the liberal peace fails to connect with or reach the daily life of people and 
does not produce a social contract on which peace is to be founded (2009a, 325-
27). A post-liberal peace is then the process in which everyday lives of people 
and their needs, customs and culture, and grassroots agencies coexist and negoti-
ate with liberal peace building practices (2009a, 331, Richmond 2010, 387). A 
post-liberal peace would be constructed on the local level, in ‘contextual forms’ 
(Richmond 2010, 671). Richmond therefore makes a plea for more engagement 
(of liberal actors) with the local, with the everyday; for an approach that can ‘in-
tellectually engage with the lives of ordinary people’ (2009a, 333). But it re-
quires more than an intellectual engagement. It means a move away from the 
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idea that politics can be changed from the outside, and a recognition of local 
agencies within peace building practices. Such analysis should thus ‘pursue a 
politics embedded in lived experience’, that is, in people’s daily lives. It means 
engaging with other dimensions of the political, a shift in interest from the formal 
and public political life to the private political life (Darby 2006b, 49, 60).  
A valuable contribution to the understanding of everyday engagement with 
hegemonic structures and political domination is the politique par le bas ap-
proach which was developed in the 1980s mainly through the work of Bayart, 
Mbembe and Toulabor and the journal Politique Africaine. It focuses attention to 
modes of popular political culture and behaviour, and aims for an understanding 
of African politics by looking at what happens below the level of high politics 
(Bayart et al. 2008). Although the studies in the collection themselves do not fo-
cus specifically on engagements with the liberal peace, the approach developed 
as the politique par le bas approach does provide us with useful tools for the 
analysis of negotiations between the everyday and the liberal, such as its empha-
sis on relational agency, the dynamics and interaction between high politics and 
low politics, and the use of concepts such as resistance and popular revenge. 
Studies inspired by this approach have focused on diverse domains such as foot-
ball (Baller and Saavedra 2010), popular demonstrations in Africa (Lafargue 
1996), and ordinary people’s understanding of war (Maindo Monga Ngonga 
2001) as sites of interaction between the politics of everyday life and the high 
politics of the state. 
What becomes evident from the above is that an approach that privileges the 
interactions between local agencies and liberal peace building can provide valua-
ble insights in addition to the limited understanding we have of processes of lib-
eral peace building and their often problematic outcomes. By focussing on local 
agencies in this process and their engagements with the liberal peace – instead of 
on institutions and technocratic questions of policy implementation – new sites 
for research are opened. In addition, instead of focussing on how the liberal can 
engage better (or at all) with the local, centralising local agencies and their en-
gagements with the liberal may enable us to access new understandings to how 
processes of liberal peace building materialise.  
The important conclusion from the discussion in this chapter is that in main-
stream academia and policy making circles the individual in whose name peace 
building interventions take place is at best considered a passive recipient and for-
gotten at worst. From various directions critical approaches have attempted to 
bring the focus back to these individuals, their custom and culture, their rights, 
needs and choices, and their agencies. This thesis is about the National Assembly 
of post-war DRC. The critique discussed in this chapter expresses a clear concern 
with the top-down approach of liberal peace building – which includes the insti-
48 
 
tution of Parliament – and argued for an approach that is concerned with local 
agencies. Instead of putting aside the institutions of the state building project of 
the liberal peace, I suggest that these institutions remain relevant but that they 
should be analysed in a different way. Instead of seeing them as part of a top-
down structure of the liberal peace, I suggest that they can be studied as sites of 
local agencies themselves. The people that make these institutions function have 
their own ‘local-local’, which lies hidden beneath the institutional cover and ve-
neer of liberal democratic practices. It means a different everyday than the one 
discussed by Richmond, Bleiker and Scott. It concerns the everyday practices of 
people within the institutions, the political practices through which MPs perform 
their role as MP. They may be elites that are co-opted in the liberal peace and 
therefore part of the ‘top-down’ and ‘elitist’ project of state building, they are 
still Congolese citizens that partake in Congolese society, share Congolese cus-
toms and traditions, albeit it from a different position than the ordinary citizen. 
Even more so, through electoral representation they are connected to the local 
communities that they represent in the National Assembly. The interaction be-
tween their agencies, aspects of the liberal peace, the electorate as well as struc-
tures of state power make the site of the National Assembly a very relevant site 
where local agencies, the everyday lives of people collide with the liberal peace. 
The next chapter will build a theoretical framework to enable such a research into 
the interaction between MP agencies and liberal democracy. 
  
3 
Consuming agents in the institutions 
of liberal peace building 
The critique discussed in the previous chapter offers new directions to analyse 
state building processes. The main interest of the liberal peace critique discussed 
is to redirect academic and policy making interest away from the institutions that 
are prioritised by the liberal peace over the interest of everyday needs of ordinary 
citizens. This would enable a more legitimate peace grounded in local needs and 
constructed on a social contract between recipient communities and international 
peace builders. This means a shift in focus to local agencies and their needs, cus-
tom, culture and their aspirations for what peace would mean for them and how 
peace would be shaped. Case studies that focus on local agencies, the ‘local-
local’ and their interaction with and resistance to the liberal peace provide often 
overlooked aspects of peace building from the margins (see for example 
Richmond & Mitchell 2011). However, this emphasis on critical agencies can 
also shed light on dynamics within the very core of liberal peace building. Al-
though the critique that the liberal peace is an institutionalist project is just, these 
institutions are made to function in the way they do by local agencies. This 
means that using the critique that argues for an emphasis of local agencies in 
peace building can also be employed to tackle the problem of the liberal peace as 
an institutionalist project in another way, namely, not by directing attention away 
from these core sites of state building, but by engaging with these institutions as 
sites of local agencies. This enables a more critical engagement with the actors 
on these sites beyond mere co-optation in the liberal peace as an elitist, exclusive 
and top-down project. It provides an analytical engagement with these often ex-
ternalised and artificial institutions in which a local is hidden. These sites can 
then be studied as sites of local agencies in which the local interacts with the lib-
eral through co-optation, resistance, negotiation, rejection and compliance.  
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At the site of the National Assembly, local agencies give shape to the institu-
tion of the National Assembly, making it function in a unique, localised way. 
These local agencies are enabled by social interaction such as that between MPs 
and their constituencies, between MPs and the executive, MPs and their political 
parties. But they are also shaped by local political custom and culture, as well as 
the newly established parameters of democratic governance. This chapter will 
discuss the concept of local agency within the institutions of liberal peace build-
ing. The chapters that follow will discuss how these local agencies consume lib-
eral democracy at the site of the National Assembly in the DRC. 
Practices of discipline 
Foucault’s concept of discipline is particularly useful for the conceptualisation of 
the power relations between the receiving countries and the liberal peace and the 
way in which this affects institutions (Abrahamsen 2000). Foucault’s disciplining 
refers to the techniques of power to subjectify individuals, to turn them into ‘doc-
ile bodies’ and exercise control over them through normalisation and coercion. 
An important notion in Foucault’s concept of disciplining is that the object of 
control is not the outcome (the disciplined body) as such. The objects of supervi-
sion and control are processes of normalisation. Normalisation is achieved 
through a corrective process. This means that disciplining aims to improve be-
haviour while establishing a power relation of strict subjection (Foucault 1991, 
137-38). This is particularly relevant in the context of the liberal peace and its 
approach to institution building because it places emphasis on a process: disci-
plining as a learning process toward “liberal democratic self-mastery” (Jabri 
2007, 116-24). Disciplining is for Foucault essentially corrective (Foucault 1991, 
179). It upholds a norm to which the subject is coerced to comply. It thus as-
sumes the possibility of progress (Foucault 1991, 160) or development towards 
normalisation. It also assumes the need for continuous coercion through discipli-
nary measures to contribute towards the achievements of normalisation through a 
double system of gratification (carrot) and punishment (stick) (Foucault 1991, 
180).  
In the case of institution building in the Congo we can see how the liberal 
peace is practiced through discipline. The disciplining practices aim to establish 
liberal democratic institutions that are seen to constitute liberal democracy. This 
disciplining takes place in the process of democratisation and liberalisation and 
uses events such as ‘HIPC decision point’1 or elections as moments to ‘measure’ 
                                                          
1  DRC reached HIPC decision point in July 2003 and received US$10 billion in debt relief IMF. 2003. 
IMF and World Bank Support US$10 Billion in Debt Service Relief for the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo. Press Release No. 03/127 28 July 28 2003..  
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or ‘examine’ the Congo’s progress (Foucault 1991, 184). Similarly, gratifications 
(debt relief, development aid) and punishment or the threat thereof (international 
criminal court, public denouncing, aid cuts) function as instruments to force the 
Congo to comply with the norm. Although liberal democracy is the intended ob-
jective, the supervision or control focuses on the process towards that by disci-
plining the institutional practices. The constant need for improvement and the 
notion of how to do things better are emphasised (good governance, for example) 
while a power relation between the host country and the liberal peace (and its 
representatives) is established. Liberal democracy and peace is the norm. 
Through continuous pressuring, praising and denouncing the Congo forced in 
this norm.  
Local agencies exercising their existence 
The romanticisation of the local gives local actors a label and ascribes them a 
role: perpetrator, victim, ‘civil’ society, problematic leaders, marginalised urban 
and rural masses, etc. This is the contemporary equivalent of the colonial objecti-
fication of the subject: it turns people into an object that have a (by the liberal 
peace) predetermined position and role. They become orchestrated actors in a 
scripted play of rebuilding the Congo, in which the discourse of the liberal peace 
defines the script. The objectification of the subject takes away local agencies 
and their will and capacity to act.  
The emphasis on citizens and their customs, culture and needs as opposed to 
merely their rights as liberal subjects implies a recognition of their contextuality 
or their subjective engagement with their present and future. People are actors in 
their own subjective presence. Mbembe speaks about the ‘emerging subject in a 
time of instability and crisis’, which problematises the relationship between tem-
porality and subjectivity and emphasises that people live in a subjective world in 
which they ‘exercise their existence’ (Mbembe 2001b, 15). The post-war is then 
an ‘emerging time’, a time of entanglement and displacement (Mbembe 2001b, 
14-7). The notion of displacement means that it is not a stagnant time. Rather, it 
is a time of constant redefinition; the only apparent stability is provisional. It is a 
time of constant disturbances and permanent instability. What is significant about 
this time of constant disturbances and permanent instability is that it is a state of 
‘normality’, in the sense that it does not necessarily result into crises (Mbembe 
2001b, 15-6). The notion of a time of entanglement problematises the concept of 
time and temporality in relation to subjectivity and emphasises that time is a non-
linear experience. The historicity of the present connects the past with the present 
and the post-war future that is to be built. Mbembe speaks of the present as the 
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experience of a time, in which the absences of the past and the future come to-
gether (Mbembe 2001b, 14-6).  
The significance of the recognition of the self that exercises his existence is 
that it draws attention to local agencies and the interaction between local agen-
cies and the liberal peace in post-war Congo. As a project of dispossession and 
discipline the liberal peace silences and ignores these local agencies. Because it 
perceives local agencies as objects of the liberal peace it ignores the ways in 
which they exercise their existence as subjects of the post-war peace process. The 
emphasis on the subject that exercises his existence thus enables an analysis of 
processes of state-building in post-war societies that moves away from the liberal 
peace’s focus on institutional organisation, institutional efficiency and efficacy, 
good governance, legal frameworks, and questions of policy implementation, 
management and efficiency. It moves away from an interest in the institutions as 
objects of discipline to a people and agency oriented perspective that aims to un-
derstand people and their agencies which make these institutions function, as 
well as how people themselves experience these processes. It redirects attention 
from institutions and their weaknesses and failures to the subject – the people 
living in contemporary Africa and their agencies.  
In the context of the liberal peace as a hegemonic project of discipline local 
agencies negotiate the power of the liberal peace. Power and resistance are inti-
mately related; power is inevitably faced with resistance (Pickett 1996). As the 
work of Bleiker (2003, 2004) and Scott (1985, 2009) that I discussed in the pre-
vious chapter has shown, such resistance is not a form of direct confrontation or 
rejection, but takes place in small forms through deceit, the toying with power 
and the negotiation of power (Bhabha 2008, 264, Mbembe 2001b, 128, Pickett 
1996, 458, Richmond 2011a, 4). Such resistance is not necessarily negative or 
destructive. Instead, it is productive and produces local alternatives. It is a critical 
agency aimed at the transformation of power (Richmond 2011a). This means that 
we should look at how the liberal peace is being negotiated by local agencies 
through the practises of their daily lives. I thus take a Bourdieuian approach to 
agency, and consider agency and structure to be complementary and mutually 
informing. Whereas structures such as the liberal peace and local political culture 
inform human agency, human agencies also redefine these structures in their turn 
(Bourdieu 1977). When local agencies negotiate the liberal peace, it this interac-
tion between structure and agency that is at stake.  
The inevitable interaction between local and liberal that takes place in coun-
tries such as the Congo that are subject to a project of liberal peace is thus a pro-
cess of liberal discipline and resistance through local agencies. The agency to 
resist and negotiate the liberal peace is enabled by its ambivalences, instabilities 
and discrepancies which provide opportunities to deviate (Bhabha 2008, 153). 
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This resistance is made possible by a ‘time-lag’, the ‘temporal break in represen-
tation’ in which the repeating takes place. In this time-lag things can take on new 
meaning because agents can in the process of repeating negotiate meaning 
(Bhabha 2008, 274, 263-5). The in-between as a creative space and moment that 
Bhabha calls time-lag, has also been emphasised by others. Ricœur distinguishes 
the meaning of the sender of a message (the speech-act) or the social action, and 
the recipient. They are not necessarily the same. But for the meaning of a mes-
sage the sender’s intended meaning is not more important than the meaning (in-
terpretation) the receivers give to it (Thompson 1981, 53-4, 63-4). In the time-lag 
between the actual speech and receiving the speech, meaning can be deviated, 
knowingly or unknowingly. More in the context of the liberal peace in Africa, 
the earlier mentioned argument of Badie on the import and export of concepts 
also emphasises the translation that takes place in this process (Badie 2000, 
Schaffer 1998). Bhabha’s time-lag is exactly that moment of the loss of meaning 
between exportation and importation, when ideas, concepts, institutions are given 
new grounding in a new context (Badie), when the speech-act is interpreted 
(Ricœur) or when the hegemonic discourse is slightly transformed (Bhabha). It is 
in this space to manoeuvre that local agencies are enabled.  
The space in which local agencies are possible is hybrid space, enabled by the 
collision of the liberal and local. As discussed in the previous chapter, hybridity 
is often used to describe the product of the interface of the liberal and the local, 
in the same way as Bayart speaks about grafting and Badie speaks about the 
transplanted state (Badie 2000, Bayart 1996a). In Bhabha’s terms hybridity is not 
an outcome of the blending of one and the other but as a dynamic space which 
enables the negotiation of the liberal peace by local agencies (Bhabha 2008, 
162). These hybrid spaces enable agencies to resist, negotiate and challenge the 
liberal peace and its disciplining acts. Instead of seeing hybrids in negative terms 
or as an in-between state, hybridity is then not mirrored as a diversion from the 
model, but rather as an opportunity for actors to negotiate the liberal and the lo-
cal. It is a momentum of opportunity to which this thesis focuses in its interest in 
the liberal peace in the Congo. I will use the term hybridity or hybrid space to 
refer not to a site or location, neither to refer to the collision of one and the other. 
Instead, following Bhabha, I will use the term to refer to opportunity, room to 
manoeuvre and act. Hybridity is then enabling; it enables agencies and produces 
‘third spaces’. It are these moments of transformation or deviation that Bhabha 
sees as ‘resistance’ to discursive domination that produce ‘third spaces’ (Bhabha 
2008, 313-4). Third spaces are challenges to the hegemonic discourse by setting 
new boundaries. It is a form of resistance through negotiation to adapt the hege-
monic discourse to the local context. It thus produces creativities such as the 
‘Hindi vegetarian bible’ (Bhabha 2008, 168-9). Hybridity is created by the in-
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consistencies in the dominant discourse, the time-lag in its translation, and by the 
disconnect between the liberal and the local – the ‘zones of irrelevance and dis-
engagement’ between the liberal and the local (MacGinty 2011, 88). Hybridity is 
then a dimension, a ‘constantly moving piece of variable geometry’ which is en-
abled by the interaction between local and liberal agencies. That is, the liberal’s 
ability to persuade and convince the local into the liberal peace, and the local’s 
ability to resist and to come up with alternatives (MacGinty 2011, 77).  
Local agencies and culture 
A peace building practice which is founded on the interaction between local and 
liberal is what Richmond calls a post-liberal peace, a space in which local agen-
cies claim emancipation, and in which they pursue and invent a peace that is 
based on local aspirations and grounded in local needs (Richmond 2009a, 330-
33, Richmond 2009b). Although they overlap in many ways, an important differ-
ence between Bhabha’s hybridity and Richmond’s post-liberal peace is the un-
derstanding of agency. Whereas for Bhabha agency is unconscious, Richmond’s 
critical agencies have awareness and strategy. Kapoor has criticised Bhabha for 
not developing the creative, resisting agent to its full potential. For Kapoor, the 
problem lies in Bhabha’s implicit culturalism. Bhabha’s hybridising agency takes 
place in the sphere of cultural transaction (Kapoor 2008, 135), in which the an-
swer to the question of why people resist is implicitly cultural and unconscious. 
Culturalism sees culture as hidden and beyond the control and awareness of peo-
ple that own it. Consequently, it denies agency and the ability to make choices. 
Culture is in this sense about continuity, and rejects the significance of innova-
tion, borrowing and importation (Bayart 2005, 71). Culturalist approaches to po-
litical change are biased towards continuity within a process of change (Eckstein 
1988, 792). It turns political development into an ideological struggle, in which 
one culture is better than the other in producing the objective of a democratic 
state in the western sense of the term (see for example Harrison 2006, Kaplan 
2000). The concept of culture then becomes a ‘methodological death trap’ 
(Koelbe 2003, 213).  
Kapoor argues that because of his use of culture, agency has for Bhabha no 
strategy and is not intentional but rather spontaneous, almost accidental. Bhabha 
does not accord agents a will and capacity to act consciously, which means agen-
cy is reactive rather than proactive. He allocates them a role of participation in 
the margin without actively contributing to the production of hybridity beyond 
the margins. Kapoor argued that Bhabha’s notion of resisting agents can be 
moved beyond the margins towards a ‘postcolonial politics that effects broader, 
structural change’ (Kapoor 2008, 132). He therefore suggests that:  
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‘(...) Bhabha’s agents are more calculative than he represents them, in particular because he 
does not grant them what he in fact grants himself: a greater awareness of hybridity. If he 
can claim that hybridity is constitutive of discourse, (...), then why not extend the knowledge 
of this claim to his protagonists, thereby making possible a more explicit strategy of hybridi-
zation?’ (Kapoor 2008, 134) 
Kapoor proposes a strategising agent (Kapoor 2008, 135). This concern with 
Bhabha’s theory is relevant for the analysis of post-war state building processes. 
It potentially gives Congolese actors a role in this process as intentional agents 
that aim to make the state building discourse work for them in their society. De-
viations from the state building agenda are then not necessarily ‘mistakes’, tran-
sitional stages or even failures, but rather diversions of the hegemonic discourse. 
Hybridity then not only deconstructs power to reject hidden truths in these dis-
courses, it also enables alternatives (Kapoor 2008, 142).  
Although Kapoor’s argument that local agents may have more awareness of 
their agency than Bhabha ascribes to them is valid, it would be a mistake to take 
culture out of the equation as an informant for local agents. Culture is highly rel-
evant as a resource that drives and shapes local agencies, and is foundational for 
the legitimacy of peace (Richmond 2011b, 14-16). Bhabha’s argument itself is 
opposed to the idea that culture is conservative and closed in on itself. His (im-
plicit) use of culture is more in line with Clifford Geertz’s work on culture as 
‘the webs of significance that man himself has spun and in which he is suspend-
ed’ (Geertz 1973, 5). Geertz’s argument is that the only way to understand poli-
tics in a culturally sensitive way is to interpret politics through the interpretation 
of meaning, ‘… that is, to make the effort to decode the significance of such 
events from the other’s viewpoint’ (Chabal & Daloz 2006, 3). These meanings 
are ‘informed by a set of conceptions – ideals, hypotheses, obsessions, judgments 
– derived from concerns which far transcend it.’ These conceptions form a (polit-
ical) culture, a system of meaning, providing rationale and shaping political de-
velopment. Culture then concerns the ‘systems of meaning through which men 
give shape to their experience’ (Geertz 1973, 312). As a system of meaning, cul-
ture ‘reveals the language in which people, who may disagree about values, or 
political ends, do so within a shared perspective’ (Chabal & Daloz 2006, 22). 
The concept of culture is then not so much concerned with what culture actually 
is (as in classic anthropology), but much more with what culture does and how it 
gives meaning to social action and political events – or in Bhabha’s work, how it 
creates hybridity. Culture is ‘an active process of meaning making and contest 
over definition’. Its relevance lies not in what it is but in what it does (Street 
1993). 
Understanding the meaning of social action requires a thorough understanding 
of what is ‘insinuated as background information’, because meaning is produced 
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in and embedded in this socio-cultural and historical context (Geertz 1973, 9). 
Such an analysis of the meaning of social action is Geertz’s thick description: 
‘As interworked systems of construable signs (...), culture is not a power, something to 
which social events, behaviours, institutions, or processes can be causally attributed; it is a 
context, something within which they can be intelligibly – that is thickly – described’ 
(Geertz 1973, 14).  
Understanding culture as an informant of local agencies has much in common 
with Bourdieu’s concept of the habitus. Habitus is conceptually located between 
structures and agents – it is produced by structures and mediates and regulates 
agent’s actions without being a system of rules that must be obeyed (Bourdieu 
1977, 72). Habitus is a sphere of subjectivities (thoughts, ideas, perceptions), a 
system of dispositions. It thus refers to the ways in which people in a certain lo-
cality relate to things and the meaning these things have for them (De Bruijn 
2008, 89). It shifts attention to the interpretation of concepts and processes for 
what they mean for actors involved. For an understanding of the process of state 
building it is then no longer relevant how policy papers define and conceptualise 
it. Habitus is a product of structures such as historical experiences, material con-
ditions, and indeed culture. It is thus a location (or patrimony, in Bourdieu’s 
terms), a specific mediating structure, that mediates people’s practices ‘without 
either explicit reason or signifying intent to be nonetheless ‘sensible’ and ‘rea-
sonable’. It thus produces a notion of common sense, a logic which governs prac-
tice (Bourdieu 1977, 79-80). We can then understand local agencies as being 
contextualised in habitus and informed by culture thickly described.  
Although Richmond’s critical agencies share a sense of strategy with Ka-
poor’s agencies, Richmond’s critical agencies, however, have awareness and 
strategy at a different level. Instead of focusing on whether the local agent is 
aware of his agency that produces vegetarian bibles (to use Bhabha’s well known 
example) or is aware of its own cleverness (De Certeau 1984, 56), Richmond’s 
critical agent is an agent that pursues hybrid space, not hybrid outcomes. It is a 
demand for emancipation, a hybrid space in which negotiation is possible 
(Richmond 2011a, 6). The critical agent is Foucault’s ‘criminal’ (Foucault 1991, 
289) which seeks emancipation to pursue peace which has legitimacy locally. 
This local legitimacy should be the foundation for a local-international peace 
building contract, a social contract in the context of peace building. It is a space 
in which peace can be given shape and form by local agents, being informed by 
culture, local aspirations and local needs (Richmond 2009a, 331-33, Richmond 
2011b, 12).  
The ‘problem’ of awareness of hybridity is thus relocated from ‘the awareness 
to create alternatives’ (outcome oriented, vegetarian bible) to an awareness of the 
pursuit of opportunity to enable negotiating agencies (opportunity oriented, 
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emancipation). The hybrid space which is for Bhabha an opportunity which ex-
ists without agents being aware of it, is for Richmond, on the contrary, a con-
sciously claimed space – a claim for emancipatory peace, self-determination and 
more influence over the process to pursue a peace that is grounded in local needs, 
local aspirations, and that responds to culture and customs. In this hybrid space 
the subject of post-war Congo exercises his existence.  
Convivial agency 
Exercising their existence in the context of the liberal peace means that the recip-
ients of these liberal peace building practices negotiate it as a power structure. 
Being confronted with the dominating structures of the liberal peace, its recipi-
ents use their agencies to toy with power, negotiate, use it, divert it, resist it, etc. 
We should therefore shift our attention from how power is produced through 
practices of discipline, to the practices of ‘antidiscipline’, or the way in which 
power is being received and used (De Certeau 1984, xv).  
De Certeau has emphasised this in his notion of the consuming agent. De Cer-
teau’s consumer is similar to the subaltern agent in Homi Bhabha’s work. It is an 
agent that engages with hegemony and negotiates or consumes it. The consumer, 
or the consuming agent, does not reject hegemony and hegemonic structures. 
Instead, he consumes it, he uses hegemonic structures ‘in the service of rules, 
customs or convictions’ that are not part of the hegemony itself, thereby making 
it ‘function in another register’. The consumption of power thus means maintain-
ing difference within the sphere that hegemony seeks to organise (De Certeau 
1984, 32). Consuming agency is therefore more diverse than mere resistance, as 
Bhabha’s agency. Consumption encompasses a broader variety of local agencies’ 
forms of engagement with the liberal peace. Understanding this engagement only 
in terms of resistance would miss the ways in which local agencies comply with, 
accept and cooperate with the liberal peace. Consumption describes the collective 
forms of consumers’ engagements with the liberal peace, such as resistance, ac-
ceptance, rejection, diversion, negotiation, etc.  
De Certeau’s concept of the consuming agent, however, differs from Bhabha’s 
subaltern agent on another important point. Because De Certeau’s concept of the 
consumer encompasses a broader scope of forms of engagements with power, it 
places agencies in a more complex relation with power. The consuming agent 
can be part of various social groups and socio-economic classes. This is therefore 
a more useful concept of agency than that of subalterneity for a study of agencies 
at the National Assembly. The ways in which the consuming agent consumes 
structures of power must thus be understood beyond the limited notion of subal-
terneity. For proponents of a subaltern perspective agency is located with the 
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subaltern. Subaltern studies aim to bring the people back as agents of their own 
history and rejects to see them as masses that are merely easily manipulated by 
elites and therefore have no agency as such. It rejects the idea that they are pas-
sive participants in universal historic processes. Instead it recognises the historic 
significance of people’s free and sovereign agency in the rediscovery of their 
culture, their engagement with their own knowledge, ideas and experiences (and 
not solely with their material conditions of existence). But it thus also recognises 
the existence of an autonomous political domain of elites and of the subaltern, 
the dominants and the dominated, each with their own idioms, knowledge, norms 
and values (Gandhi 1998, Lee 2005, 170-1, Spivak 1987, 197).  
However, in the effort to focus on silenced voices, the subaltern approach 
risks essentialising subaltern consciousness or even turning subalterneity into an 
empirical social entity (Pouchepadass 2000, 167). This inflates subordinated 
voices into an alternative for dominating voices, and derives the subaltern from 
its subordinated state. Critical notes can also be placed on the claim made by the 
subaltern studies group that the subaltern has autonomous conscience and agen-
cy, which stems from the historic fact that dominants have never been able to 
integrate the subaltern sphere into their hegemony. The subaltern approach has 
ignored long term debates within anthropology and sociology on the relations, 
exchange and assimilation between high-politics and low-politics (Pouchepadass 
2000, 168-9). The isolation of the subaltern as an autonomous group thus does 
not capture the complexity of social relations but ignores it.  
Darbon and Quantin have criticised the overemphasis on the subaltern in the 
process of political change at the cost of an almost complete marginalisation of 
elites (Darbon and Quantin 2007, 488). It cannot be denied that elites do play an 
important role in peace building, particularly since peace building practices privi-
lege elites and institutions. Although it is important to include the silenced voices 
of local agencies it would be naïve to ignore elites and their agencies as a conse-
quence. Daloz draws attention to the modalities of leadership, issues of represen-
tation between elites and their supporters (Daloz 1999a, 14-6). A subaltern ap-
proach to processes of change in post-war Congo would ignore some of the key 
processes of the conflict and peace building process which have undeniably been 
played at the elite level. But a subaltern perspective reminds us that below the 
more visible side there exists a level that is by no means excluded from this pro-
cess – ‘under the pavement there is sand’ (Bayart et al. 2008, 34). Although 
agreeing with Darbon and Quantin that agency is not exclusively located at the 
subaltern level, it should also be recognised that a solely elitist perspective, as 
they suggest, will also do no justice to the social complexity of these processes of 
political change. Elites and ordinary citizens are connected through various social 
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structures. This counts particularly for Parliamentarians, who are connected to 
their constituencies by the framework of electoral democracy.  
The point these authors are making concerns the isolation of the subaltern or 
the elites as an autonomous social entity and a lack of recognition of the dynam-
ics between them. An elitist approach argues that political action takes place at 
the elite level (Daloz 1999a, 18, Darbon & Quantin 2007). The subaltern ap-
proach emphasises a dichotomy between the dominants and the dominated, in 
which the dominated are silenced and agencyless. However, what an elitist ap-
proach and a subaltern perspective both ignore is that within the multi-layered 
power structures of the liberal peace these social categories become ambivalent. 
The notion of subaltern or dominated, just as the notion of elite, refers to a rela-
tion rather than a sociological category. In the complexity of liberal peace build-
ing these relations do not only concern domestic social structures. Through liber-
al peace interventions these domestic social structures are distorted and become 
ambivalent. Elites are subject to disciplining practices of liberal peace building 
interventions, and some subaltern actors find themselves given voice through 
INGO interventions, or have been provided with channels to participate and even 
access to become part of a new liberal peace building elite. In such an ambivalent 
context such categories thus obscure more than they reveal. The subaltern only 
exists with the elites as its reference and vice versa: if there are no dominants 
there can be no dominated, and if there are no dominated there can be no domi-
nants (Pouchepadass 2000, 165, 174). Instead of understanding agencies in terms 
of a stable category their agencies should be better understood as relative. They 
are produced in relation to other agencies and thus dependent on each other. 
What matters is the power relation between different actors, the relation vis-à-vis 
the referent of domination. 
These social interactions are important for political analysis. A simplified fo-
cus on the subaltern or the elites as an autonomous social group will not capture 
the dynamics and complexity of politics in Africa. The earlier mentioned poli-
tique par le bas approach focuses attention to modes of popular political culture 
and behaviour, and aims for an understanding of African politics by looking at 
what happens below the level of high politics. However, as the authors empha-
sise in the 2008 revised edition of the original book from 1980, politique par le 
bas should not be understood as an African version of subaltern studies (as it has 
often been), which they label as being mere populism, and, like Darbon and 
Quantin (2007), radicalised in the opposite direction of elite oriented studies of 
politics (Bayart et al. 2008, 12, 25). Rather than seeing controversies of ‘high 
politics’ and ‘low politics’, or of periphery and centre, politique par le bas does 
not privilege the role of one social group to another. Instead, it is preoccupied 
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with the relations between these different groups and the political game of the 
relations between different social actors (Bayart et al. 2008, 10, 20).  
The political society should also not be seen as a separate structure from the 
civil society, instead it should be understood in terms of mutual interpenetration 
and mutual reinforcement. Bayart speaks of the mysteries of the rhizome; sub-
terranean root structures, which act as a medium through which the link between 
African societies and state is formed (Bayart 1993, 163, 221). Structures of pow-
er are produced and institutionalised as a ‘social-historical world’ turned into 
common sense. In this process, the dominated and dominants both take part, but 
not as dominated and dominants. Rather, understanding their agencies in rela-
tional terms they can be better characterised as convivial, in which they share the 
same epistème, or the same living space (Bayart 1983, 110-14, Mbembe 2001b, 
103-4, 110).  
Because it rejects central binaries, the notion of conviviality problematises 
agency in a world we are used to understanding in terms of exploited and exploi-
ters, dominated and dominants, suppressed and suppressors. The logic of conviv-
iality does not reject the notion that people are dominated, exploited and sup-
pressed, nor the fact that people resist, but questions the respective essential roles 
of dominants as instigators and dominated as passive recipients. Nyamnjoh ar-
gues that an emphasis on agency as located with individuals, and preoccupied 
with individual progress, achievement and capacities is, contrary to mainstream 
understanding of the term agency, not a universal. More relevant questions can 
be asked if agency is contextualised in conviviality – such as ‘how are individu-
als able to be who they are – agents – through relationships with others?’ 
(Nyamnjoh 2002, 111). Nyamnjoh argues that understanding contemporary Afri-
ca requires a re-conceptualisation of the concept of agency that does justice to the 
socio-political context. He argues that rather than conceptualising agency as the 
individual’s ability to act, it is more important to ‘understand how agency is rec-
ognised, fostered and contained in different localities’ (Nyamnjoh 2002, 135). 
This then opens up the notion of agency ‘beyond the analytic limits of individu-
alism and the lone heroic actor’ to the interaction of the political and the individ-
ual or collective Self (Werbner 2002, 3).  
Like politique par le bas, Nyamnjoh argues for an understanding of agency 
that it is not merely about individual empowerment but rather about group or in-
dividual agency within social context. In the context of the Cameroonian grass-
fields he speaks of domesticated agency, which is agency that is locally recog-
nised and culturally accepted, underlined by conviviality. The notion of convivi-
ality emphasises the need of different agentive forces to achieve negotiated un-
derstanding, but also emphasises that agency, empowerment, is only recognised 
as long as it does not marginalise the other (Nyamnjoh 2002, 111-2). This exam-
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ple of the recognition of agency in Cameroon points to the culturally biased 
mainstream understanding of agency as individual capacity to act. A convivial 
understanding of agency then means that subaltern agency is complicit with that 
of the dominants, and vice versa; that agency emerges within the broader social 
spectrum of conviviality. Agency is then open to groups and individuals, emer-
gent within the convivial relations between rulers and ruled as a form of negotia-
tion between the two. Agency should therefore not be understood solely as indi-
vidual empowerment or capacity. It may have other forms, both in how it is so-
cially recognised (as the study of Nyamnjoh shows) as in its practical manifesta-
tion (as politique par le bas emphasises) through forms of reciprocal relations 
and rhizomatic social structures (as Bayart discussed).  
Agency seen as existing in conviviality means understanding agency beyond 
the relative autonomy of social actors and gives new perspectives on the relations 
between the political and the individual or the group. Rather than seeing political 
elites as exploiting victimised and incapacitated masses, it argues that the masses 
partake in the production and reproduction of the existing authoritarian state, and 
may thereby be complicit in their own exploitation (Bayart 1983, 112). This em-
phasis on social relations instead of central social binaries relocates agency, it is 
located neither with high politics (mainstream political science approach) nor 
with the subaltern (radical critique on the mainstream approach) but in the inter-
action. It thus brings a new dimension to questions of local agencies in a liberal- 
or post-liberal peace. This conceptualisation of agency enables a meaningful ap-
proach to the study of the consumption of liberal democracy at the site of the Na-
tional Assembly. Instead of perceiving Parliamentarians as isolated actors that 
have agency because of their elite status, it understands them as members of a 
society recipient of liberal peace building interventions. It locates Parliamentari-
ans in a web of social structures that enables their agencies. 
Richmond’s critical agency is primarily concerned with agencies of ordinary 
people, the ‘local-local’ which lies hidden beneath the often externalised civil 
society (Richmond 2011b, 13). The concept of convivial agency is another way 
of undoing the ignoring of the silenced masses and their everyday needs, but 
without ignoring elites either. Local elites are not cut-off from the everyday or 
the local-local. Because convivial agency emphasises the interaction between 
elites and masses, it does not isolate groups of people from the broader social 
complexity that they participate in. Local agencies are enabled and shaped 
through these interactions, seeing either group in isolation of the other means 
ignoring important aspects of local agencies and their consumption of the liberal 
peace.  
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Parliamentarians as consumers of the liberal peace 
When conceptualising agency as convivial, we understand elites and their agen-
cies in the context of the society they represent and are part of. We can then no 
longer see these elites as being distinct from society, but as being an integral part 
of it. Just as we can study ordinary people and everyday agencies which are ena-
bled by their interactions with others, we can also study local elites’ everyday 
agencies that are similarly enabled by their interaction with others, elites as well 
as non-elites. They are part of a spectrum of interrelated agencies and have their 
own everyday. This everyday is about how people ‘navigate their way around 
and try to create space for their own activities while taking into consideration 
institutions of power’ (De Certeau 1984, xi, Richmond 2009b, 571). This does 
not exclude elites per se. Just because they have a different social position than 
non-elites, and thus a different kind of everyday, does not make them less local, 
and therefore less relevant for the understanding of local consumption of the lib-
eral peace. A certain local-local that lies hidden beneath the externalised ‘local’ 
of civil society (Richmond 2011b, 14-15) also lies hidden within the institutions 
that liberal peace building practices aim to build. It lies hidden in the practices of 
the people that make these institutions function. The point is thus to approach the 
agencies of local elites in a non-elitist way but focus on their hidden agencies. 
De Certeau’s notion of consumption recognises that agents’ engagement with 
power structures is dependent on their relation to this power structure. Just as 
ordinary people, elites consume power – in our context, the liberal peace – alt-
hough they may do this from a different position and with different interests. 
Their reproduction of power and their co-optation with power is also a form of 
consumption. Local political elites have in this sense an interesting, but ambiva-
lent position. They may be part of the state structure, reproduce state power and 
be co-opted in the liberal peace, as for example elected Parliamentary representa-
tives. But they are nevertheless still part of a local recipient community and as 
such have local aspirations, needs, customs and cultures which, as critical agen-
cies, negotiate the liberal peace. This ambivalent position of local elites makes it 
highly relevant to study their everyday agencies as consumers of the liberal peace 
that may at times resist, reject, avoid, subvert, deviate and at other times accept, 
negotiate and reproduce it.  
These forms of consumption of the liberal peace are shaped by local needs, 
aspirations, culture, custom and desires, as Richmond argued for critical agen-
cies. But as I argued in the previous paragraph, those local needs are also in-
formed by the social relations – elites and the people they represent, elites and 
other elites. This is even more so in a context in which a new democratic frame-
work aims to change these elite-citizen engagements through liberal democratic 
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practices such as elections, representative governance, civil society interaction, 
etc. This means that elites can be studied and analysed in a non-elitist way, fo-
cusing on their everyday practices of how they consume democracy in interaction 
with others – their constituencies, the power structures they are part of, their own 
needs and aspirations, cultures and customs. Focusing on this interaction between 
MPs and others will give us a more complete understanding of how people’s 
agencies interact, how democracy is being consumed locally, and how local pre-
sent structures shape and enable agencies to consume their democracy. 
Elites such as MPs thus consume the liberal peace through a variety of prac-
tices of consumption. They do that in their role as political representatives of 
their constituency, as Member of Parliament, as member of the opposition or ma-
jority, as member of a certain political party or as independent political actor, as 
supporter of the President, as member of an inner clique of power, etc. Each 
identity depends on one’s relation to other actors (such as representative or 
member) which comes with different expectations and obligations. But agencies 
are also enabled by one’s relation to power (to the liberal peace). For example, 
being an MP means that one’s identity of MP is a form of co-optation with the 
liberal peace (the notion of elected parliamentary representation), which enables 
and disables certain forms of agency. But this being an MP has different aspects: 
one is a constituency representative, but also a member of a political party or an 
independent political actor, a member of the majority or opposition. These en-
gagements all enable and disable different agencies. It suggests that the engage-
ment with the liberal peace of political actors such as MPs is highly ambivalent 
and much more nuanced than as it is often understood in terms of ‘co-optation’ 
or reproducers of power- and state structures. Looking at their everyday practices 
of consumption of the structures they are both subject of (as local agents) and 
part of (as MPs that are elected through the liberal democratic practice of elec-
tions) can tell us much more about how such an important group of actors engag-
es with the liberal peace.  
That such analyses of the everyday of elites and their everyday practices can 
be very insightful about the functioning of politics locally has been shown in the 
work of, for example, Jean-Pascal Daloz and Peter Geschiere (see for example 
Daloz 1999b, Daloz 2003b, Daloz 2009, Geschiere 1995). However, the litera-
tures that study the practices and agencies of political elites have analysed these 
practices in isolation of – or not in the context of – peace building interventions. 
The emerging literature on everyday agencies in the context of liberal peace 
building has, on the other hand, focused on the ‘local-local’ of non-elites, of the 
silenced subaltern. By combining an approach that focuses on the ‘local-local’ in 
order to include silenced voices in liberal peace building practices, with the study 
of institutions of state and governance, this study aims to bring new insights in 
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the hidden agencies that occur within the core of institutionalist state building 
practices.  
This thesis focuses on the National Assembly in post-war DRC. It recognises 
the critique that that the liberal peace is disconnected from societies because of 
its top-down approach and its privileging of institutions over people. But it also 
recognises that these institutions are not irrelevant. The focus on local agencies 
that make the institutions function aims to provide a non-institutionalist approach 
to the study of the institutionalist project of state building. It are people that make 
institutions function. The theoretical frame outlined in this chapter aims to shift 
attention to agencies in this state building process by focusing on their practices 
of the consumption of the liberal peace. As discussed in this chapter, this con-
sumption takes place in a hybrid space which enables local agencies. This space 
is produced by local agencies that seek an emancipatory peace that can be re-
sponsive to local needs. It is a hybrid space which is discursively produced by 
the interaction between the liberal and the local. In order to explore this hybrid 
space as a context in which local agencies are enabled, I will explore the discur-
sive interaction between the local and the liberal. A historic perspective is essen-
tial to appreciate local discourses about the present experience of the liberal 
peace and the way in which people exercise their existence in the present. I will 
therefore explore narratives about the present by placing them in a context of 
narratives about the past. In these local narratives we can identify local needs, 
demands and interpretations of the significance and meaning of the liberal peace 
and the present in general. These narratives give us insights in how the present 
experience of the liberal peace has meaning in terms of a political project that 
seeks emancipation, self-determination and a peace that is responsive to local 
needs rather than international desires.  
But if this hybrid space is a product of the discursive interaction between local 
and liberal discourses, these liberal discourses should be analysed in terms of 
their engagement with the local and the needs expressed in its discourses as well. 
Therefore, after having explored Congolese narratives, I will focus on the dis-
courses of the liberal peace and its materialisation in the Congo. A comparison of 
the two, or putting the two together will show the discursive emergence of a hy-
brid space. This is then a virtual site in which the local agencies that consume the 
liberal peace are active.  
I have chosen for the site of the National Assembly because it is a site of sig-
nificance for the liberal peace. The liberal peace at the site of the National As-
sembly is specifically concerned with liberal democracy, so the research on the 
consumption of the liberal peace will focus on the consumption of an important 
pillar of the liberal peace, namely liberal democracy, more specifically in terms 
of how it concerns the National Assembly and its actors. Not only is Parliament 
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at the heart of liberal democracy, it is also a space in which agencies of elites and 
non-elites (MPs, executive, citizens) interact and collide. It is thus relevant in 
terms of a research that concerns post-war state building and the liberal peace, 
but it is also relevant for the kind of questions and issues this research project 
engages with. I have thus, despite my arguments for a non-institutional perspec-
tive on institution building, still chosen to focus on an institution. I maintain my 
argument that institutions are important, but that to understand their functioning, 
one should focus on the people (agencies) that make these institutions function in 
a certain way. The choice to study the National Assembly is thus legitimate, but 
it needs to be approached differently. That is, not as an institution relieved of its 
human characteristics, but as a site of local agencies. It is a space of movement, 
of dynamics in which local agencies consume democracy. My concern is then not 
with how the legislature functions as an institution that is central to the new 
democratic political order – i.e. whether it functions as it should according to the 
liberal democratic norm, or how it functions as an institution of liberal democra-
cy, identifying problems and bottlenecks. Rather, my interest lies with how ac-
tors, agents, that act on the site of the National Assembly act in their engagement 
with the new democratic order. In other words, my interest lies in how these 
agents consume liberal democracy in their participation in and engagement with 
this institution of democracy. This also means that the ‘site’ is a virtual site 
which is defined not by the walls of the People’s Palace, but by its agencies 
which penetrate in society as well as in the executive and occur in faculties out-
side the formal sphere of politics such as in the behavioural and performative 
spheres. This is convivial agency – the agencies enabled by the interaction be-
tween MPs, citizens, the executive, and to a lesser extent members of the interna-
tional community, donor agencies as well as (I)NGOs that engage with Parlia-
ment and its agents in their state building and democratisation programmes. Alt-
hough there are also other actors and agents that are directly or indirectly in-
volved (e.g. parliamentary staff, provincial governance institutions which 
through gubernatorial elections elect the Senate, business interests ...), my re-
search will be limited to these groups of agents.  
The notion of convivial agency in the context of Parliament means that an MP 
as such and on its own has little agency. He becomes a relevant agent that con-
sumes democracy when he acts with or in response to other agents (his engage-
ments with the executive), his engagements in the Parliament (with other MPs), 
his engagements with the electorate, or representatives of the international/donor 
community. It is in these relations, these engagements with others that agencies 
are enabled and through which liberal democratic hegemony is consumed. De-
pending on his relation to the power structure (as an elected member of Parlia-
ment, a member of the opposition or majority, a member of a political party or in 
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his capacity as independent political actor, or perhaps as a close confident of the 
those in power) different agencies are enabled. Convivial agency in the context 
of liberal democratic hegemony is thus concerned with how liberal democratic 
hegemony is being consumed through agents through their relations with others.  
 
  
4 
Negotiating the present and  
claiming emancipation 
“I am bound to tell what I am told, but not in every case to believe it” - Herodotus 
On a morning in November 2009, I was talking with a group of young political 
activists in Kasavubu district in Kinshasa. We spoke about political develop-
ments in the Congo since the end of the war, and the promises and disappoint-
ments of democracy. A passerby tapped me on the shoulder and said ‘Mundele1, 
c’est a cause de vous’. The people with whom I was speaking were slightly em-
barrassed but did not contradict the man when he spoke about how the West has 
betrayed the Congo and its people. He said to me ‘I don’t like (President) Kabi-
la’, and walked away. The man used an in the Congo commonly used narrative to 
make sense of the current situation. He perceives the West to be the cause of 
Congolese misery. He is disappointed in President Kabila, but he understands 
that Kabila is in power because he is the favourite of the West, like Mobutu had 
been in the past. He therefore holds the West responsible for the perpetuation of 
misery and the veneer of democracy.  
In this chapter I will discuss these Congolese historic narratives and argue that 
they give meaning to the post-war reality of Congolese people. In the previous 
chapter I have conceptualised the post-war as a time of instability and redefini-
tion in which subjectivities emerge through a process of making sense of the pre-
sent and imaging a future which demands a coming to terms with the past. The 
narratives I discuss in this chapter form part of this process of sense making of 
the present people experience. Historic self-narratives are therefore important 
informants of a Congolese demand for emancipation.  
                                                          
1  Mundele is Lingala for white person or foreigner, although the term is also used for people that have 
adopted ’white people’s behaviour’ CEUPPENS, B. 2003. Onze Congo? Congolezen over de 
kolonialisatie, Leuven, Davidsfonds. 
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The narratives are stories with a purpose which are constructed for a purpose. 
We will see that in the historic self-narratives a political project of emancipation 
is captured. This quest for emancipation is grounded in a local understanding of 
the present. This is an essential element for the understanding of local agencies 
and their participation in the present. It is a politico-historic context in which 
they exercise their existence. But they are also narratives that are silenced by the 
liberal peace. In doing so, it disengages from a local political project of emanci-
pation. To provide a necessary background to the narratives and their workings, 
the chapter starts with a brief historic overview of the various phases of transition 
to democracy in the Congo.  
Democratic transition since 1990 
Efforts for democratisation in Congo did not start with the 2003 peace agree-
ment. In November 1980, thirteen parliamentarians wrote an open letter to Mo-
butu in which they criticised him for being the cause of (then) Zaire’s economic 
and political problems, and demanded political change in the name of the people 
of Zaire (Ngalula Pandanjila et al. 1981). The letter was a response to Mobutu’s 
declaration of 1977, in which he had announced political reforms (Mobutu nd), 
but which had not materialised. The 13 parliamentarians, under the leadership of 
Etienne Tshisekedi, would in 1985 found the Zairian popular opposition party 
UDPS that lead the political resistance against the Mobutu regime. In the 1980s 
the economy further collapsed, the regime had to resort more and more to violent 
repression to maintain a form of order and lost effective control over large parts 
of the country. It took Mobutu until 1990 before he finally bended to growing 
international and domestic pressure for democratic reform.  
The changing international context after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and 
increasing economic crisis domestically made an end to the unconditional sup-
port for the regime from the West (in particular a changing of tone from close 
allies Belgium, France, USA and the IFIs). Together with rising national unrest 
and political opposition, and with an eye for political transitions taking place in 
the region, Mobutu announced political change in January 1990. There would be 
a national consultation process with the intention of investigating popular de-
mands for political reform. The population was invited to present their concerns a 
consultation committee in the following months. The response was overwhelm-
ing. After the consultation, Mobutu announced an end to the single party regime 
and a transition to democracy through a National Sovereign Conference (CNS). 
He also stepped down as leader of the MPR (Mouvement Populaire de la Révolu-
tion), redefined his role of head of state, and shed some tears – ‘understand my 
emotions’ were perhaps the most legendary words he ever spoke (Mobutu 2008).  
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Following the successful example of Benin in 1990, a CNS became a popular 
mechanism for political transition in Francophone Africa in the 1990s. The CNS 
was a national round table in which government delegates, interest groups, oppo-
sition parties and churches negotiated about the future political organisation of 
the country. The mechanism of a CNS was based on Rousseau’s ideas about 
popular sovereignty and the right of the people to renegotiate a social contract. It 
was a platform on which the people renegotiated the social contract with the po-
litical leadership, setting the stage for democratic transition (Robinson 1994b, 
577). The purpose of the CNS was firstly to investigate the wrongs of the past, 
both in terms of political and economic policy as well as crimes committed by 
the regime. As such it had a similar function as a truth and reconciliation com-
mittee as a mechanism for reconciliation and transitional justice. Secondly, the 
CNS would have to decide what would be the best way to get out of the crises 
Zaire was facing. It had to adopt a transitional constitution and a constitution for 
the Third Republic, and establish transitional political institutions (i.a. Parlia-
ment, Government of National Unity, Electoral Commission) (Nzongola-Ntalaja 
2002, 190-92). 
The transitional process under the CNS would be a turbulent period. It failed 
to establish a democratic system mainly because of the obstructions by Mobutu 
who tried to cling onto power (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002, 193). Public protests 
against Mobutu’s control over the process, and the demand for its reopening after 
Mobutu had closed it prematurely, resulted in the bloodbaths of the Christian 
March of February 1991 and the massacre at the university of Lubumbashi in 
May 1990 (Jewsiewicki et al. 1995, Kongolo-Mukanya 1991). Mobutu appointed 
eight new governments and Prime Ministers between 1990 (the ‘launch’ of the 
democratic transition) and 1994 (Kabungulu Ngoy-Kangoy 1995, Annex A), 
thereby firmly taking control over the process of democratic transition even 
though he was merely ceremonial head of state according to the power sharing 
agreement that came out of the CNS process. Eventually, general elections were 
scheduled for 1997, but these would never be held as Laurent Kabila toppled 
Mobutu in May 1997.  
Kabila spoke of democratisation but quickly installed a centralised regime that 
resembled that of his predecessor. He excluded Tshisekedi’s UDPS from his 
‘Gouvernement de Salut Publique’, thereby alienating many of his initial sup-
porters (Schatzberg 1997, 70). Only days after overthrowing Mobutu, Kabila is-
sued a constitutional decree that established a transitional system in which power 
was centralised in the hands of the President. Besides being head of the execu-
tive, he controlled defence, exercised legislative powers and ruled by decree 
(1997, Art. 5). He announced a system that was supposed to be a radical and di-
rect democracy at the grassroots level in which Committees of Popular Power 
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(CPP) were elected. However, rather than direct democracy, the CPPs functioned 
as an instrument to consolidate Kabila’s weak power base and to mobilise and 
control the population (Villers and Omasombo Tshonda 2002, 406-07). Political 
change towards democracy, or the further rooting of a new dictatorship, was 
again interrupted by war that started in August 1998. Contrary to the previous 
war, this war did not overthrow the regime, but ended at the negotiating table in 
Sun City, South Africa, in December 2002.  
One of the five prime objectives of the Sun City Peace Agreement were dem-
ocratic elections that would complete the transition to a democratic political or-
der (2002, II). During the transition period, power and posts in state institutions 
were divided between the different signatories of the agreement (the ex-
government, rebel movements, political opposition and civil society) based on a 
power sharing formula. The power-sharing agreement is commonly referred to as 
the ‘1+4’, which refers to the system in which one President was assisted by four 
Vice-Presidents from different signatories of the agreement. Power sharing was a 
necessary mechanism to end the war, but proved to make the transition process 
complex. Lack of mutual trust, lack of commitment towards the transitional 
agenda, lack of willingness to work together and ongoing local conflict and secu-
rity concerns dominated the transition process (De Goede & Van der Borgh 
2008, 119-21, International Crisis Group 2006, 5, MONUC/PAD 2004, 1-2).  
Much emphasis was given to the elections as the end goal for the transition, 
the closure of cycles of conflict and the start of a new chapter in the history of the 
DRC. The post-war transition process was framed in terms of a democratic tran-
sition. However, considering the relatively short time frame and the conditions 
under which the transition was to take place, a more realistic perspective was for 
elections to replace the problematic transitional government and Parliament with 
democratically elected governing institutions that could lead a democratisation 
and state rebuilding process in the post-transition period. It was a situation in 
which the termination of the existing situation was an urgent need, and elections 
were seen as a good mechanism to achieve that. Organising elections to end the 
transition process was thus not, as some have argued, a new approach of promot-
ing democracy under conditions of war (Abass Ahamed 2006). Rather, elections 
were made instrumental in the transition from war to peace (Lyons 2002). The 
elections that were to end the transition process were seen from this less idealistic 
and more pragmatic perspective, aiming to create an enabling environment for 
post-transition democratisation and state building (De Goede 2006, 92). Elec-
tions were thus an important end goal of the transition process.  
Organising elections in post-war DRC was nevertheless an overwhelming 
task. Voters had to be identified and registered, though there had not been a cen-
sus since 1984 (UN 2005, 2) and hardly anyone had identity documents. 9,000 
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polling centres had to be set-up, stocked, staffed and trained, and that all in a vast 
country with no more than 500 km of paved road, vast areas with little or no 
communication facilities nor electricity, and certainly no experience with multi-
party elections for more than 40 years (Human Rights Watch 2005, 4-5, 
International Crisis Group 2006, 2-3, UN 2005, 1). There was also no legal 
framework to enable elections. At the very minimum, a new constitution and 
electoral law were required, but also laws on i.a. political parties, campaign fund-
ing and the independence of the courts were required to enable the elections to 
take place in a well organised and fair manner. 
On 30 July 2006 the elections were finally held, and Joseph Kabila (who had 
succeeded his father after he was assassinated in January 2001) was elected and 
inaugurated in December of that year. A national Parliament and provincial as-
semblies were elected and installed. Despite a few incidents and violent clashes 
in Kinshasa related to the electoral results, it was considered a successful process 
that had achieved its objective of ending the war and creating an enabling envi-
ronment for state building and further democratisation by installing a legitimate 
government. For many Congolese it was an important milestone that meant a 
new beginning after suffering under dictatorship and violent conflict, completing 
a transition to democracy that had lasted sixteen years.  
Congolese historic self-narratives as mythistory 
The past and the present 
The above brief description of the history of democratisation in the Congo since 
the 1980s puts the current post-war democratisation effort in a sequence of 
events that shows that the democratisation process has historicity. In order to 
make sense of current affairs we often refer to the past – looking for roots, ori-
gins or historic patterns. However, just whose past, or better said whose narra-
tives, we engage with is a generally overlooked question. When speaking with 
Congolese people about their history it is evident that their interpretations differ 
from those commonly held abroad. For example, for many internationals current-
ly working in the Congo, the democratisation process has started in 2003. For 
many Congolese it started in the early 1990s, or even before. For internationals 
the guiding document for democratisation is the Sun City peace agreement, Con-
golese often refer to conclusions of the CNS. For internationals the wars were 
conflicts as a consequence of state failure and the greed of Congolese warlords, 
for many Congolese it was an internationally instigated hurdle in the struggle for 
democracy. And while the Sun City Accords have ended the war in the eyes of 
international policy makers, many Congolese do not speak of peace because the 
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daily reality of this peace differs little from that of war and it is therefore consid-
ered an inappropriate term to describe their daily realities. 
To engage meaningfully with Congolese experiences, we should, as Luise 
White has argued, let ‘people speak for themselves’ by allowing them to use their 
own narratives and stories (White 2000, 50). People’s understanding of the world 
in which they live is always historically informed. The relations between the 
past, present and future are fundamental for processes of change and people’s 
understanding of it. The distinction between before and after, or between past, 
present and future is too simplistic because ‘every age is in reality a combination 
of several temporalities’ (Mbembe 2001b, 15). Instead of understanding time as a 
sequence, in which the presence replaces the past and precedes the future, for 
Mbembe the past is not replaced by the present. The past is part of the present, in 
the same way the future is part of the present as well. The point is thus not to see 
the present just with respect to its proper historicity (Bayart 1996a), but with re-
spect to the rapports between the past (historicity, history and memory) and the 
current, and the projected future. The present and the future are intimately con-
nected: the past gives meaning to the present; the present gives direction for the 
future; the future makes us reinterpret the past. The claim of discursive space by 
non-western voices in the liberal peace also has a historiographic element to it.  
Both the Subaltern Studies group and the English Marxist social historians 
have emphasised the democratisation of historiography, writing historical anal-
yses in which subaltern groups – peasants, women, and other non-elites – are the 
subject of history (Chakrabarty 2000b, 14-15). These approaches have empha-
sised not only that non-elites are part of historical production, even though their 
voices are less heard, but also that perspectives from below provide unheard nar-
ratives on historical phenomena. In the study of non-western history, this ap-
proach has produced understandings of post-colonial experiences which break 
away from reading history within the frames of Eurocentric interpretations of the 
non-West as ‘the other’ (Gandhi 1998, 170-71). Filipino Pantayong Pananew 
historiography goes a step further and eliminates the West not only as a narrator, 
but also an as audience by emphasising that historiography should be ‘from us 
and for us’. It therefore rejects writing in a non-native language and writes in 
Tagolog (Filipino) (Reyes 2008).  
These historiographies are activist historiographies that provide additional 
perspectives on historical events. It has produced emancipatory historiographies 
that articulate national history in anti-colonial and nationalist terms, and empha-
sise exploitation and historical injustice.2 However, the purpose of this chapter is 
not activist or to give voice. Rather than seeking to give voice to subaltern narra-
                                                          
2  A well-known example of this genre is Rodney (1973). On the DRC, see for example Mbavu Muhin-
du (2005). 
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tives as a means to democratise historic knowledge, this chapter seeks to analyse 
how Congolese people employ historic self-narratives to interpret and give mean-
ing to the present. Historical knowledge then has a purpose and a function and 
historical narratives should be understood as such (White 1973, 1-42).  
People employ their history to interpret the present and deal with events, and 
in the process they reinterpret the past (Alexander 2000, 253). From this perspec-
tive, historiography is not a representation of a historical reality, but rather a re-
construction in light of the present. The historiographer adds meaning, an inter-
pretation, to his narrative – historical facts do not shape the narrative, the narra-
tive shapes the historical facts (Ankersmit 1984, 186-88). Here Paul Ricœur’s 
philosophy of history is helpful. Ricœur’s work on history and historiography 
builds on Heidegger’s centralisation of historic experience for human existence 
and Gadamer’s notion of the way the past lives on in the present (Guignon 2006, 
551-5). Engaging with history is eventually a way of engaging with the present. 
Ricœur holds history to be purposeful, intentional or futural – the present is al-
ways on the horizon when thinking about the past (Ricœur 2004, 412). His ar-
gument on the intentionality of history is most strongly developed in his work on 
the mediation between time and narrative in which he focuses on the concept of 
emplotment (Ricœur 1984, 53-54). Emplotment mediates between individual 
events and the story as a whole. And secondly, it brings together different factors 
in the same story, towards the plot (Ricœur 1984, 65-66). Emplotment thus pro-
vides the explanatory effect of the story. Ricœur here follows Hayden White who 
argues that explanation through narrative occurs through the use of emplotment, 
which is different from explanation through argument (Ricœur 1984, 164, White 
1973, 7-11). With their notion of emplotment, White and Ricœur take distance 
from narrativist historiography which relies on a linear understanding of time and 
a story to be composed of a beginning, middle and an end. By focusing on the 
purpose of history through emplotment Ricœur proposes a different engagement 
with history and time. ‘By reading the end in the beginning and the beginning in 
the end, we learn also to read time backward, as the recapitulating of the initial 
conditions of a course of actions in its terminal consequences’ (Ricœur 1980, 
180). 
The notion of history as a construction and understanding of plots (Veyne 
1971), emphasises the centrality of the narrator’s point of view. Through em-
plotment the narrator constructs a story based on events, a story that is intentional 
or purposeful in that it provides explanation. This also means that there is ‘no 
longer a polarity between history and its other’. The historian, or narrator, is 
closely involved in the formation of historical objectivity, of historical truth 
(Ricœur 2004, 295). Ricœur thus turns away from the notion of historiography as 
giving an account of facts and truth (Ricœur 1984, 171). Instead, he argues that 
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historic truth does not exist, for it is dependent on the horizon of the present, that 
is, the purpose of the narrator’s past for his present (Ricœur 2007, 50-1).  
By looking at historic narrative through Ricœur’s lens, we can engage with 
these historic narratives to understand Congolese perspectives on the present be-
cause the narrated emplotment produces the truth of the narrator. This means that 
historiography is a negotiation between the past and the present, in which peo-
ple’s perceptions have influenced historic events, but also how events have 
shaped a worldview, a mindset and perceptions (Reyes 2008, 249). Historic nar-
ratives thus engage with the present as a state of being and a process of becom-
ing, that needs ‘inventing what no longer is, and perhaps never was, but must be 
in order to legitimize our presence, to give it a meaning that ensures the link be-
tween what no longer is and is not yet, constitutes the most important feature of 
postmodern invention of the present’ (Jewsiewicki 1993, 772).  
 
History, memory and mythistory 
Memory connects the past and the present representations of the past in narra-
tives are expressions of memory. In Memory, history, forgetting Ricœur explores 
the dynamics between memory and history, with the perspective of the horizon 
of the present and the future (Ricœur 2004, 412). For Ricœur memory has two 
dimensions; a veridical dimension and a practical one. It is at the intersection of 
these two dimensions that memory becomes intentional for the present (Ricœur 
2004, 54, 57). Memory, as an object of historical knowledge, has a duty to the 
present and the future in the sense of forgetting and forgiveness. Ricœur speaks 
about ‘reckoning with time’ as the way in which people mediate between 
memory and history (Ricœur 2004, 383-4).  
For the purpose of this study I consider these historic narratives as historic im-
aginations or myths. I choose the term myth not to imply that Congolese narra-
tives hold no truth and are fictional. Neither do I imply that Congolese people 
refer to their historic narratives as a myth themselves. I choose the term because 
the narratives fulfil a role in interpreting the present and making sense of every-
day life. The concept of myth embodies the notion of emplotment in historic nar-
ratives. Myths should not be taken literally in the search for historical facts, but 
rather they reflect constituted truths for the people that narrate them. They are 
narratives which locate the present in a historical sequence. They provide no-
tions, sourced from the past, that interpret and give meaning to the present (Ram 
1993, 11-12, Veyne 1988, 14, 113, 123).  
But these narratives should also not be seen as being distinct from historical 
experience and events. The two notions of ‘truth’ and ‘myth’, logos and mythos, 
are not necessarily opposed. Rather, they interact dialectically, together con-
structing ‘mythistory’ (Blok 1994, 41, Heehs 1994, 11-15). Myths are construct-
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ed on historical facts, events, which become distorted and ‘mythologised’. The 
narrative, however, continues to make claims of historical truth and facts, and 
uses the language of logic and reason to validate itself (Heehs 1994, 15). This 
comes back to Malinowski’s argument that myth is not so much a story told but 
rather a reality lived (Malinowski 1926, 21, Orr 1991, 142). Congolese myth 
should be understood as the outcome of the dialectics between myth and histori-
cal facts.  
However, I would like to go one step further in the discussion about truth, or 
rather historical accuracy, and myth. Considering these historic narratives as 
myth shifts attention from historical events to the function the narrative has for 
the present. Concerns whether these narratives have truth and historic accuracy 
then become irrelevant (Veyne 1988, 122). The notion of a myth emphasises the 
function of narratives and their emplotment rather than its historic truth. It can 
therefore be employed when considered useful (Veyne 1988, 84). What matters 
is their function in enabling people to give meaning to the present reality they 
experience. Myths employ the constitutive power of the imaginaire (Veyne 1988, 
117-18). The imaginaire3  is not the unreal but refers to the inability to distin-
guish the real from the unreal, and thus the irrelevance of this distinction (Bayart 
2005, 132, Deleuze 1995, 66). The imaginaire is a form of consciousness that 
represents the meaning of the real (Sartre 2005, 360-61). But it is more than 
merely an ‘image of’, something that gives meaning to something that ‘is’. The 
imaginaire is a source for the creation of this ‘real’:  
‘The imaginaire does not come from the image in the mirror or from the gaze of the other. 
Instead, the ‘mirror’ itself and its possibility, and the other as mirror, are the works of the 
imaginaire, which is creation ex nihilo” (Castoriadis 1987, 3). 
Historic imagination thus shapes the reality of Congolese people, and is thus 
constitutive of the post-war state of being. The sphere of the imaginaire operates 
at the materialisation of that what is not (yet) into that what is and thus blurs the 
state between Deleuze’s ‘real’ and the ‘unreal’ (Deleuze 1995, 66, Peñafiel 2008, 
100-02). Myths, as expressions of historical imagination, are thus an important 
resource that gives meaning to the present, but they are also a source that creates 
the present.  
                                                          
3  I use the French term ’imaginaire’ because, as Chambers remarks, the English translation ’imaginary’ 
of the French concept of the imaginaire does not have the same meaning. The English term imaginary 
refers only to that what is imagined, the faculty of imagination. The French term imaginaire as it has 
been developed in French philosophy refers to a much more complex notion of interaction between 
consciousness and objects, between ideas and their materialisation (Sartre 2005). Chambers therefore 
suggests translating the French imaginaire for ’imaginarium’, to maintain the aspect of the imaginaire 
as ’that what is possible to think’ (Chambers, R. 2001). Because this term also does not necessarily 
capture the meaning of the term imaginaire in its full extent, and in my view only adds another layer 
of interpretation and potential misinterpretation, I follow the example of the translator of Bayarts, 
L’illusion identitaire and use the French term imaginaire (Bayart 2005). 
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The conceptualisation of these Congolese narratives as mythistory makes them 
usable because they are then not just stories, they are stories with a purpose, con-
structed for a purpose (Felkins and Goldman 1993, 448-49, O’Flaherty 1988, 
35). The narrative produces a regime of truth that defines the kinds of narratives 
and arguments that are accepted as true, the frame of reference that can define 
what is to be true and what is not (Foucault 1980, 132). This regime of truth 
frames the historicity of the relations between the Congo and the West in the nar-
ratives. It is the confrontation with this regime of truth one encounters when dis-
cussing with Congolese people about the issues of the narrative. There often 
seems to be a miscommunication between internationals and Congolese not be-
cause of different argumentation, but because of experiencing and reflecting the 
same historic facts in a different regime of truth. What this regime of truth, like 
any other regime of truth, does, is that it makes certain things thinkable and logi-
cal while it discards others (Foucault 1980, 133).  
The purpose of understanding historic narratives as historiographic narratives 
that carry myth is that it emphasises a constructed truth for Congolese people that 
is relevant for the current post-war state building process. Studies on civil war 
have shown the importance of what Oberschall calls ‘collective myths’ in the 
process of mobilising people for war (Jabri 1996, 139, Mertus 1999, Murer 2009, 
Oberschall 2007, 123-4). Subsequently, these collective myths are the key for 
successful peace building (Murer 2010, Oberschall 2007, 188). What these stud-
ies emphasise is the mobilising force of these collective myths, the fact that they 
can be manipulated to serve a purpose, be it war or peace. In more general terms, 
the effect of these myths is that they shape people’s perceptions of and engage-
ment with the present. For the moment we can leave undefined for what Congo-
lese myths mobilise, but we can recognise their relevance for understanding 
Congolese engagement with the post-war State building process. 
 
Sources and producing narratives in the Congo 
In the following paragraph I will explore Congolese historic narratives as 
myths and their workings as interpretative frameworks that give meaning to the 
post-war experience. A few comments on the main sources from which I have 
drawn are in place. Evidently, there are multiple Congolese myths, none of them 
is uncontested. I do not aim to discuss a grand Congolese historic narrative. Ra-
ther, the narratives I will discuss are based on discussions with my respondents. 
They were widely shared by people in different parts of the country where I con-
ducted my research (Bas-Congo, Kinshasa, South Kivu), in which different polit-
ical preferences exist as well as different recent historical experiences. They also 
appeared to be shared by people from different social strata, such as political 
elites, civil society activists, members of the general public, and political party 
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activists. In my discussions and interviews with Congolese during my research in 
the Congo, as well as during previous visits to the country, my discussants often 
emphasised their historic experiences. These historic narratives were important 
for them to explain their perspectives. They found it important that I understood 
Congolese history ‘in the right way’, to be able to understand current political 
developments. The narratives I have put together in this chapter are thus collect-
ed as a by-product of my research, based on discussions, interviews and consulta-
tion of written texts and secondary sources. In addition to this, I have drawn on 
work by Congolese historiographers, and some important collections of Congo-
lese narratives that have been published by anthropologists.  
Discourses of foreign intervention in Congolese affairs are indeed produced 
by political leaders. The narratives remind us of the discourses of the nationalists 
of the 1950s and 1960s that lead the quest for independence. Ghana’s Kwame 
Nkrumah, Côte d’Ivoire’s Félix Houphouët-Boigny, Senegal’s Léopold Senghor, 
Tanzania’s Julius Nyerere, and their more radical counterparts Amilcar Cabral, 
Sekou Touré and Patrice Lumumba – they all used a nationalist discourse for 
social and political mobilisation in the quest for self-determination (Cooper 
2002, 49-59). This nationalism was distinctly different from European national-
ism (Gellner 1983, 81-82, Kedourie 1970, 29). It constructed nationalism in 
terms of liberation, and was anti-imperialist. It emphasised sovereignty and self-
determination and little beyond that (Davidson 1992, 162-64, Hobsbawm 1990, 
136). The narratives thus contain not only the image of the Congolese as victims, 
but also of a new beginning similar to the Independence fifty years earlier. They 
construct the present as a reproduction of the independence momentum.  
The narratives are quite overtly employed to present the respective leader, 
whether Mobutu, Kabila, Bemba, Tshisekedi or any other, as somebody that will 
stand up against this foreign tutelage and that will defend Congolese self-
determination, dignity and sovereignty – be it successfully or unsuccessfully. 
They mobilise the resources provided by the ‘pact between remembrance, memo-
risation and commemoration’ to justify their power (Ricœur 2004, 85). However, 
dismissing these perceptions as elitist demagoguery to seek legitimacy is one 
side of the coin. The inverse is also true. These repertoires can only be employed 
by these leaders because they respond to popular perceptions (Cruise O’Brien 
2007, 16-18). The recognition of this makes it impossible to deem the narratives 
irrelevant. In order to win popular support, one has to stand up for Congolese 
rights and resist foreign intervention. It is telling that criticisers of Kabila and 
Radio Trottoir in Kinshasa often seem more concerned with the idea that Kabila 
has the support of ‘the European Mafia’, than with the notion that he lacks sup-
port of the Congolese people.4 The meaning might be similar, but the difference 
                                                          
4  Discussion at Street Parliament, Victoire, Kinshasa, Field notes, March 2010. 
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in perspective is significant. The discourses of leaders are thus simultaneously a 
response to popular perceptions as well as sources of popular perceptions. This 
means that the use, construction and apparent manipulation of memory (and in-
deed forgetting) is more complicated than merely imposing a certain ‘authorised’ 
version of history from above, but that this truthful memory operates to oneself, 
but also in relation to others (Ricœur 2004, 132).  
What make these narratives relevant is that they are employed by various so-
cial groups in the context of politics and post-war state building – political elites, 
urban masses, rural poor, civil society activists, the military, opposition as well 
as those in support of the regime. Evidently, these people do not necessarily 
agree with each other. However, they do use the same repertoires to construct 
their arguments. My respondents from various socio-economic and political 
groups, as well as in daily talks with people in public transport and the organisa-
tions and institutions I worked with – they often referred to the same narratives, 
using it as a frame of understanding for their interpretation of current affairs.  
Some comments on knowledge production and access to information in the 
Congo are necessary. Spread of information in the Congo and creation of truths 
often depends on word of mouth, hearsay, rumour and the infamous radio trot-
toir, or ‘pavement radio’. This has perhaps less to do with the literacy rate (which 
is actually not particularly low),5 and more with a long established and chronic 
lack of (reliable) information in the country. Newspapers are rife in Kinshasa, but 
anywhere else they are difficult to acquire. Of the many books that are being 
published on the Congo, almost none are translated in local languages, and few 
of the publications in French reach the handful of bookstores that is to supply a 
city of 8 million inhabitants. Those that do are unaffordable for the far majority 
of the people.6 Outside the capital city, books are extremely hard to get.  
Radio is the most important and popular source of information, but outside the 
cities (but also increasingly within) a lack of electricity makes radio and tv often 
difficult to access which means that people often rely on rumour and hearsay for 
their access to information. I found it nevertheless surprising how well people in 
remote areas are sometimes informed about particular issues. But even in Kin-
shasa, where people have relatively good access to media (including internet) 
compared to the rest of the country, the city relies more on radio trottoir than 
anything else.  
Radio trottoir is by outsiders considered to be the over-active rumour machine 
of Kinshasa, but for the Congolese it is a medium that spreads truth and facts, as 
                                                          
5  Literacy rates were estimated in 2007 as 81% for men and 54% for women, 
http://www.irinnews.org/country.aspx?CountryCode=CD&RegionCode=GL, accessed 10 July 2010. 
6  A recently published history book on the Congo by a renowned Congolese historian Ndaywel e 
Nziem (2008) costs US$60 (price November 2010), GNI per capita in 2009 was US$160. 
(http://data.worldbank.org/country/congo-democratic-republic, accessed 24 November 2010).  
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opposed to the manipulated and propagandised media that function as vehicles of 
political actors. People have long learned not to trust the official stories, and 
therefore find information based on eye-witness accounts more valuable (Ellis 
1989, Jewsiewicki et al. 1995, 220). Increasingly, cyber cafes open their doors in 
Kinshasa, connecting the Congolese, and radio trottoir, with the internet. Ellis 
and Ter Haar describe radio trottoir as ‘the socially-channeled, oral discussion of 
current events in Africa’ which is ‘more than rumour alone. It conveys infor-
mation and news but is also used for entertainment and almost as a collective 
form of psychotherapy’ (2004, 29-30). The truths radio trottoir provides are es-
tablished because the stories are ‘readily and commonly told’ (White 2000, 31). 
This means that Congolese knowledge and popular understanding of history and 
current affairs is not based on a reflection of information from sources that are 
considered reliable in the West. However, as Luise White’s study on vampire 
stories shows, using rumour and gossip – people’s stories – as historic sources 
‘allows to access a more intimate terrain of personal experience and of thinking 
than other historical sources can do’ (White 2000, 85). Allowing people to speak 
for themselves means engaging with their stories, their truths and their sources. 
Through such stories information is spread, ideas are constructed and popular 
conscious is being developed. It is this popular consciousness that I am con-
cerned with here. 
Another source, from which I have drawn extensively, is the ‘Relecture de 
notre histoire’, a re-consideration of Congolese history in the context of the po-
litical transition of the early 1990s (Conference Nationale Souveraine 1992). This 
report is an important document in the development of Congolese self-narrative. 
The CNS tasked a committee of Congolese historians under the directorship of 
one of Congo’s foremost historian with reflecting on the past to provide a histor-
ic context to the (then) current political and economic crisis, and enable the CNS 
to learn from the past to facilitate its transitional process.  
The relecture is not a rewriting of history but rather a reinterpretation of histo-
ry to identify where and how things went wrong, how the promise of independ-
ence could have ended in such a disaster. The report elaborates on the chaotic 
years following independence in June 1960. These events have had an impact on 
the course history has taken since then up until the period of the CNS. This rein-
terpretation of historic events that had eventually resulted in the crisis of the 
1990s had a profound political meaning in the sense that it sought to simultane-
ously blame and reconcile in order to clear the ground for a new beginning that 
would not be haunted by the past. On the other hand, the document is a self-
narrative that is as little as possible hampered and influenced by foreign dis-
courses and interests. The CNS was a domestically driven process, with little in-
terference of international donors and democracy promoters. The narrative that 
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the report offers is thus a self-narrative that is written for a Congolese audience 
in an attempt to facilitate a domestically steered transition process – a narrative 
by Congolese for Congolese.  
The relecture played an important role as a narrative that produced ‘truth’ as 
part of a process; a healing mechanism that seeks to come to terms with the past 
to enable reconciliation between the perpetrators of the Mobutu regime and the 
people, thereby enabling a shared future (Rigby 2001, 186). It has succeeded in 
producing such a shared truth about the past and has much authority as such. 
Although the report itself never circulated widely, its conclusions have become 
common knowledge. It is therefore a rare source that provides authentic insights 
in Congolese historic self-narratives. It is however important to be wary of the 
dangers of the notion of collective myth and collective narratives and recognise 
that collective memory is a representation of the past that is shared by Congolese 
people, without claiming that ‘some sort of collective mind or consciousness ex-
ists above and beyond the minds of the individuals in the group’ (Wertsch 2009, 
239). 
Although other narratives exist to give meaning to different aspects of the pre-
sent reality Congolese people experience, in the context of post-war politics, state 
building and democracy, it are narratives about Congolese victimhood and strug-
gle for self-determination that dominate. This is not surprising. These repertoires 
emphasise the historicity of the relations between the Congo and the West. The 
process of post-war state building and the quest for democracy is a process in 
which the relation between the Congo and the West is prominent, for it is the 
West and international organisations dominated by the West (such as the UN and 
its agencies, and the IFIs) which are primarily engaged with these processes. This 
narrative therefore provides a relevant historic frame for Congolese experiences 
of the liberal peace, exactly because it centralises the relationship between the 
main stakeholders, and the Congolese experience of this relationship. 
‘They said “here is your independence”, now we know it is all a 
lie’.7 - Constructing historic self-narratives in Congo 
 
Rubbers’ study of Congolese narratives on post-colonial history in southern Ka-
tanga found that people use four different narratives to make sense of events and 
the situation they found themselves in. These narratives had an important com-
monality, they all emphasise the stable distinction between white people (or in 
broader terms westerners or foreigners) and Congolese people, and the opposing 
roles they have in history: chosen and cursed, perpetrators and victims, able and 
                                                          
7  Congolese journalist in conversation with author, field notes November 2009. 
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helpless. They construct a perception of domination and submission, in which the 
Congolese is presented as a passive victim that has no agency or ability to influ-
ence its own fate. His fate is determined by foreigners, either directly or indirect-
ly. Whereas the foreigners are ambiguous (they can be good or evil in their in-
tent), the Congolese is always helpless (Rubbers 2009, 283).  
One of the narratives identified by Rubbers emphasises the invisible hand of 
imperialism behind the misery of everyday life in the Congo. It reduces Congo-
lese history to western intervention, in its past and current form, which it de-
scribes as shameless greed behind a farce of altruistic arguments (Rubbers 2009, 
276). In the context of my research on politics, post-war state building and de-
mocratisation it is not surprising that exactly this narrative was brought forward 
by my informants. It is the West that is prominently present in state building and 
democratisation in contemporary post-war Congo, and therefore the necessary 
referent.  
This narrative sees Congolese post-colonial history in terms of Congolese vic-
timisation of western interference that is pursuing its own financial interests at 
the cost of Congolese self-determination and peace in the region. The mythistory 
is constructed on repertoires of violence against Congolese people, as well as 
continued interference in Congolese domestic affairs, and the breaching of sover-
eignty to serve foreign (western) financial interests. Leopold’s Congo Free State, 
the Colonial era, the Pagaille, 32 years of dictatorial rule under Mobutu, the two 
wars of the 1990s, the difficult transition process, the tutelage of CIAT dring the 
post-war transition process, and the suspicion over the elections of 2006 – the 
Congolese see the hand of the West behind these events that have victimised the 
Congolese, either directly or through manipulated African collaborators such as 
the person of Mobutu or the state of Rwanda.  
Consequently, a second important repertoire that carries the mythistory is the 
continued struggle for freedom and democracy. It is the powerful other, the West, 
Rwanda and their Congolese allies, that conspires against the Congo and its peo-
ple. But the Congolese have continued a struggle for their freedom, dignity and 
democracy. Built on the heroic status of Lumumba, the second independence 
movement of Pierre Mulele, the martyrs of 1965, the struggle for democratisation 
of the 1990s and its martyrs, and the rebellions of the 1990s – there is a narrative 
that sees the Congolese as a nation struggling against foreign inflicted injustice. 
The mythistory tells a story of how the Congo has been victimised by western 
interference and exploitation, and how the Congolese have struggled to win back 
their self-determination and dignity. It uses classic repertoires of loss, fate, vic-
timhood, good and evil, the promise of a better life, heroes and their dramatic 
deaths. The stark distinction between the two narrative forms – one of heroic vic-
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tim, the other as tragic victim – offers an opportunity to explore the ambivalence 
of Congolese engagement with the present.   
Narrating mythistory: The tragic victim 
The present of the tragic victim is put in a historic sequence that starts with the 
exploitation of the slave trade, the terror under the rule of the Congo Free State, 
followed by the Belgian colonial regime (Ceuppens 2003, Fabian 1997, 20-71, 
Ryckmans 2010). The first few years of independence were dramatic. An institu-
tional crisis made the country ungovernable, the regime lost control over the 
state, provinces seceded, rebellions broke out, foreign mercenaries roamed the 
country, Prime Minister Lumumba was assassinated, and two coups d’état were 
committed.8  This pagaille (the mess) is seen to be caused by western interfer-
ence (primarily Belgium, aided by the US and others) that did not want the Con-
go to be truly sovereign and independent, and thus beyond the control of the 
West and its financial interests. The aim was to maintain a form of neo-colonial 
control through the manipulation of Congolese leaders and let the nationalist 
government collapse (Wamba-dia-Wamba 1987, 33-35). The secessionist at-
tempts of Katanga and Kasai were not autochthonous efforts to claim self-
determination, but efforts by the West to divide and rule (commonly referred to 
by Congolese as balkanisation) to protect its financial interests. They thus engi-
neered “the consolidation of political power by Congolese moderates under the 
tutelage of Washington, New York and Brussels” (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002, 96), 
in which the Congolese were merely manipulated pawns (Conference Nationale 
Souveraine 1992, 3-4).  
This western instigated chaos enabled Mobutu to access power and install a 
dictatorial regime that would last for 32 years. Mobutu, however, presented him-
self as a combatant for Congolese dignity and self-determination. With his 
speeches on African dignity and his demands for cultural and economic self-
determination he did much to develop the Congolese victimisation narratives that 
blamed others (Dunn 2001, Mobutu 1975, 506). Mobutu emphasised that many 
of the problems the country was faced with were either a legacy of colonialism, 
or a consequence of the continuation of colonial relations in the form of neo-
colonialism (Ngoma-Binda 2009, 89).  
Mobutu’s Authenticité policy – the psychological and cultural decolonisation 
of the Congo – was presented as a counter-hegemonic discourse that rejected for-
eign tutelage. Authenticité was a form of Zairian cultural nationalism that was to 
restore national pride and build a national identity. It emphasised Congolese cul-
                                                          
8  For an account of events, see for example Ndaywel e Nziem (2008), Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002), De 
Witte (1999), Young (1965) , Young (1965) and Young and Turner (1985).  
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ture, traditions and values as a framework for development and a rejection of the 
exploitation from the West. This sense of injustice and the framing of the Con-
go’s international relations in these terms is something that is known by every 
Congolese. People in isolated rural areas, as well as urban poor, political elites 
and intellectuals – they would often emphasise to me in interviews or in conver-
sations that they know very well what is happening, how their country is exploit-
ed and who profits from this. Mobutu cleverly exploited the myths of Congolese 
submission to foreign interests that enabled him to present himself as a leader 
that claims the ‘real independence’ for the Congo. 
However, towards the end of his regime, Mobutu became more and more seen 
as the embodiment of foreign interference, the instrument of foreign interests. 
Political opposition became more and more critical of Mobutu and his regime, 
and Congolese infamous rumour machine rapidly spread these concerns. There 
were concerns about whether Mobutu was an agent of the Belgian secret service 
and whether his disastrous economic policies of Zairianisation and Radicalisa-
tion were in fact drawn-up by western advisers aimed at ruining Congolese econ-
omy. Also, Mobutus attempt to obstruct the CNS process are seen as a foreign 
inspired attempt to block change (Conference Nationale Souveraine 1992, 19-
21). The notion that Mobutu has implemented policies that worked against the 
best interest of the Congolese people thus directly lead to suspicions of him be-
ing an agent for the West.  
Not long after Laurent Kabila accessed power in May 1997 people realised 
that the country had again fallen victim to foreign interests and the problems of 
others. ‘AFDL came from abroad. From abroad comes no liberation, only ag-
gression’, said a former MP, ‘the war was a war of occupation. The state had 
been occupied, supported by Rwanda.’9 The notion of Rwandese aggression and 
interference in the Congo had developed already before the 1994 genocide. Mo-
butu’s politics had caused much controversy over the nationality and identity of 
Rwandophones (the Banyamulenge and Banyarwanda), descendants of migrants 
from the colonial days when both Rwanda and Congo were Belgian colonies. 
Anti-Rwandan sentiments were thus already rife in the Congo before the spill-
over of the Rwandan genocide into Congo in 1994 and the Rwandan aggression 
of 1996 (Mamdani 2001, 234-63, Prunier 2009a, 46-72, Vlassenroot 2002). 
When the second rebellion was launched in August 1998, the Kinois were fu-
rious. A true hunt for ‘Rwandans’ was organised in the city in which rebels that 
had reached Kinshasa from the military base in Kitona (Bas-Congo province) as 
well as civilians who were accused of being ‘Rwandan’ were assaulted or killed. 
The regime speaks about ‘the war of aggression of which our country has been 
                                                          
9  Interview with former MP 3, now civil society activist, Bukavu, 19 March 2010. 
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the victim’ (Nzazi Mabidi 2009). Followers of UDPS go even further. For them 
the failure of the CNS and the two wars that followed are related:  
‘The CNS has given the people power, self-determination. It has liberated us. The Interna-
tional Community could no longer interfere. But they did not accept that, the international 
mafia – you know who I am talking about, (Louis) Michel10 and his friends. So they instru-
mentalised the war and the Sun City peace process to win back their influence. Winning 
back our self-determination is still the struggle.’11 
Stimulated by reports by (international) NGOs, the UN reports on illegal ex-
ploitation in the Congo and its infamous so-called ‘secret paragraph’ in which 
people, countries and companies were named and shamed (UN 2001a, UN 
2001b, UN 2002, UN 2003), people frame the war as other people’s war; as the 
war of people who were after Congolese riches. The argument is that war was 
brought to the Congo by outsiders, that it was not a Congolese war. The Congo-
lese see themselves as a peace-loving nation. The idea that violence is brought to 
the Congo by the Rwandese is a common perception of Congolese people. It is 
an understandable idea, considering that the explosion of the Great Lakes Region 
in the late 1990s was triggered by the 1994 Rwandan genocide and its aftermath. 
But it is also an attempt to make sense of the senseless violence in some parts of 
the country, and to find a way to deal with it. When I spoke to an employee of a 
Congolese NGO about the state of misery in the Congo and the ongoing violence 
and conflict in the East, she asked me, ‘do you see us as being violent? Are we 
violent and aggressive?’ Her answer followed shortly, ‘we don’t do this to our-
selves. The Rwandans have brought violence here.’12 In a discussion in Bukavu, 
a town in Eastern Congo where people have suffered from ongoing conflict and 
structural violence in the region, people speak about the ‘Rwandification’ of the 
Congolese armed forces through the integration with CNDP (Congres National 
pour la Défense du Peuple) troops.13 This explains the Congolese Armed Forces’ 
atrocious behaviour, a source of insecurity rather than security.14 Similarly, in 
Bas-Congo the perpetrators of the 2007 and 2008 massacres are said to be ‘the 
                                                          
10  Louis Michel was European Commissioner for Humanitarian Aid and Development from 2004 to 
2009, before which he was Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs. He has been closely involved in Con-
golese peace and transition process, and was one of the main figureheads of the international commu-
nity in Congo. He is seen by many Congolese as being too close to President Kabila and therefore par-
tisan, and as a leader of the treacherous International Community. 
11  Interview with Street Parliamentarian 3 and UDPS, Kinshasa 03 March 2010. 
12  Discussion NGO employee, Kinshasa, field notes November 2009. 
13  CNDP was widely believed, and not just by Congolese, to be either a division of the Rwandan army, 
or a rebel force defending Rwandan interests on Congolese soil. The CNDP was composed of Rwan-
dophones, and claimed to defend the interests of the Congolese Rwandophone minority in Congo. In 
2009, as part of the peace agreement between the Congolese Government and CNDP, its troops were 
integrated in FARDC. 
14  Focus Group with 16 civil society representatives from Bukavu and surroundings, Bureau de Coordi-
nation des Société Civile, Bukavu, 16 March 2010.  
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Tutsis and the Katangans’. In other words, ‘strangers’ or ‘outsiders’, in the con-
text of Bas-Congo.15  
Since the mid-1990s there is thus a second ‘foreign evil’ that is held responsi-
ble for Congolese misfortune: Rwanda and to a lesser extent Uganda, Burundi 
and Angola – neighbouring countries that are held responsible for the continuing 
conflict since the mid-1990s and that are seen to want to control and destabilise 
Congo in order to profit from its riches, often working together with western 
powers in a conspiracy, between ‘les Anglo-Saxons’ and Rwanda against Congo: 
‘The United States is a source of instability everywhere around the world, and 
also here. But so are Great Britain, and the European Union and Belgium. (...) 
Rwanda was the driving force behind the (rebellions of) AFDL and RCD. But 
behind Rwanda were the United States and Great Britain. Rwanda is just an in-
strument of the United States and Great Britain.’16 
Referring to the failures of western responses to the 1994 Rwandan Genocide 
and its aftermath and the problem with the FDLR (Forces Démocratiques pour la 
Libération de Rwanda) on Congolese soil ever since, people feel that the Interna-
tional Community has brought a foreign (Rwandan) problem to the Congo. Peo-
ple feel they have fallen victim of a problem that is not their own.17 In his State 
of the Nation Speech of 2008, President Kabila spoke about an ‘unjust war that 
was imposed upon us’. He emphasises that not only has the Congo become vic-
tim of a crisis that was not its own, it is also not assisted adequately by those re-
sponsible, leaving the country victimised twice (Kabila Kabange 2008). In the 
east it is strongly felt that Rwandan problems continue to haunt the Congo, a no-
tion which was reconfirmed in 2009 when Rwandan troops were invited to enter 
the Congo to join an offensive against the FDLR. Unfortunately for the Congo-
lese in these parts of the country, these ‘Rwandan’ problems are dealt with on 
Congolese soil, making Congolese civilian victims. A great sense of injustice 
exists, and people feel betrayed by the international community which has im-
posed peace negotiation and a power sharing agreement on the Congolese, while 
the regime in neighbouring Rwanda is not told, or put under pressure enough, to 
talk with its enemy, the FDLR. Kagame refuses to talk to them, the International 
Community accepts that and the Congo suffers from it, is the reasoning. The In-
ternational Community is therefore considered complicit in the continuation of 
instability and insecurity in the Congo.18  
                                                          
15  Interview Bunda dia Kongo representatives, Boma, 30 November 2009. 
16  Focus Group 2, civil society representatives, Bukavu, 19 March 2010. 
17  Focus Group 1, civil society representatives, Bukavu 16 March 2010, Focus Group 2, civil society 
representatives, Bukavu, 19 March 2010. 
18  Focus Group 1, civil society representatives, Bukavu, 16 March 2010; Interview with MP 9, Bukavu, 
18 March 2010. 
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The DRC is of course not unique in using these repertoires. African self-
narratives are often constructed on (the manipulated use of) the rhetoric of au-
tonomy, resistance and emancipation to create an authentic African voice. Narra-
tives are then employed to emphasise African victimhood. Africans are not pre-
sented as having their fate in their own hands, but rather as being subjugated to 
violence. The history of Africa is reduced to ‘a series of phenomena of subjection 
interconnected in a seamless continuity’. Africans are reduced to passive receiv-
ers of subjection, agency is attributed to outsiders, and to fictive or invisible ac-
tors, who are ‘said to always determine, ultimately, the subject’s life’. The result 
is a ‘cult of victimisation, in which the African is never responsible for the 
course history has taken, a lack of self-criticism accompanied by a quest for sov-
ereignty and self-determination (Mbembe 2001a, 3-5). This Congolese narrative 
should be understood as such a form of self-writing.  
Narrating mythistory: The heroic victim 
A second narrative tells a story of Congolese people struggling against foreign 
inflicted injustice and for Congolese sovereignty and dignity. Referring to the 
notion of Congolese victimisation, leaders that resist foreign interference and 
exploitation and claim Congolese self-determination and sovereignty are hailed 
as national heroes, and martyrs of Congolese dignity and patriotism. Mobutu did 
indeed emphasise this imagery of himself as a protector of dignity and self-
determination, but so did other Congolese leaders. It is a repertoire that has 
served Congolese leaders well. The imagery of Lumumba as a martyr whose 
tragedy represents the tragedy of the Congolese people as a whole goes back 50 
years (Kinkela vi Kans’y 1993, 135, 138), but the imagery is effortlessly repro-
duced with a more recent ‘martyr of Congolese dignity’, Laurent Kabila. Alt-
hough there was little democracy under Kabila, he is imagined as a protector of 
Congolese patriotism and self-determination, continuing the struggle of Lumum-
ba. On the website of current President Joseph Kabila it is written that his father 
at the age of 19 swore to his mother to be another Lumumba (Nzazi Mabidi 
2009). He has continued the effort for the second independence and has been 
dans le maquis until he took over power. Recently, a Congolese political scientist 
concluded that Laurent Kabila was ‘undeniably one of the true patriots and mar-
tyrs’, just as Patrice Lumumba (Ngoma-Binda 2009, 155-56). Kabila fought to 
liberate the Congo from Mobutu’s dictatorship that was being upheld by his in-
ternational friends. His struggle was therefore also against continued western 
imperialism. Ngoma Binda writes,  
“Kabila has rebelled, being outraged by the imperialist enterprise in Congo launched by Le-
opold II. It was an enterprise of the confiscation, by all means including villainous ones, of 
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the rights and powers of the people, and an enterprise that installs puppets of the dominating 
and imperialist powers at the leadership of the newly independent country.” (Ngoma-Binda 
2009, 161-62, Author’s translation from French) 
Because he stood up against this imperialism of the West, making ‘the same 
mistake’ as Lumumba had done 40 years earlier Laurent Kabila was killed (Le 
Potentiel 2010g), ‘for his love for the Congo, for Congolese sovereignty and for 
territorial integrity.’19 The mistake both Lumumba and Kabila made was to stand 
up against international interest and interference and to demand sovereignty, self-
determination and dignity for the Congolese people. Both were assassinated, in 
the eyes of many Congolese, by an international conspiracy. And although father 
Kabila was shot by one of his body guards, it is widely believed by the Congo-
lese that behind this act were in fact international actors and their interests – ‘bul-
lets shot by a body guard, remote-controlled by the enemies of our nation’ (Nzazi 
Mabidi 2009). 
When Jean-Pierre Bemba wrote in his autobiography (cum electoral campaign 
discourse), that his rebellion and political vision were about freedom and self-
determination (Bemba 2001, 212), he built on a long tradition of liberation strug-
gles since independence and martyrs of democracy, Congolese self-determination 
and sovereignty and Congolese dignity. The call for a second or true independ-
ence started in the context of the pagaille and the notion that foreign interests had 
lead to the assassination of Lumumba because he claimed full independence for 
the Congo. In the light of the political turmoil and the secession attempts of Ka-
tanga and Kasai, a rebellion was launched in 1963, led by Lumumbist Pierre 
Mulele, to claim a ‘Second Independence’. The rebellion claimed self-
determination and resisted the interference of western powers that had aligned 
themselves with the regime of Mobutu. It was a response of the Congolese peo-
ple to the sell-out of Congolese independence by the murderers of Lumumba to 
western imperialists (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002, Wamba-dia-Wamba 1987, 122-
23). The rebellion failed, and Mulele was brutally executed.  
The mythistory holds the West responsible for the failures of these claims of 
true independence. The argument goes that the inefficient and corrupt regime 
itself could not have resisted this uprising of the masses. The rebellion could only 
be defeated because of the assistance to the regime in Kinshasa by the West 
(Conference Nationale Souveraine 1992, 7-8). But it is not just charismatic lead-
ers that have claimed the status of martyr of liberation. The failed CNS process is 
popularly remembered as the victorious days of popular resistance against a dic-
tatorship that was upheld by foreign interests and as a popular demand for self-
determination, power to the people. As the previously quoted UDPS activist said, 
                                                          
19  Interview with former MP 1, Kinshasa 30 October 2009; Quote from Nzazi Mabidi NZAZI MABIDI 
2009. Ne jamais trahir le Congo, 21 janvier 2009.. 
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“the CNS has given power, self-determination and dignity back to the people. It 
has liberated us.”20 
 
Narrating the post-war transition process 
Narrating history in terms of a long struggle for freedom, dignity and democracy 
frames the post-colonial past as a black chapter in the history of the country, and 
the present as a new beginning to overcome that past. After a failed democratic 
transition in the 1990s and two civil wars, the transition process that followed the 
peace accord was seen as a form of foreign tutelage, a western driven process. In 
December 2002, after a long and complex process of peace negotiations, a Glob-
al and Inclusive Accord was signed by all belligerents. It was necessary to in-
clude all the main belligerents. But it was also problematic, for it proved to be 
very difficult to proceed with the transition process, implement the ambitious 
transitional agenda, and organise elections. Foreseeing some of these difficulties, 
a committee of foreign ambassadors was installed as a spoiler management 
mechanism, but also an arbitration mechanism that aimed to hold the transitional 
leaders accountable and push as much as they could for the implementation of 
the transitional agenda.  
Perhaps it is not surprising that the main funders of the transition wanted to 
oversee the process and arranged for a mechanism that would form some form of 
guarantee on the process. Special Representative of the Secretary General 
(SRSG) Bill Swing called it a moral authority, that had only a supportive role 
(CIAT 2006). For the Congolese, however, it was an interference in Congolese 
sovereignty, 21  that was sometimes perceived as threatening by the political 
elite.22 The international community was overtly present on the political stage 
and involved in political processes. For many Congolese this was too much, ei-
ther because it was seen as illegitimate interference in domestic affairs, or be-
cause it was interpreted as a conspiracy between the greedy political leaders and 
their foreign patrons.  
The power-sharing agreement is also seen as being enforced by international 
mediators. This ‘1+4’ formula, in which one President was assisted by four Vice-
Presidents from different former belligerent groups, is seen as having paralysed 
governance. “1+4= 0” was a popular reference to governance during the transi-
tion period. The idea behind the 1+4 formula was that the Presidency could func-
                                                          
20  Interview with Street Parliamentarian 3 and UDPS activist, Kinshasa 03 March 2010. 
21  Interview with (then) MP, Kinshasa 11 May 2006; interview with (then) Minister, Kinshasa 18May 
2007. 
22  Interview with one of the four (then) Vice-Presidents, Kinshasa 10 May 2007 
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tion as a platform to forge consensus between the former belligerents, and where 
mutual trust and confidence could be built. However, in effect it functioned as a 
platform on which the war between the belligerent leaders continued, thereby 
paralysing governance and the transition process (De Goede and Van der Borgh 
2008, 120). Kinshasa daily Le Potential however wrote: “Eventually, the transi-
tional executive is like a detonating cocktail, ready to explode at the least crisis 
and block the whole (transitional) mechanism. The only means to avert such an 
eventuality would be establish a climate of confidence between the primary ac-
tors, particularly the five members of the Presidency” (Le Potentiel 2003, 
Author’s translation from French). 
The idea behind the 1+4 formula may have been well intended, for many 
Congolese it was another example of how the international community, the West, 
finds arrangements to keep the country under its control:  
‘1+4 exists only in the Congo, nowhere else. And we did not have it because the Congolese 
wanted it. It has been imposed upon us by the West. The West does not want a sovereign 
Congo, it does not want a democratic Congo, it does not want the rule of law in the Congo. It 
wants a weak Congo to exploit.’23  
A civil society activist told me that ‘since Sun City and the transition, Congo 
is under tutelage of the International Community. We have accepted the 1+4 in 
the name of peace.’24 It was recognised that this was not a power sharing agree-
ment in the best interest of the population, but rather a temporal elite bargain or 
warlords’ peace (Lemarchand 2007, 12-14). It was accepted as collateral damage, 
convinced that it was the best of two evils. The narratives, on the other hand, in-
terpret this as a conspiracy, a joint effort of Congolese elitist and western busi-
ness interests. 
The discontent about the transition is fed from different directions. UDPS, an 
opposition party that left the negotiation table in discontent and that has sidelined 
itself from the political process ever since, is perhaps most vocal and aggressive 
in its rejection of the Sun City peace process and the political system it has in-
stalled. It claims that the peace agreement was not a ‘peace on our terms’, that it 
served foreign interests instead of Congolese interests, and that it ignored the 
democratisation process of the 1990s. This process did perhaps fail in the end, 
for the supporters of UDPS it was the great momentum. Compared to the CNS 
transition, the post-war transition is not ‘Congolese’ but ‘foreign’. UDPS claims 
that the West is behind the current regime, thereby insinuating that Kabila is a 
puppet of the West. To them, the elections were a farce and the results have been 
manipulated because ‘the West wanted Kabila’ – ‘The International Community 
already knows who will be the winner of 2011’.25  
                                                          
23  Street Parliament, Victoire, Kinshasa, Field Notes March 2010. 
24  Interview with Civil Society activist 3, Bukavu, 18 March 2010. 
25  Street Parliament, Victoire, Kinshasa, field notes March 2010. 
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Despite these concerns, the elections of 2006 and the launch of the Third Re-
public were welcomed as a new beginning. Elections had been promised long 
ago, a transition to democracy started in 1990, and again in 2003. In the mean 
time there had been numerous victims of the struggle for democracy and both 
wars. The elections thus meant much more for the Congolese than merely a strat-
egy in the transition from war to peace. Although conditions were perhaps not 
conducive to hold elections, it was nevertheless considered impossible to post-
pone them because of this public demand for elections.26 People are proud of the 
elections of 2006, ‘we have found our dignity again with the elections.’27 This 
pride was evident on Election Day in 2006, when people patiently queued out-
side the polling stations, cast their votes with dignity and devotedly executed the 
counting process by candlelight until the early hours of the next morning. In his 
inauguration speech, Kabila refers to the war as a ‘battlefield for democracy’, a 
battle that has been won and that enables the beginning of a new era. Kabila pre-
sents his inauguration as the victory of Congolese self-determination, Congolese 
dignity and he emphasises that he, and with him the Congolese people, will take 
their responsibilities (Kabila Kabange 2007, 15-16).  
The elections marked the end of the wars that were characterised by foreign 
interference and exploitation, and completed a peace and transition process in 
which the country had been under foreign tutelage. It also marked the end of a 
long struggle against dictatorship and the beginning of the long awaited democ-
racy. It meant victory and the regaining of self-determination. With the launch of 
the Third Republic, the post-war thus becomes an emancipatory momentum in 
which Congolese re-claim self-determination and emphasise sovereignty and re-
ject foreign tutelage.  
The narratives provide a frame of meaning to the present. The narratives are 
very rich and contain much more interesting material than I can discuss in this 
chapter. For the purpose of this thesis, a few aspects stand out. The mythistory 
frames the current post-war situation in terms of both continuity (continued in-
ternational interference and victimhood) and change (emancipation, democracy, 
a new impetus for resisting this international interference). It puts the current sit-
uation in a historic sequence of events of ongoing international breaching of 
Congolese sovereignty and a quest for emancipation. It frames the current post-
war era as a victory of the quest for self-determination and an end to foreign tute-
lage. It is thus employed as an emancipatory discourse that claims sovereignty, 
Congolese dignity and self-determination. The liberal peace is thus locally de-
fined as a political project that pursues peace founded on locally defined aspira-
tions, namely those of emancipation and self-determination. 
                                                          
26  Interview with Western diplomat 1 and CIAT member, Kinshasa 28 May 2006. 
27  Interview with PALU representatives, Kinshasa 06 May 2010.  
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This means that Congolese and their partners have a different interpretation of 
the present in a historical sequence. As a project of dispossession the liberal 
peace is not about dignity and self-determination. The narratives also show am-
bivalence in the engagement with the hegemonic discourse of the liberal peace. 
Congolese employ a strategy of straddling engagement and disengagement with 
the liberal peace to emphasise their own status as hero or victim, and to give 
meaning to the failures of the past and the present, as well as hopes and fatalistic 
perspectives for the future.   
Secondly, it affects relations with the main partners (donors) of processes of 
state building and democratisation. Different people use the same repertoires to 
construct opposing arguments. Putting political differences aside, the narratives 
create a suspicion of western partners engaged in state building and democratisa-
tion. These interventions are considered to be instruments to prevent Congolese 
self-determination and to continue Western domination. In the historical se-
quence of the relations between the Congo and the western world, these partners 
are perceived with distrust and suspicion. Consequently, the narratives also pro-
vide a frame of meaning and interpretation to the failures of the post-war regime 
and the disappointments with unfulfilled expectations. The narratives enable this 
to be interpreted as the result of continued interference of the West and its ally 
Rwanda. The West is simply not trusted. This sets the stage for us-them percep-
tions, rather than a partnership of actors with shared objectives. 
The narratives thus negotiate western interference (power) in post-war Congo 
and seek to destabilise it by providing an understanding of the present shared by 
local agencies that pursue a post-liberal peace. Because these narratives are ig-
nored and silenced by liberal peace interventions the liberal peace is unable to 
connect with local agencies. The agents of the liberal peace fail to recognise that 
local agencies see them as the cause of perpetuated Congolese misery, and nei-
ther do they recognise that local agencies frame the post-war as a political project 
in pursuit of emancipation from the West. This lack of understanding of local 
interpretations of the present affects the ability of outside actors to engage with 
local agencies. In the next chapter I will discuss these myth workings and how it 
implicates the process of post-war state building and democratisation in the Con-
go and negotiates with the discourses of the liberal peace.  
  
5 
Narratives of disengagement  
and the emergence of hybridity 
The narratives discussed in the previous chapter provide a historic context for a 
negotiation of the present. The liberal peace is given meaning as a political pro-
ject in pursuit of emancipation and self-determination. In this chapter I will bring 
Congolese narratives on the present and the discourses of the liberal peace on the 
Congolese present together to emphasise a fundamental disconnect between the 
experience of the current post-war reality of the agents of the liberal peace and 
their Congolese partners. The first section will discuss the negotiation of the pre-
sent based on the Congolese historic self-narratives discussed in the previous 
chapter. It expresses continuity (continued foreign tutelage) and change (emanci-
pation). This claim for emancipation is a political project. It is a claim for space 
for local agencies. The following section will discuss the discourses of the liberal 
peace and how they materialise in post-transitional Congo. It discusses how the 
liberal peace intervention shies away from political engagement with the political 
processes it intervenes in and thus disengages from the process it seeks to disci-
pline. But it not only depoliticises its own intervention. The liberal peace also 
fails to recognise the Congolese political project of emancipation because it ig-
nores local needs and aspirations that are hidden in the Congolese narratives. 
Hybridity that enables local agencies is thus created through mutual disengage-
ment. The final section discusses the disconnect that is established through these 
mutually disengaging narratives and the hybrid space that is subsequently ena-
bled.  
Negotiating the present 
The relevance of the narratives discussed in the previous chapter is that they help 
us understand how Congolese experience and give meaning to the processes of 
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post-war state building and democratisation, and how this affects the processes 
under way. The narratives talk about the historicity of Congolese relations with 
the West. The emphasis is on the negative impact of western and foreign inter-
ference in Congolese domestic affairs, and a Congolese quest for self-
determination. But because these local narratives are ignored and silenced, the 
liberal peace disables itself from engaging with local agencies. The ignoring of 
the emancipatory claims of local agencies reflects a failure of the liberal peace to 
live up to its emancipatory peace ideals.  
 
Narrating the failures of post-war state building and democratisation 
The ambivalent attitudes towards the new beginning expressed itself soon after 
the Third Republic was launched. Even in the Eastern part of the country, the 
region where Kabila won with an overwhelming majority, the region to which 
Kabila is said to owe his electoral victory, people feel disappointment. A civil 
society activist said that people have not voted for Kabila, but for peace, for self-
determination, for sovereignty, for unification and against balkanisation of the 
country. For the people in Eastern Congo, ‘voting for Kabila meant voting for 
that’.1 Elections were a gift, received with open arms. People saw it as a means 
to make an end to all sorts of misery, war, poverty, lack of wellbeing, foreign 
interference. But little has changed, even insecurity has not ended. People know 
that ‘the hand that gives is also the hand that takes’, and hold the West accounta-
ble for this, because they pursue their own financial interest, forget the people 
and let Rwanda continue to interfere in Congo as before.2  
This perception was further fed because in the words of the international 
community there is peace in the Congo, while for many Congolese violence, in-
security and conflict continue to be daily realities. The peace seemed to be a 
peace of the Congolese leadership and their international partners. ‘During the 
Bukavu crisis of 20043 we understood that (SRSG Bill) Swing was the real head 
of state. He controlled everything. Joseph Kabila was only a farce.’4 People con-
fronted with the continuation of local conflict were very disappointed with the 
peace process. All attention went to the national conflict and the installation of a 
new regime, while local conflicts were ignored or expected to end automatically 
in the context of the national peace process (Autesserre 2010). The peace, they 
                                                          
1  Interview with former MP 3, now civil society activist, Bukavu 19 March 2010.  
2  Focus Group 1, civil society representatives, Bukavu 16 March 2010; Interview with MP 9, Bukavu 
18 March 2010. 
3  Following a series of incidents that heightened tension between the different former belligerents, vio-
lent clashes between former rebel militias lead to the temporary capturing of the city of Bukavu in 
May 2004 by one of the former belligerents and the threat to withdraw from the peace- and transition-
al process a few months later. The crisis nearly made the peace process collapse (De Goede & Van der 
Borgh (2008), International Crisis Group (2004), and Wolters (2004).  
4  Interview with former MP 3, now civil society activist, Bukavu 19 March 2010.  
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feel, is a farce. It is not good enough, not a real peace, only a peace for the elites 
in Kinshasa, not for the rest of the population. People feel that the Congolese 
leaders and the International Community have betrayed the Congolese people.5 It 
was a cause for much resentment, and anger. Much to the surprise and confusion 
of the international representatives, people expressed their anger towards peace 
keeping mission MONUC and the International Community in general, and on 
occasion responded violently to them instead of to the Congolese political lead-
ership of the transition process.  
The fatalistic repertoires of the victimisation narratives have tempered the ini-
tially high expectations of the post-war era. This is particularly useful for the 
post-war regime. The elections and the launch of the Third Republic were simul-
taneously a reclaim of dignity and self-determination, closure of the previous era, 
as well as a continuation of the historic sequence of foreign interference in Con-
golese affairs. The victimisation narratives emphasise Congolese inability to de-
termine its own fate and turns them into passive victims of foreign determination. 
The perceived domination of the West thus turns Congolese leaders into incapa-
ble victims too. Although the failures of the regime are recognised, the narratives 
argue that Congolese leaders are hostages, captured by the demands of the West. 
It is argued that the President tries hard and does what he can to win back self-
determination and make an end to the problems the country is faced with.6 But he 
is faced with the same problem as his father and Lumumba were. It is therefore 
not surprising that it is a discourse that is populist and indeed very useful for 
Congolese politicians. It is used to unite with the people by identifying them-
selves as collective victims and the West as collective enemies.  
As such, these narratives also serve a purpose for the new regime and the po-
litical elites. Although these narratives live among the wider general population 
and are reproduced by them, it would be naive to ignore the fact that the regime 
reproduces and instrumentalises these discourses to its own advantage. Not only 
do politicians make clever speeches in which they employ these discourses to 
emphasise nationalism, patriotism, and particularly themselves as leaders that 
reject foreign tutelage. The media and radio trottoir is of course also heavily in-
fluenced by the regime. Supporters of Jean-Pierre Bemba, Kabila’s main oppo-
nent in the 2006 elections make similar claims. However, pointing accusatory 
fingers at the West cannot be put aside as mere political talk.  
The West is the favourite enemy that can be used for many occasions: in the 
East the West is the manipulative hand between the conflict between Rwanda 
and Congo, in Kinshasa it is the imperialist hand behind the elections that had an 
unexpected – or unwanted – result. But while opposition voices accuse Kabila of 
                                                          
5  Interview with Street Parliamentarian 3 and UDPS, Kinshasa 03 March 2010. 
6  Focus Group 2, civil society representatives, Bukavu 19 March 2010. 
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plotting with the West, even members of the Armed Forces see a conspiracy of 
the West against the Congo. In a workshop for FARDC (Forces Armées de la 
République Démocratique du Congo) officers on human rights and the rule of 
law, the officers expressed a sincere concern about the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) as another instrument of the West against Congo. The Court was 
seen as anti-Congolese and a threat to the Congo, and thus as pro-Rwandan and 
as an instrument of les Anglo-Saxons.7  
But whereas Kabila employs these narratives to emphasise his own leadership, 
the urban supporters of UDPS use the same narratives to disqualify President 
Kabila and every other political leader that went along with the West in pursuing 
the Sun City Peace Accord, which was, according to them, a betrayal of the Con-
golese people. For them, democracy is about freedom, a freedom in their daily 
lives. That freedom presently does not exist. They feel sidelined by the donor 
community and the western partners because of its emphasis on institutions in-
stead of the voice of the people (De Goede 2011, 149).8 The supporters of the 
opposition argue that the West has abandoned the people and has chosen to sup-
port Kabila in its own self-interest. They all see a strong western hand that sup-
ports Kabila. The West has engineered the elections of 2006 so that Kabila would 
access power. It is another false start for the Congo, and the West is again per-
ceived to be responsible for the outcome of the elections and the failures of the 
regime.  
 
The post-war as emancipation 
In the sequence of the Congolese historic self-narratives discussed in the previ-
ous chapter, the post-transitional era was to be a break with the past, an end to 
foreign interference in domestic affairs and a re-claiming of Congolese self-
determination and dignity (Ngoma-Binda 2007, 23-24). Kabila tells the Congo-
lese to be optimistic. The future is ‘founded on the strength of emancipatory and 
democratic ambition which is discernible through the patriotic engagement of all 
our compatriots’ (Kabila Kabange 2008). The narratives thus interpret the launch 
of democracy as a victory of self-determination, the long awaited second inde-
pendence. The emphasis of democracy as governance by the people lies on self-
governance as opposed to foreign tutelage. Democracy is then given an emanci-
patory meaning. Besides a redefined role between the people and its political 
leaders, democracy thus also means self-determination vis-à-vis the international 
community. In the Kinshasa daily Le Potentiel a politician commented:  
                                                          
7  KAS/FARDC workshop, ’Etat de Droit et la Justice Militaire en RDC’, Kinshasa, 26 and 27 February 
2010, field notes. 
8  Interview with MP 4, Kinshasa 04 November 2009. 
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“How can the International Community continue to impose things to a government that has 
been elected by the people? That is the real problem. Or rather, one has to respect the elec-
tions. The electoral game is not simple. It is about legitimacy. It is for this reason that the In-
ternational Community always wants to manipulate elections, so that the elected leaders will 
not have legitimacy with the people. Only to be held to account by the powers that supported 
them. The Congolese will no longer accept that. (...) It should not be forgotten that, in this 
country, our ancestors have battled for centuries to create this country. If we reclaim this le-
gitimacy through the ballot box, this is because we want normality, stability and organisation 
of this country. The International Community should understand that the history of this 
country is stubborn. For years, nobody notices that the Congolese are fed up. But it will take 
means that are the least expected at the time when you least expect it, then the Congolese 
will express their discontent.”(Le Potentiel 2010f, Authors translation from French)  
Similar comments are often made by ordinary Congolese people. The author 
of the quoted text above argues that there is no place for international interfer-
ence in Congolese domestic politics anymore. The will for self-determination, 
self-government has for too long been ignored. But the Congolese ‘will no longer 
accept’ a government that is manipulated by the international community and 
that has no legitimacy from the Congolese people. Democracy, and the installa-
tion of a democratically elected President, Government and Parliament were crit-
ical elements for Congolese emancipation. Self-government can liberate the 
Congo from foreign tutelage. The post-war elections represented the long-
awaited second independence. Democracy is emancipatory and means self-
determination, sovereignty and dignity.  
Democracy thus becomes a technology for emancipation, similar as ‘libera-
tion’ for Laurent Kabila and ‘independence’ for Lumumba and Mobutu. It is a 
political project in pursuit of a peace that responds to local needs and aspirations. 
Using democracy as a technology for emancipation from western interference 
evidently has an impact on relations with western partners in post-war state 
building and democratisation efforts. The victimisation narratives perceive the 
Congolese as victims of international exploitation and interference for foreign 
self-interest, they see the engagement of the international community in post-war 
state building and democracy in this light as well. The perception is that interna-
tional engagement still serves first and foremost the interest of the international 
community itself, not the Congolese.  
 
Distrust of the international and disengagement 
Many Congolese therefore distrust international (western) partners and donors, 
assuming they hide their true intentions. Subsequently, the discourse of the liber-
al peace (including good governance, state building and democracy) is consid-
ered with suspicion because it is the international community in the first place 
that has interests against these principles. It has after all, according to the narra-
tive, rigged the elections. There was much concern about electoral fraud and ma-
nipulation, not by the Congolese candidates but by the international partners. 
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They paid for the elections, they wanted to make sure they would get the result 
they wanted, was the assumption.9 Much to the frustration of democracy promot-
ers, an often heard comment was that it were not the elections of the Congolese 
(‘not our elections’) but those of the international community (‘your elec-
tions’). 10 It was widely believed – particularly in parts of the country where 
UDPS and Jean-Pierre Bemba’s MLC had much support – that the international 
community wanted Kabila to win. Particularly in those parts of the country, 
many people now feel that ‘Kabila is just like Mobutu’: both accessed power 
with the help of the West, but against the will of large parts of the population.11  
A second aspect in this are the country’s natural resources. The Congolese are 
well aware of the wealth of the country in terms of natural resources. They em-
phasise that they have become victim of their wealth, and perceive any foreign 
interference in the country as being driven by greed and economic interests. Al-
truistic arguments of development and democratisation are considered a farce. 
History shows ample examples of the true intentions of the international commu-
nity. The suspicion towards the international partners in state building and de-
mocratisation has made that the international discourses of democracy and de-
velopment are not taken seriously, because they are perceived to be a farce be-
hind which the West hides its true intentions.  
As an emancipatory discourse, democracy and self-determination then claim a 
certain distance from the international partners in which foreign tutelage is not 
accepted. The Congolese search for emancipatory opportunity. This emancipa-
tion means disconnecting from western interventions, which are dominated by 
imperialistic and exploitative interests. But also, western interventions that are 
unable to connect with the Congolese reality as it is being understood by Congo-
lese are excluded from this emancipatory project. It is therefore this emancipa-
tory project that is ignored by liberal peace interventions. The liberal peace there-
fore fails as an emancipatory peace. In doing so, liberal peace interventions fail 
to engage with local agencies. This creates a Bhabhaian hybrid space in which 
local agencies redefine the political process of state building and democratisa-
tion. Western donors are however not rejected as a whole. People are well aware 
that foreign assistance is needed to rebuild the country. But what is demanded is 
a different relationship with donors, one with mutual respect. It needs to be based 
on the interests of the Congo, in terms of development and democratisation,12 but 
on local terms and situated in a local context.  
                                                          
9  The 2006 elections were for 80% funded by international donors (International Crisis Group 2006).  
10  Interview with Western diplomat 1, Kinshasa 28 May 2006 
11  Comment by a taxi driver in Kinshasa, field notes 13 October 2009. 
12  Street Parliament, Victoire, Kinshasa, Field notes 06 March 2010.  
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Depoliticised state building in post-war Congo 
I will now turn to the approaches and engagement of the western donor commu-
nity in the Congo and discuss the state building and democratisation effort in the 
Congo as a project of discipline to normalise the Congo into a docile democracy. 
However, in practice the donor community shies away from engaging politically 
in this very political process and thus fails to implement what it argues. And sec-
ondly, the liberal peace also ignores the political demands of Congolese agencies 
which see the liberal peace as a political project for emancipation and self-
determination. Subsequently, the liberal peace is disconnected from local agen-
cies. However, both narratives do relate to each other, and are relevant to put to-
gether, in the way they engage with the other as actor and position themselves. 
 
Poverty reduction strategy and country assistance framework as depoliticised 
problem solving approach 
The post-war transition period in the Congo (2003-2006) mainly aimed to stabi-
lise the country and reinstall a regime with a legitimate government. It aimed to 
do the groundwork on which democratisation and state-building could take place 
in partnership with the newly elected government. The post-war effort for recon-
struction, democratisation, state building and development in the DRC derives 
from the July 2006 Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper (PRGSP). The 
PRGSP was prepared after a participatory consultation process, in which 35,000 
people throughout the country participated (IMF 2007, 15). However, this con-
sultation was conducted in a period when large parts of the country were still af-
fected by violent conflict, which puts question marks to the claims made on in-
clusiveness of the process (and subsequently the claims of ‘local ownership’ of 
the strategies in the strategy paper), as well as to the impact this reality may have 
had on the responses given by participants. Aimed at improving living condi-
tions, the strategy is first and foremost concerned with poverty reduction, devel-
opment and economic growth.  
The first of the five identified pillars of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) 
is the promotion of good governance and the consolidation of peace through 
strengthened institutions (IMF 2007, 49), with a focus on administrative, political 
and economic good governance. Administrative governance is focused on reor-
ganisation of the public sector, in terms of census, designing organigrams and 
anti-corruption measures. However, despite some minor comments about the 
need for enhanced institutional capacities, the primary concern is with the setting 
up a public sector, not with its quality of service, capabilities or defined roles 
(IMF 2007, 50-53). The section on political governance is dedicated to decentral-
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isation measures only, and ignores concerns about national political governance 
institutions (IMF 2007, 53-54).  
Following the PRGSP, the short-term priority plan for 2007 drawn up by the 
new Government (Contrat de Gouvernance mars-décembre 2007) carefully 
avoids the discussion about corruption and anti-corruption measures, the link 
between politics and corruption. For example, although Parliament is promised 
more access to information to perform its oversight duties, there are no strategies 
mentioned whatsoever to combat corruption within political governance 
(Government of the DRC 2007, 9, IMF 2007, 51-52). Neither is there mention of 
the perseverance of corruption in political governance as an obstacle to good 
governance. The political process as a whole as well as practices that shape these 
political processes are ignored in the document. It prefers a narrow interpretation 
of institution building as institutional structures that emphasises poverty reduc-
tion and development without accepting that these are essentially political pro-
cesses.  
This negligence of politics is continued in the ‘Country Assistance Frame-
work’ (CAF), the joint donor response to the PRGSP that forms the common 
strategic approach to international assistance to the DRC for 17 multi-and bilat-
eral donors, together worth ca. 85% of donor funds available to DRC.13 Because 
the needs and strategies as outlined in the PRGSP are broad, CAF suggests a se-
quencing strategy, which prioritises security and transparency (CAF 2007, 15). 
Consequently, the strategy about governance reforms is reduced to Security Sec-
tor Reform (SSR), transparency, management of public finances and natural re-
sources, decentralisation and reform of public enterprises and civil service. There 
is no recognition of the fact that these processes and issues are inherently politi-
cal and require political processes to function. Nor are the inherently problematic 
nature of political processes in the DRC and corruption within the political pro-
cess recognised as potential risks that could threaten reforms (CAF 2007, 23-26). 
The donor community shies away from the political context in which these re-
forms are to take place, and takes political norms and subjectivities for granted.  
The strategy in post-war DRC is a clear example of Chandler’s depoliticised 
problem-solving approach (Chandler 2006, 8). A concern with this approach that 
focuses on technical issues and procedures is that it does not touch on the internal 
logics and practices of politics in Congo, the structures of power, domination and 
accountability. It sets up institutions, but does not engage with the political role 
these institutions play in governance processes. It engages in capacity building, 
but does not consider to what political end these built capacities will be used, or 
                                                          
13  CAF is a joint Assistance Framework of the European Commission, the African Development Bank, 
the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, the United Nations, Belgium, Canada, China, 
France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United 
States.  
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whether they will be used at all. The strategy is concerned with a transition to 
statehood, rather than the state’s functioning (Richmond and Franks 2009, 204-
5). It is telling that the indicator for the objective to improve the oversight role of 
key institutions is merely the percentage of parliamentarians that have received 
training on parliamentary oversight (CAF 2007, 87), not a qualitative assessment 
of Parliament’s performance. Because donor engagement shies away from the 
political context in which the reforms are to take place, the political decision 
making process itself remains relatively untouched by state building pro-
grammes. 
 
State building in the Congo: The case of the National Assembly 
This thesis is particularly concerned with the site of the Congolese National As-
sembly and the final two chapters will all focus on local agencies on the spatial 
site of the National Assembly. I will therefore take a closer look at the state 
building effort at the National Assembly, how this important political institution 
is approached in isolation of politics in the state building programme as well as 
in isolation of the politics of local agencies. 
Although further in the report it is mentioned that the PRSGP requires 
strengthening of institutional capacities of the state as well as its non-
governmental partners (NGOs) (IMF 2007, 94), not once in the whole document 
is the National Assembly or Parliament mentioned as a subject of institutional 
reform or capacity enhancement strategies. The mere installation of Parliament is 
considered to be enough in the context of perhaps more pressing needs. Political 
institutions are thus approached by donors as requiring technical assistance to 
restructure the institution, better manage it and make it more efficient and effec-
tive. The National Assembly itself responds to this technical approach by meas-
uring its own successful functioning quantitatively in terms of the number of 
laws prepared and adopted, and the MPs questions as part of parliamentary over-
sight (Assemblée Nationale n.d.). Although the parliamentary institutions do re-
ceive considerable attention from a variety of donor organisations, much of the 
funds and means are allocated to the provincial assemblies that were in an em-
bryonic state and would require significant institution building to facilitate the 
much awaited decentralisation process (Niane and Baba Unpublished, 2009).14  
The technical assistance programmes with the National Assembly are execut-
ed mainly by UNDP and other INGOs such as AWEPA (Association of Europe-
an Parliamentarians for Africa), DAI (Development Alternatives Inc.), EISA 
(Electoral Institute Southern Africa) and USAID (United States Agency for In-
ternational Development) that are often subcontractors to UNDP itself. Activities 
                                                          
14  Interviews with USAID representatives, Kinshasa 28 October 2009 and EISA representative 2, Kin-
shasa 05 November 2009. 
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include capacity building in for example parliamentary core activities such as 
drafting laws and parliamentary oversight, as well as the donation of equipment 
and setting-up of offices, and thematic workshops and seminars on issues such as 
corruption, good governance and the rule of law.15 Another strand of projects is 
concerned with MPs representational role, and aims to facilitate the relation and 
exchange between MPs and their constituencies (for example EISA 2007). 16 
Congolese NGO’s, Civil Society Organisations (CSO’s) and Community Based 
Organisations (CBO’s) also undertake projects of this kind, often funded by one 
of the mentioned international agencies involved in parliamentary support. In the 
provinces as well as in Kinshasa itself, ateliers d’échange are organised by local 
civil society groups, aimed at bringing the MPs together with their electorate. 
The CSO’s involved argue that there is little interest of the MPs to participate – 
sometimes they carefully avoid contact with civil society in their constituencies – 
but they also argue that if CSO’s do not take the initiative there will not be any 
exchange at all.17  
A few general conclusions can be made. Some organisations have made a de-
liberate choice to work primarily with, or allocate a significant part of their activ-
ities to, parliamentary staff. The argument is that building staff capacity is more 
durable, since MPs (in theory) rotate every five years, while staff (in theory) re-
mains.18 The problems in the functioning of the institution and its administration 
are seen as being caused by a lack of experience, understanding, knowledge, and 
skills. These are all technical needs that can be addressed through capacity build-
ing efforts such as training, workshops and seminars. The identified needs thus 
suit the capacity building agenda of the donors and the implementing organisa-
tions, and justify the interventions made.  
Even more so, some organisations argue that a key problem is the ‘confusion’ 
over the ‘role’ of the MP in a democracy.19 Again, this is an issue that is ex-
pected to be addressed through capacity building efforts such as training. In this 
respect, it is recognised that capacity building itself does not necessarily change 
behaviour, political mentality and culture, and that when capacity is being built it 
remains to be seen how enhanced capacity is being employed and used.20 The 
                                                          
15  Interviews with USAID representatives, Kinshasa 28 October 2009, DAI representative, Kinshasa 11 
March 2010; UNDP representatives, Kinshasa 10 November 2009; EISA representative, Kinshasa, 05 
November 2009; AWEPA representative, Kinshasa, 16 October 2009 
16  Interviews with KAS representative, Kinshasa, 27 October 2009 and EISA representative, Kinshasa 
05 November 2009. 
17  Interviews with civil society representative 1, Boma 30 November 2009, civil society representative 2, 
Bukavu 16 March 2010, civil society representative 5, Bukavu 19 March 2010. 
18  Interviews with UNDP representative, Kinshasa 10 November 2009, DAI representative, Kinshasa 11 
March 2010 and USAID representatives, Kinshasa 28 October 2009. 
19  Interviews with USAID representatives, Kinshasa, 28 October 2009, DAI representative, Kinshasa 11 
March 2010, AWEPA representative, Kinshasa 16 October 2009.  
20  Interview with USAID representative, Kinshasa, 28 October 2009 
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feeling that capacity building workshops have little impact in practice is common 
among donors and implementing organisations. ‘MP’s seem keen to learn, but 
they do not implement what they have learned in their daily work’.21 Some even 
feel that the activities they organise ‘have no impact whatsoever’.22 Individual 
politicians that are well-known to be self-enriching and corrupt denouncing cor-
ruption and advocating for more transparency is the ‘Caliban-syndrome’ 23 in 
practice - Congolese using the language western donors like to hear (Chabal 
1996, 46). In practice, domestic political actors speak the same normative liberal 
democratic language, but do not necessarily share its underlying political subjec-
tivities. It is a practice of disengagement.  
Often, participants arrive late or leave early, enjoying a generous lunch and a 
per diem for participation. These practices raise concerns about the interest in 
these capacity building activities. More importantly, they emphasise the fact that 
there are limits to the extent to which democratisation can be built through capac-
ity building while political subjectivities do not support its underlying norms. 
Even if subjectivities are influenced by capacity building workshops, they do not 
necessarily change. International assistance in democratisation is concerned with 
measurable output (in terms of workshops held, numbers of participants, etc.), 
rather than the outcome of these activities.  
The engagement with the democratisation process, and the development of 
Parliament as a key institution for a democracy, is thus reduced to technical as-
sistance and capacity building with a limited impact on Parliament as a political 
institution. Such workshops and assistance may indeed provide MPs and the civil 
servants of the National Assembly with improved skills and a better understand-
ing of the role of the National Assembly in a democracy. But it does not neces-
sarily affect the efficiency and efficacy of the institution, nor does it necessarily 
discipline its agencies to become and behave like western style liberal democrats. 
Although the assumption is that having put in place the framework of Parliament 
in a liberal democratic state order, people will not only have the commitment to 
make it work, but more importantly, to make it work according to the liberal 
democratic norm. The state building and democratisation logic tends to equate 
the desired outcomes of democracy with the mere creation of institutions and 
processes. By using a language that is normative and that aims to ‘shape’ and 
‘discipline’ political subjectivities political actors are assumed to adhere to liber-
al democratic principles and thus materialise the desired outcomes of liberal de-
                                                          
21  Interview with AWEPA representative, Kinshasa 16 October 2009. 
22  Comment made by INGO representative, author’s field notes August 2010. 
23  Caliban, the half man-half fish from Shapespeare’s The Tempest, is a savage who speaks in Shake-
spearean verse. The character has become a symbol for oppressed peoples, the savage who has learned 
to speak the oppressors language, straddling between indigenous and imposed culture (Vaughan, A.T. 
and Vaughan, V.M. 1991, Mannoni, O.J.D. 1956). 
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mocracy (Bhuta 2008, 521-23). The assumption is thus that with the shell of lib-
eral democracy (its institutional framework, which can relatively easily be built 
with technical projects) political subjectivities will automatically be disciplined. 
In addition, the depoliticised international approach does not engage with these 
political subjectivities either. The practice of engaging in a process of disciplin-
ing Congolese political actors to become liberal democratic politicians through a 
technocratic and depoliticised approach thus fails.   
Mutual disengagement and creating hybrid space 
The engagement in the process of post-war state building and democratisation of 
both the Congolese and the International Community in DRC shows that there is 
no constructive partnership in this process. From both sides there are discomforts 
with the discourse of state building and aspects of it are rejected. It is evident that 
there are radically different assumptions about the starting point and purpose of 
the process. There is also discomfort with each other and the perceptions about 
the other, expressed through distrust and disrespect as well as though silencing 
and ignoring, which results in mutual disengagement. 
Nevertheless, the Congolese discourses as well as those of the liberal peace 
both engage, each in their own way, with three important concerns about the pro-
cess of state building and democratisation: the political nature of the liberal peace 
in the Congo; power and empowerment in the relation between western and 
Congolese actors; and the agency of the actors involved. In this final paragraph 
of this chapter I will bring the discourses together and discuss how they narrate 
these concerns, and thereby together create ‘zones of mutual non-engagement 
and irrelevance’ (MacGinty 2011, 88).  
 
Liberal peace as a local political project 
The Congolese narratives bring instabilities and ambivalences in the hegemonic 
liberal democratic discourse to the forefront. The narratives deconstruct and lay 
bare the (perceived) power that is hidden by the hegemonic liberal democratic 
discourse, a power that wants to keep the Congo under its control. This expres-
sion of power and hegemony from the West is subsequently rejected and resisted 
by emphasising self-determination. In a Bhabhaian way, the narratives engage 
with the hegemonic liberal democratic discourse, and mimic it to resist the liberal 
democratic hegemony by using the notion of democracy as people’s self-
governance. They are constructed on the ambivalence in the liberal democratic 
discourse (Bhabha 2008, 122), which ‘does not recognise the self-determination 
of others, but is rather a project of dispossession’ (Jabri 2010, 48). Whereas the 
western partners offer an orthodox peace, that is ‘determined to transfer (its) 
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methodologies, objectives and norms into the new governance framework’, the 
Congolese claim an emancipatory peace that resists foreign domination through 
peace building practices (Richmond 2005, 214, 218). The narratives engage with 
the argumentation of the liberal peace, reflect on themselves in this argumenta-
tion and emphasise ambivalence. The ambivalence is found in the fact that the 
liberal peace speaks about democracy, self-government and ownership, but prac-
tices it in a way that disrespects these principles. The narratives emphasise this 
ambivalence and use that to destabilise the western engagement in post-war 
DRC. It negotiates the liberal democratic discourse, it challenges its boundaries 
and makes demands for the changing of its terms based on the ambivalences 
(Bhabha 2008, 158, 169).  
It thus bends the democracy argument by replacing the domestic power hold-
ers as the referent with the West, thereby not emancipating the people from its 
rulers, but emancipating the Congolese people from western domination and the 
agents of the liberal peace. It thus constructs the argument for the Congolese to 
accept the liberal peace (in terms of democracy, peace) but reject it as a project 
of dispossession. This peace is quietly claimed by local agencies. This opens up 
the emancipatory agency that Congolese use when they perceive the post-war 
momentum in terms of reclaiming self-determination. In this hybridity, democra-
cy, state building and indeed the relation with the partners in these processes are 
reconsidered and negotiated. What the narratives then produce is a claim for a 
sense of citizenship that not only recognises the rights to participate in a political 
system, but more importantly to participate in the process of the definition of that 
system (Barnsley and Bleiker 2008, 134, Slater 2004, 203-4). The hegemonic 
liberal democratic discourse is the discourse that is simultaneously used as a 
source for this demand, as well as the main object of resistance. 
 
Power and empowerment in local-liberal relations 
Both the Congolese narratives and the liberal democratic hegemonic discourses 
narrate power and the relations of power that exist between the Congo and its 
international partners. The discourses of liberal democracy seek to control, dom-
inate and discipline the Congo which is presented as being in need of this assis-
tance to become what it should be. It locates the cause of the misery (and the way 
out of it) in the Congo and with Congolese people themselves. It presents itself 
as the willing partner, being faced with an unwilling, violent, corrupt population 
that is both ruthless and ignorant. For the international donor community, im-
plementing the liberal peace then means a process of disciplining and teaching in 
the form of transferring capacities and knowledge. The Congolese narratives lo-
cate the cause of the misery with the West, and see the West as either the ob-
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struction to a way out (tragic victim) or as the power to be overcome (heroic vic-
tim). 
When they narrated the past and the present in our discussions about current 
affairs in the Congo, many of my respondents expressed a concern with the audi-
ence of historic narratives. Like the Pantayong Pananew historiography group 
mentioned in the previous chapter, they centralise the questions of whose history 
is being told, and for whom it is being told. This Filipino historiography group 
emphasises the emancipatory power of historiography, because historiography 
‘from us and for us’ can help people regain primary agency in their own history. 
It would inspire people to take responsibility for their own past, and thus reject 
the psychologically crippling attitude of blaming others for their own fate (Reyes 
2008, 247, 250). My informants emphasised that they found it important that I 
would understand Congolese history: their past on their terms. The narrative is 
thus employed to imagine identity and give meaning to the present (Ricœur 
2004, 81, Rigby 2001, 2). But contrary to Pantayong Pananew historiography, 
the tragic victim narratives, however, fail to be self-critical and deny Congolese 
agency. Instead, they produced an identity of Congolese people as Fanon’s ‘na-
tive’ (1967, 1968), Said’s ‘oriental’ (2003), or Spivak’s ‘subaltern’ (1988), peo-
ple that are not autochthonous, but merely a construct of western intervention 
(Lazarus 1999, 86). They reproduce colonialist discourses to emphasise their 
own victimhood.  
But the parallel narrative that emphasises the heroism of resistance against this 
victimisation seeks to resist this and narrates Congolese empowerment. It uses 
the past and the historic trajectory of these relations as a technology to make 
events of the past relevant for the present and the future (Jabri 2007, 145). It pre-
sents a past in which the West is the perpetrator and the Congolese are the vic-
tims. While the Congolese are willing, the West is a continuous obstacle for a 
more prosperous future. Salvation must come through emancipation and empow-
erment which become the objective of the liberal peace in Congo. The co-
existence of these two opposing narratives emphasises the ambivalence of Con-
golese engagement with the post-war situation in terms of continuity and change, 
engagement and rejection. 
This virtual dialogue about power and empowerment remains a dialogue of the 
deaf because both parties avoid engaging in it and with each other. It concerns 
the production of truths about the current post-war democratisation and state 
building process. It is evident that there is conflict between the perspectives on 
the partnership in the implementation of the liberal peace. Even though both par-
ties have used the post-war momentum to push their agendas, the Congolese de-
mand for democracy thus means something very different than the demand of the 
western partners and democracy promoters (Abrahamsen 2000, 44). The liberal 
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pursues an objective of turning the Congo into a docile liberal democracy. For 
local agencies the post-war is a political project through which they can give 
shape to their new post-war political and society. The implementation of the lib-
eral peace in post-war Congo is then not a process in partnership between Con-
golese actors and the international donor community, as the PRGSP and CAF 
wants to make us believe, but rather a power struggle over the meaning and need 
for democracy (Abrahamsen 2000, 84) which precedes questions about the form 
and shape of democracy.  
 
Narrating agency 
The discourses also narrate agency or rather the lack thereof. The Congolese pre-
sent themselves as victims whereas the liberal democratic discourse evades re-
sponsibility and agency by emphasising Congolese ownership. But this is only 
ownership over a process with a pre-determined outcome. The liberal evades re-
sponsibility by locating the problem with the host community (Chandler 2006, 
73). The donor community in the Congo shares a depoliticised engagement in 
state building and democratisation. Overall, members of the international com-
munity refer to working with the current regime as frustrating and have become 
cynical over political developments and the will of the regime to implement the 
decentralisation plans or organise the long awaited local elections.24 It has there-
fore decided to leave the initiative to the Congolese regime and be less pro-
active. ‘We realise more and more that state building requires a local government 
that is willing. If that does not exist, as in the Congo, the international communi-
ty can do little.’ 25  
To argue that they do not have responsibility and ownership over this process 
(and its inherently difficult nature), international actors follow different lines of 
argumentation. Development organisations that implement the technical pro-
grammes of institution building shy away from these concerns and operate as 
Ferguson’s ‘anti-politics machine’ (Ferguson 1990). They hide behind their ‘po-
litical neutrality’ as a form of moral superiority and refuse to engage with poli-
tics. This attitude of the development sector is sometimes even potentially un-
dermining, when uncritical funding of problematic reform programmes contra-
                                                          
24  These were originally supposed to take place before the general elections of 2006, but have been con-
tinuously postponed. According to the electoral calendar of May 2011, they were to be held in Febru-
ary 2013 (Commission Électorale Nationale Indépendante May 2011) but this has been postponed 
again. In May 2014, CENI announced a new electoral calendar for the local elections. They are now 
scheduled to take place in three steps between June 2015 and October 2015 (Commission Électorale 
Nationale Indépendante 2014).  
25  Interview with Western diplomat 2, Kinshasa 09 November 2009. 
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dict efforts to engage critically in political debates about state building and de-
mocratisation.26 
Some donors choose to hide behind the workings of the Congolese narratives 
and use the Congolese claim for sovereignty and self-determination as an excuse 
to not engage in the more difficult aspects of political processes such as democra-
tisation and the disciplining of political subjectivities.27 According to others, this 
‘cowardice attitude’ pretends to respect Congolese sovereignty, but merely aims 
to protect financial interests some countries have in the Congo. This attitude thus 
not only uses the workings of the Congolese narratives to its own interests, it also 
reproduces the myth by confirming that these countries financial interests stand 
above concerns of democratisation and good governance in the Congo.28 
A more critical response towards the Congolese regime and the implementa-
tion (or lack thereof) of the democratisation and state building agenda criticises 
both the ‘political neutrality’ of the development approach, as well as the ‘cow-
ardice attitude’ of other countries. It seeks to engage in a political dialogue with 
Congolese authorities. It claims to see through the workings of the Congolese 
narrative and the Caliban-syndrome. However, this approach does not locate the 
problem with the response of the international partners. It still locates the prob-
lem with the Congolese actors themselves, and with their lack of recognition of 
the problem, or lack of willingness to engage with it:  
‘You can capacity build as much as you want, organise as many workshops and seminars as 
you want, and keep pouring millions into it, but if the elites do not have the political will for 
democratisation and to improve things here in general, it will not make a difference.’29  
These more critical partners question the notion of sovereignty and how that 
interferes with state building efforts. They argue that if outside interventions on 
state building and democratisation are to be successful they will have to breach 
the sovereignty principle. But they also argue that the notion of sovereignty is 
based on functioning states, and therefore does not apply similarly to countries 
such as Congo. Because the Congo is considered, and treated, as a sovereign 
state, successful change and reform becomes a matter of political will of the po-
litical leadership.30 Centralising political will of Congolese actors, they argue that 
the problem is that Congolese authorities refuse to engage seriously in the con-
tent of democracy and that they have difficulty to get access to discuss these mat-
ters. They argue that there is a need to discipline political subjectivities, but that 
they are unable to do so because of a lack of access and openness for an upfront 
                                                          
26 Interviews with Western diplomat 4, Kinshasa 29 August 2010, DFID representative, Kinshasa 03 
September 2010. 
27  Interview with Western diplomat 4, Kinshasa, 29 August 2010, Western diplomat 5, Kinshasa 30 
August 2010 and Western diplomat 6, Kinshasa, 03 September 2010. 
28  Interviews with Western diplomat 3, Kinshasa, 25 August 2010. 
29  Interview with Western diplomat 5, Kinshasa, 30 August 2010. 
30  Interview with Western diplomat 3, Kinshasa 25 August 2010.  
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and honest discussion. These representatives of the international community are 
being confronted with the workings of the myth described in the previous chap-
ter. ‘No longer can we say “do this, do that”, the DRC has claimed its sovereign-
ty. All the international community can do is advice.’31  
These three responses appear to be very different and are the cause of tension 
between different international actors on the ground. However, an important 
commonality in these three responses is that they deny primary agency of them-
selves in the process of democratisation, either because they avoid it and hide 
behind the workings of the myth and the claims of sovereignty and self-
determination; because they refuse it and play the depoliticised development 
card; or because they are confronted with the workings of the myth and are faced 
with what is considered as a lack of Congolese political will. The argument is 
that the Congolese have the agency but not the will, whereas the internationals 
have the will but no (sufficient) agency. The different attitudes towards the ques-
tion of agency and responsibility are thus different narratives of disengagement 
which make space for hybridity and local agencies.  
However, despite Congolese claims for agency and emancipation, the victimi-
sation narrative remains present. But by pointing to the West as the cause for the 
failures of Congolese attempts to democratise and stabilise the country, the Con-
golese present themselves as being without agency as well. They thus also evade 
responsibility for the outcomes of the processes towards their own constituen-
cies. The Congolese narratives argue that the West does not want the Congo to 
be democratic and independent, and that western partners seek to maintain con-
trol over the country through trade, war and aid. The Congolese are helpless and 
lack agency to take matters in their own hand (Rubbers 2009, 283). Both dis-
courses emphasise that there is an essential problem with the other partner in this 
process, a problem that seems unsolvable.  
Producing hybridity 
The liberal peace in the Congo shies away from political engagement and limits 
itself to technical assistance and thus in effect evades the very core of what it 
claims to be doing: disciplining the Congolese to become good democrats. The 
International Community chooses to avoid this level of political engagement, 
whereas the Congolese do not want the international community to engage with 
it in the first place. This is the political project of local agencies. Local agencies 
are ignored but maintain a form of resistance. It is a hybrid space in which local 
agencies shape a new political environment. The core of the liberal democratic 
hegemonic discourse is rejected, resisted, ignored and avoided. Institutions are 
                                                          
31  Interview with representative of development organisation, Kinshasa, 19 October 2009.  
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not disciplined, political subjectivities are not touched upon, but through every-
day practices these agencies shape an emerging political environment (Richmond 
2010, 21-2).  
This may lead to the conclusion that post-war state building as a practice of 
the liberal peace in the Congo has, as in many other countries, resulted in little 
more than a virtual peace, a shell state made up of shell institutions (Richmond 
2005, 227, Richmond and Franks 2009, 204). The outer framework of democracy 
is being constructed, but the inner workings of these institutions that depend on 
political subjectivities are being left untouched. However, the case of the Congo 
shows that this virtual peace or shell state is not just a consequence of the inter-
nal contradictions of the liberal peace itself. It is also produced by Congolese 
actors and their resistance towards the liberal peace. The boundaries of interna-
tional engagement in democratisation are set by the Congolese as well as the in-
ternational partners themselves. This reflects the model of hybridisation as a pro-
cess of engagement and resistance between the liberal and the local (MacGinty 
2011, 77-8, Richmond 2009a). However, what we see in the Congo is a variation 
on the model. The liberal peace may in word seek to comply with local agencies, 
but as we have seen it in effect does not follow through this project of discipline 
with its practices. It thus does not incentivise local agencies.  
The model sees local agencies only as resisting the model. As we have seen in 
the analysis above, this interaction is more complex. The liberal not only depolit-
icises its own practices, it also silences the political project of local agencies. It is 
therefore not merely the resistance of the local, but also the disengagement of the 
liberal that produces ‘zones of mutual non-engagement and irrelevance’ – that is 
‘areas of lives that the liberal peace is uninterested in, and areas of the liberal 
peace in which local communities have no interest’ (MacGinty 2011, 88). 
If international partners do not wish to engage in a reinvented mission civilisa-
trice and if the Congolese do not want to allow this to happen, the consequence is 
that the liberal peace is unable to connect with local agencies. These local agen-
cies will then shape the way in which the institutions will function and the politi-
cal role they will play. This means that responding to the failures of the liberal 
peace is not just a matter of improving its praxis. The previous analysis suggests 
that it is also a matter of perceptions about the partnership and the partners itself, 
and the ability of the liberal to meaningfully connect with its local partners. The 
outcomes might thus depend less on praxis and more on agencies that are less 
tangible and therefore less manageable.  Even more so, because of this mutual 
disengagement state building may actually take place not within the liberal 
peace, but outside it (Richmond 2010, 18), in these ‘zones of irrelevance’ and 
hybrid spaces. 
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The concept of a shell institution is therefore unfortunate, because it easily 
leads us to think of these newly formed state institutions as being empty shells, a 
framework on paper, a building, a budget, but little substance. Such a perspective 
ignores agencies within these empty shells. This perspective is widely shared by 
practitioners in general. By accepting these newly built institutions as empty 
shells, the mechanisms and processes of consumption that make these institutions 
function are ignored as being irrelevant. Even more so, by pretending it is only 
possible for these institutions to function (according to the liberal democratic 
norm) or else be an empty shell the ‘dissensus about their detail, contextuality 
and the mechanisms of governance, control and power that put them together for 
others’ are ignored as well (Richmond and Franks 2009, 15). Below the institu-
tional level of these empty shells reside local agencies that shape hybridity. This 
is a site of struggle, a site of resistance, and a site of consumption. But paradoxi-
cally, also, as this chapter has shown, a site of negligence and evasion. The fol-
lowing two chapters explore the practices of consumption of local agencies that 
occur in these hybrid spaces, focusing on the site of the National Assembly and 
its agents. 
  
6  
Consuming democracy:  
MPs and the electorate 
The previous two chapters have discussed how the discourses of the liberal peace 
and those of local agencies are mutually disengaging and produce a hybrid space 
in which local agencies are enabled. Despite this mutual disengagement liberal 
agents and local agencies do not operate in complete isolation from each other. 
There is an unavoidable interaction between the liberal peace and local agencies 
which is expressed through various agencies such as resistance, rejection, ac-
ceptance, or negotiation. In the following two chapters I will focus on this inter-
action between local agencies and the liberal peace. The agencies of resistance, 
negotiation and renegotiation express a negotiation of the liberal peace in re-
sponse to local needs, customs, culture and aspirations. But the interaction be-
tween the liberal peace and local agencies is also a process of renegotiation of the 
local itself.   
The case study looks at agencies at the site of the National Assembly as a site 
on which local agencies are enabled in conviviality. The focus is thus on agen-
cies that are enabled in the relation between different actors. As such, the case 
study will look at MPs and their interaction with others. Chapter six will focus on 
agencies produced by the interaction between MPs themselves and in their inter-
action with le pouvoir. This chapter, on the other hand, is concerned with prac-
tices of the consumption of democracy between the MPs and their constituencies 
through which social expectations are re-produced, but also renegotiated. It thus 
looks at the everyday practices of MPs in their relations with their constituencies. 
The first section describes everyday aspects of MPs – their social position, be-
havioural aspects as well as expectations and responsibilities associated with the 
office of MP. The following section then focuses on the expectations this as-
sumed role produces. A position of father-chief comes with rights, but more im-
portantly also with responsibilities towards the community or the electorate. The 
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final part of the chapter describes how MPs are unable to meet those expectations 
within the framework of liberal democracy. There exists a tension between for-
mal practices of constituency work and the formal responsibilities of an MP, and 
a preference for informal practices of constituency work which better respond to 
the social obligations of an MP. It is in effect at this level that the liberal clashes 
with the local. MPs seek strategies to divert from the liberal democratic practices 
to meet their obligations, sometimes successfully, sometimes unsuccessfully.  
These practices negotiate the liberal, but while doing so, the MPs also renegotiate 
the terms of their obligations towards the constituency. The MPs thus straddle 
between the two in an attempt to redefine political practices.  
MP’s self-representation and status 
On an early evening in October 2009 I am sitting in the car with an MP, driving 
through Kinshasa. As opposed to many of his colleagues, he drives himself. He 
has a posh saloon car, with leather seats, tinted windows and an infra-red camera 
that helps him reverse through the dark, unlit streets of Kinshasa. The impressive 
music installation in the car also plays cassette tapes. He plays a tape with Con-
golese music in Lingala. The MP translates the lyrics for me. The song praises 
deceased people. In the choir of the song the names of well-known people are 
cited, among them some politicians such as the popular former Speaker of Par-
liament (who actually is not dead). The MP notices that I have picked up some 
names and explains that it is common practice to cite the name of well-known 
people to flatter them – ‘it does not mean anything’, he adds.1 On the back seat 
sits the policeman that the MP has privately hired for his security.2 The police-
man has an assault rifle on his lap. The MP asks if it bothers me. It does not. Alt-
hough the policeman is there for the security and protection of the MP, he also 
makes himself useful by getting out of the car in the traffic jam to arrange the 
traffic so we can get through. When we’re driving again he jumps back in the car.  
The MP has a very un-Congolese driving style. He drives slowly, gives way to 
other people and smiles and waves at people we pass. At a busy and lively square 
the car gets surrounded by young men that shout at us excitedly. ‘Mokonzi, Mo-
konzi’, they shout, ‘Chief, Chief’, followed by a waterfall in Lingala.3 They must 
have recognised the car. They are not angry or aggressive, rather excited to see 
their MP and have the opportunity to express their needs and possibly get some 
money. The MP calmly opens his window and tells the young men that he has a 
guest to be concerned with now, but that he will speak to them on his way back. 
                                                          
1  On this practice in Congolese popular music see Bob White (2008).  
2  On this practice of hiring policemen for private purposes, see De Goede (2008).  
3  Lingala is one of the four national languages of the DRC, and the lingua franca in Kinshasa. 
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He explains to me that we are driving through his constituency. ‘Social assis-
tance’, he says to me with a smile.  
This incident shows how the relation between MPs and their electorate is one 
of direct redistribution. MPs (are seen to) hold a social position which is per-
formed through material and behavioural ways. Because of this, they are ex-
pected to provide assistance to their electorate, while expectations about their 
formal responsibilities as MPs (representation, parliamentary oversight, legisla-
tion) are diminished. However, MPs are often unable to meet these (informal) 
expectations and attempt to renegotiate them.   
Congolese MPs present themselves as being different, distinct, from their elec-
torate. They consider themselves to be part of a different social class, away from 
the masses. The masses are poor, invisible and without opportunities. They are 
people that need to be taken care of. MPs are wealthy, visible, and well-known, 
people with many opportunities and connections, and people that take care of the 
people that need taking care of. Although many MPs may come from privileged 
backgrounds or privileged families, many others used to be members of those 
invisible masses. Being an MP, a member of the political but also social and eco-
nomic elites, is therefore an escape from this invisibility.  
This being visible, being ‘somebody’, is most clearly expressed in material 
ways and behaviour, or ‘external signs of superiority’ (Daloz 2010, 61). Their 
possessions and life style express a socio-economic status that distinguishes them 
from the rest of the Congolese. Material possessions such as a car become highly 
symbolic of status. When MPs took office in 2006, they were all granted a gov-
ernment sponsored interest free loan to buy a suitable vehicle for themselves. 
One of the measures from the regime to manage the parliamentary crisis in Feb-
ruary-March 20094 was to pay off the loans of these cars.5 Kinois refer to a ‘par-
liamentarian’s car’, for a type of 4x4 that is typically associated with MPs, rather 
than referring to its brand and type. Like the car of the MP described above, 
many of these cars have tinted windows which enhances the celebrity status of 
the MP, but which also blocks the view from the outside. MPs thus segregate 
themselves from their community. By driving cars that the general public does 
not have, and by hiding behind tinted windows, they create a symbolic separation 
between their own class and the rest.  
But these symbols of distinction do not end here. For example, MPs and the 
general public have a separate entrance to the plenary (although coming from the 
same entrance hall), and MPs enjoy privileges such as legal immunity 
(République Démocratique du Congo 2006a, Art. 107). There is also a dress 
                                                          
4  This crisis will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6. 
5  Interviews with MP 1, Kinshasa 20 October 2009, MP 6, Kinshasa 13 November 2009, MP 8, Kin-
shasa 08 December 2009. 
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code. MPs wear a suit, like other members of the political and economic elites, as 
well as representatives of the international community in the Congo. According 
to the Règlement Intérieur of the National Assembly, male MPs are required to 
wear a suit during parliamentary debates and committee meetings. Female MPs 
are required to wear a long skirt or a traditional Congolese dress (pagne), and are 
not allowed to wear trousers (Assemblée Nationale 2007, Art. 62). This again 
emphasises the socio-economic distinction between members of the elites and the 
general public. The suit is a dress of the elites; the vast majority of the general 
public probably does not own a suit. Directors of local NGOs, politicians, busi-
nessmen, people with high income have and wear suits, others do not. This be-
came awfully painful when in early 2010 the dress code for MPs was extended to 
the public that wanted to sit in the audience during parliamentary debates in the 
Plenary. No longer were men that did not wear a suit with tie allowed in the au-
dience of the plenary, neither were women that wore trousers or clothes that were 
otherwise deemed ‘inappropriate’. According to a civil servant in Parliament, the 
point is that people are dressed appropriately, in a way that respects the stature of 
Parliament. Himself dressed in a silvery suit and bright purple tie that made him 
resemble a piece of Christmas decoration, he said that people sometimes came 
very poorly dressed, even in working clothes, pointing to a cleaner wearing an 
overall. ‘In Parliament it should not be like that’, he says.6 Parliament is a place 
for elites. 
These rules about dress code have a significant symbolic impact on democra-
cy. By excluding that part of the population that does not have the dress of the 
socio-economic and political elites from the ‘People’s Palace’, as the Parliament 
building is called, politics and governance is lifted to an elitist level. It basically 
tells people that democracy is not something they are allowed to participate in. It 
confirms the popular cynical belief that politics takes place in the ‘air condi-
tioned offices’, a space occupied by people in suits. This dress-code clearly 
marks the boundary between people that participate and are part-of the political 
space, and people that are not.  
This notion of wanting to demarcate the spaces of people that are part of these 
elites and people that are not is also seen in the way in which people think about 
education and degrees. People expect their leaders to have a certain social status. 
In the run up to the second round of the presidential elections in October 2006 a 
common argument of Bemba supporters was that Kabila did not have a universi-
ty education. They wondered why having a university degree was not a condition 
for a presidential candidate, whereas it is a precondition for ordinary people to 
                                                          
6  Discussion with civil servant at the Palais du Peuple, Fieldnotes, April 2010. 
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qualify for even the more mundane jobs.7 MPs and members of the political elite 
use a notion of education as part of their image to demarcate an in-group and out-
group. MPs emphasise the lack of education and understanding of the general 
population, while they present themselves as a social group of people that is able 
to quote from the Constitution at will, and that speaks in a formal, legalistic and 
pompous language. Carrying a copy of the Constitution under the arm seems to 
be part of the dress code for MPs. In parliamentary debates, no speaker leaves an 
opportunity unused to quote from the Constitution and various laws. This may 
express a search for legitimacy of the discourse of the speaker in question, or an 
attempt to express one’s respect for the new Constitution and the democratic in-
stitutions of the 3rd Republic, including the Rule of Law. More importantly, what 
it also expresses is a symbolic definition of the formation of a social group of 
people that work with the law, makes the law, and speaks in legalistic terms. This 
parlance is a form of performance of status, institutional behaviour, that distin-
guishes them as an educated elite from others. Dress-codes, use of language, cer-
tain cars (Daloz 1990), eating in expensive restaurants and preferring European 
dishes above Congolese dishes (Daloz 1999b), having assistants, body guards or 
a private police escort, a driver and several cell phones, and pretty and young 
girlfriends (Daloz 2002), access to travelling abroad, and the ability to send chil-
dren abroad for their education are all part of the repertoire of acts that can be 
best understood as the codes and performance of identity of a self-proclaimed 
social group of elites. They are practices of ostentation to ‘assert oneself and win 
recognition’ (Daloz 2003b, 40). 
This political and socio-economic elite is in many ways similar to the colonial 
évolués. As in some other African countries, under colonial rule native Congo-
lese could achieve the status of ‘évolué’. The évolués were a social class of peo-
ple that were educated and had achieved a level of ‘civilisation’ and ‘develop-
ment’ that made them emerge from the Congolese masses. They were never con-
sidered to be equal to the white colonials, but were respected as developed Con-
golese (Quantin 2005, 50). They occupied positions in the colonial administra-
tion, and at independence were the people in whose hands the political control 
and administration of the state fell. The political and economic elite that emerged 
in the wake of independence had its origins largely, though not exclusively, in 
the évolués, a social class from the late colonial period (Bomandeke Bonyeka 
1992, 388-99, Mutamba Makombo 1998, Willame 1972, 167-73).  
Interestingly, évolués were not only put in an intermediate position (in be-
tween Congolese masses and colonial whites) by the colonial system, the mem-
                                                          
7  Personal conversations, Kinshasa September-October 2006. In the revised electoral law of 2011 this 
has indeed been amended. The law now states that an eligible candidate must have completed studies 
or be able to prove he has professional experience in the professional areas of politics, administration, 
law or the socio-cultural domain (République Démocratique du Congo 2011).  
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bers of this class also sought to distinguish themselves from other Congolese, 
and demanded treatment as people who had adopted European behavioural 
norms (Ryckmans 2010, 34, Willame 1972, 24-6, Young and Turner 1985, 112). 
As Congolese that behaved like European colonialists, they were referred to as 
‘mundele ndombo’ (‘white-blacks’) (Ryckmans 2010, 35): people that have a 
black appearance but the behaviour of white colonials (Ceuppens 2003, 41). The 
behaviour of these white-blacks was similar to the behaviour of the white-whites 
that were gone, and whose places, status and behaviour they took over: they oc-
cupied the colonial mansions, drove expensive cars, used the coercive forces to 
repress any popular dissent and, worst of all, looked down on the population 
(Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002, 123). 
Like the évolués, current MPs show a similar attitude of searching a status, a 
social position that distinguishes them from other Congolese people. Being an 
MP, a member of the political and socio-economic elite, then comes with certain 
expected behaviour, or the performance of this claimed status. In the eyes of the 
general public, MPs have power. They are seen to be part of the political and 
powerful circles that reside in Kinshasa. Little distinction is seen between oppo-
sition MPs (who have in reality practically no power or influence), or MPs of the 
ruling coalition. Neither does the general public see a difference between MPs 
and members of the executive.8 What matters is that they are understood to be 
part of a group and therefore have a certain status. That the MPs that lost their 
mandate for (alleged) electoral fraud in July 20079 were given the monthly salary 
of an MP for the duration of the legislature’s mandate (Kamerhe and Kengo wa 
Dondo 2009)10 is thus not merely a pay-off but also a symbolic recognition of the 
loss of status the MPs have suffered. Some of them continue to refer to them-
selves as ‘Honorable’, the official title for an MP, as another way of holding on 
to the symbols of being part of the political elite.11 Although they may have lost 
their seats in Parliament, in public life they are still addressed as an MP and have 
therefore not fallen back into the invisibility of being a member of the masses. 
This status, the social position that comes with being an MP is important. The 
MPs enjoy their status and claim this status, and the electorate gives them this 
status. They do this not without reason. The status of being distinct from the 
                                                          
8  Interviews with MP 8, Kinshasa 08 December 2009, MP 9, Bukavu 19 March 2010, Mwami 2, 
Bukavu 20 March 2010, field notes, Bas Congo, December 2009. 
9 In July 2007, 18 MPs lost their seat in Parliament after the Constitutional Court had ruled that they 
were guilty of electoral fraud. The former MPs themselves argue that it was a matter of personal con-
flict with le pouvoir or an unwillingness to join the majority. Interview with former MPs, Kinshasa 
April, 2010. 
10  In this letter, the Speaker of the National Assembly and the Speaker of the Senate respond to a letter 
from the IPU concerning the case of the dismissal of the 18 MPs. The authors explain which measures 
were taken to accommodate the people concerned.  
11  Interview with former MP 4, one of the 18 MPs that lost their mandate in July 2007, Kinshasa, 26 
April 2010.  
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masses comes with important social obligations, as we will see in the following 
paragraph.  
Obligations of being distinct: The MP as father-chief 
The significance of understanding the performance of status and politics is that it 
helps us understand politicians’ everyday lives and their everyday engagements 
with others. In the case of MPs this is most notably their relations with the elec-
torate in general or more specifically their own constituency. It is evident from 
the above that MPs seek to distinguish themselves as an elite that is elevated 
from their electorate. What MPs in effect do is define their own position vis-à-vis 
their electorate, or in De Certeau’s terms, they appropriate a space for themselves 
(1984, 36). By adopting and performing an identity as an elite they claim a posi-
tion for themselves and the other (the electorate) and thus define a relation that 
enables agencies. Apart from political expectations that fall within the framework 
of representative democracy, such an elevated position comes with social expec-
tations as well (Chabal 1992, 213). The relations between MPs and their elec-
torate are established by representative democracy, but the dynamics are better 
captured by Schatzberg’s (2001) moral matrix of the political father-chief and the 
political family. Within this frame, the MP’s escapism to achieve elite status 
should be seen as the performance or the self-representation of the MP as father-
chief. The MP thus relates to his constituency as a father-chief to his family. The 
ostentation of MPs confirms their power and prosperity, but it also provides reas-
surance to their followers because it shows that they have the ability to supply 
and provide to their constituency or clientele (Daloz 2003b, 48). 
The father-chief is a member of his family (community), but he is also elevat-
ed from the rest of the group in terms of his status, wealth and wisdom. In his 
role as a provider, the father-chief figure redistributes his wealth to take care of 
his family and shares his knowledge and wisdom to teach the community 
(Schatzberg 2001, 149). A father-chief is thus simultaneously member of the 
family, as well as, as a head of the family, distinct from the rest of the family 
members. In his paternal role, an MP, while being distinct from the masses he is 
thus also seen to be a member of the community he represents (his constituency). 
This being a member of the community is an important aspect of being a com-
munity’s representative as a father-chief.  
The conceptualisation of the role of MP as father has also been observed in 
other countries, African as well as non-African (see for example AfroBarometer 
2005, Auyero 1999). Lindberg, for example, observes that 76% of the Ghanaian 
electorate sees its MP as a father figure that should take care of the electorate 
(Lindberg 2010a, 8). The conceptualisation of the MP as a father figure is an ex-
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pression of a clientelist voter-politician relationship, which is characterised by 
the delivery of direct and material benefits to individuals and small groups of 
people (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, 2). The adopted (as well as given) pater-
nal status comes with a range of social practices and expectations thereof in the 
engagements between the father-chief and his family. The ostentation of African 
elites should thus not be understood as some ‘self-gratifying pastime’, but rather 
as a practice that corresponds to popular as well as elite’s expectations (Chabal & 
Daloz 1999, 42-3, Lindberg 2009b, 11). It is a practice that belongs to people of 
a certain status; they are not merely allowed to behave as such, they are expected 
to behave as such. The self-representation of MPs thus impacts their engage-
ments with their constituencies.  
What Congolese people expressed in my interviews is an expectation that their 
political representatives are wealthy so that they can distribute. The argument 
made is not that they earn so much, nor that they have access to funds. Where the 
money comes from, whether it is actually there, is not what matters. The imme-
diate assumption is that with a certain position comes a certain economic status 
and social responsibility. This assumption is confirmed by the way in which MPs 
present themselves. Being a leader implies one has means, which one is expected 
to redistribute. MPs describe their constituency work as social assistance; people 
come to MPs with their demands for the most diverse problems that stretch far 
beyond the responsibilities of an MP within a representational democracy, but 
which are common practices of clientelist accountability.  
In March 2010 I visited a small village about 50 km from Bukavu, the capital 
of South Kivu province in the far east of the country. I had joined a personal 
friend who works for a Congolese NGO that runs community development pro-
jects with CBO’s in rural areas. He visited the village to discuss the projects on 
co-operative agriculture and the commercialisation of their agriculture by access-
ing markets to generate a much-needed income for the poverty-stricken village. It 
was busy in the village, everybody had come out to see and welcome the visitors. 
Children stared at me with big eyes and surprised faces when stepped out of the 
car. A group of women sang and danced on the village square to welcome the 
visitors. After the meeting with the CBO we were given a tour through the vil-
lage and were welcomed by the village chief to share a meal in his modest house. 
When we stepped into our car to leave the village, a big crowd of villagers 
swarmed around the car. They held their hands up, asking me for money or small 
gifts. My friends explained that we had not come to give people money, but that 
we had come to support their community organisation. The people were disap-
pointed and some even slightly angry. A woman shouted at me ‘then we will not 
vote for you in the elections!’  
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I doubt that the woman really thought I was an electoral candidate. But she 
was also clearly not joking when she made the comment. The incident could not 
express more vividly the expectations that go with political leadership. The no-
tion of MP as a father-chief plays an important role in the practices through 
which legitimacy and accountability are negotiated between MPs and their elec-
torate – both during and outside the electoral period. One of the most notable 
roles of the father-chief is that of provider; he must provide for the general well-
being of his people. He is thus expected to provide private- and club goods, in-
stead of public goods. Because it is private or targeted at a small group, clien-
telist accountability is often considered to be hampering democratisation. ‘Re-
wards’ are expected to be distributed before the elections (vote buying) rather 
than after (delivering of political goods) (Lindberg 2003, 127). As accountability 
becomes a matter of distributing benefits MPs priorities are diffused towards pri-
vate relations and primary MP tasks such as legislation and executive oversight 
become less important (Lindberg 2003, 127-28). Lindberg thus concludes that 
clientelist practices in voter-politician relations are a credible indicator of ‘how 
healthy’ (or ‘unhealthy’) a democracy is and whether the ‘soil is fertile for con-
solidation’ (Lindberg 2003, 129).  
However, in constituency systems such as the Congo club goods and private 
goods often make, in the eyes of MPs and the electorate, more sense than public 
goods because they are targeted only at that part of the population that matters 
for re-election (Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007, 10). It has been argued that the 
continuation of clientelist accountability practices is typical for young democra-
cies which lack credibility and therefore rely on patronage systems and the buy-
ing of credibility (Keefer 2007). Clientelist strategies are then a strategy to ac-
quire political credibility which MPs lack otherwise (Bratton 2007, 99, Keefer 
and Vlaicu 2005). This would suggest that clientelist strategies are not preferred 
by MPs, but are the only means available because the state is malfunctioning.  
A different argument holds that poverty explains why voters value direct assis-
tance and material goods higher than public goods such as legislation and execu-
tive oversight (Kitschelt & Wilkinson 2007, 24). What is relevant about this ar-
gument is that it underlines that an important driver of clientelist practices is the 
demand side, the electorate. Studies on accountability pressures in other African 
countries have shown that people hold MPs primarily accountable for the distri-
bution of private and club goods (Lindberg 2009b, 9-12, Szeftel 2000, 
Wantchekon 2003, 403). Clientelist accountability is just as much about ‘vote 
selling’ as it is about ‘vote buying’ (Lindberg 2010a, 5). People give their votes 
in exchange for private or club goods, not for collective goods such as legislation 
or executive oversight. In my encounters with villagers in Bas Congo I had the 
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following conversation with three carpenters that were making furniture in the 
open-air workshop under a tree on the village square: 
MdG: ‘Do you know who your National MPs are?’ 
Carpenter 1: ‘Yes, they are Mr. X and Mr. Y’ 
Carpenter 2: ‘And Mr. Z’ (who was actually not an MP but a senator)12 
MdG: ‘What do they do in Kinshasa?’ 
 
The carpenters remain silent and look puzzled; they have no idea.  
 
MdG: ‘What do they do for the community here?’ 
Carpenter 1: ‘They come here, but it is a long time ago’ 
Carpenter 3: ‘Mr. X. has delivered water to our village. The water we have now was brought 
by him.’ 
MdG: ‘When was that?’ 
Carpenter 3: ‘That was during the election campaign’ 
Carpenter 2: ‘Mr. Z installs electricity in different communities of Boma (the nearby city), but 
not yet here.’ 
 
People do not expect any representation of their interests in the legislature. Di-
rect redistribution and constituency work is not an expectation in addition to po-
litical representation, legislation, and executive oversight (Barkan 2009a, 7-8). 
Instead, it is the primary concern. Although in my interviews some people recog-
nised in that political representation, executive oversight and legislation are in-
deed tasks of MPs, the vast majority considers direct redistribution and constitu-
ency work the primary task of an MP. Their demands and expectations do not go 
any further than direct problem solving and direct assistance, often of a more 
practical nature.13  
It’s notable that the matter of what an MP does for his electorate is first and 
foremost associated with his presence and his symbolic visibility through his 
acts. As the above quoted conversation shows, MPs are recognised for what they 
personally deliver to their constituency, not for their actions in Parliament itself. 
However, presence need not be physical. For example, the pictures below are an 
advertisement of a community development project funded by the MP for his 
constituency. The MP in question is never to be seen in his constituency and be-
ing close to the President he resides comfortably in the higher circles of the Kin-
shasa political elite. Nevertheless, he is vividly present in the community because 
of his projects and the advertisements of these projects. 
                                                          
12  Members of the National Assembly are referred to as ’Député’, whereas members of the Senate are 
referred to as ’Senateur’. 
13  Interviews with MP 3, Kinshasa 27 October 2009, MP 4, 04 November 2009, MP 8, Kinshasa 08 
December 2009, Mwami 2, Bukavu 20 March 2010, civil society representative 2, Bukavu 16 March 
2010, Deputy bourgmestre of a Boma city disctrict, Boma 30 November 2009, Field notes Bas Congo, 
December 2009. 
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Photo 6.1 Sign in a village in the constituency of MP Antoine Ghonda in 
Bas Congo province (‘Antoine Ghonda Foundation - join the ef-
fort to reconstruct the wealth of our country together’) – Author’s 
picture, December 2009. 
 
 
 
Picture 6.2 Sign in a village in the constituency of MP Antoine Ghonda in 
Bas Congo province (‘rehabilitation of the market ‘Blue Bon-
net’ provided by the Antoine Ghonda Foundation’) – Author’s 
picture, December 2009.  
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This case of Antoine Ghonda does not stand on its own. An MP from South 
Kivu builds and maintains school buildings in his constituency from his private 
pocket.14 An MP from Maniema runs a local development NGO, for mother-and-
child care and runs a community radio station to provide access to information 
for the population of his constituency.15 An MP from Bas Congo Province has 
set up community based self-help organisations in his constituency, which func-
tion as a solidarity, emergency and well-fare fund for its members. The MP has 
provided the start capital for the funds, and members pay their contribution. The 
CBOs are named ‘Friends of Honorable so-and-so’.16 Although the CBOs may 
function as self-managed self-help funds, by attaching his name to the CBOs, the 
visibility of the MP in question is high. This MP combines the paternal roles of 
providing (financial means) and giving parental guidance to his people to learn to 
take care of themselves. Members of these CBOs will thus acquire a sense of 
empowerment as well as a sense of relief, which is provided for by their MP. 
Similarly, an MP from Equateur province imports medicines, second hand medi-
cal equipment and things like mattresses from North America for the hospital in 
his constituency.17 An MP from Bas Congo province regularly organises parties 
for the youth of the constituency, who feel impoverished and deprived of such 
luxuries. Music, alcohol, food, women, but not a single word on politics, ‘yet still 
he is liked by the youth,’ complains a local civil society worker.18 The examples 
of such activities are endless.  
As shown in these examples, many MPs creatively play with the notion of civ-
il society and its popularity with Congolese people as well as with the discourses 
of international donors. They stretch the notion of community development, and 
try to use their access to the donor community to mobilise funding for their chari-
table projects for their communities. Employees of Embassies and donor organi-
sations in Kinshasa confirmed to me that many MPs use individual meetings as 
an opportunity to present project proposals for community projects such as the 
building of schools or medical centres in their constituencies.19 In western minds 
this logic of combining community development work and political campaigning 
is morally rejected as corrupt or as an attempt to vote buying. However, Congo-
lese MPs often spoke proudly about their attempts to improve living conditions 
in their constituency through private means. Most MPs I interviewed wanted to 
elaborate on their relations with their constituency, and emphasised that they 
were working hard to use their political power and position, their access to do-
                                                          
14  Interview with MP 1, Kinshasa, 20 October 2009. 
15  Interview with MP 10, Kinshasa, 20 April 2010.  
16   Interview with MP 8, Kinshasa, 08 December 2009. 
17  Interview with MP 11, Kinshasa, 24 April 2010. 
18  Interview with civil society representative 1, Boma 30 November 2009. 
19  Fieldnotes, private conversations, Kinshasa October-November 2009. 
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nors and organisations, to provide some of the basic needs for their constituency. 
It is not morally rejectable, but rather a moral obligation to do so for ‘their peo-
ple’.  
From this behaviour we can read two things. Firstly, Congolese MPs may be 
concerned about the general negative reputation they have with foreigners (as 
well as Congolese people) for being selfish, greedy and without good intentions 
for democracy and development of the country. This is without doubt the case. 
But more importantly, and even if the former is the case, it is interesting that the 
MPs I spoke with were not inclined to present themselves as good intended and 
hardworking MPs by focusing on their responsibilities to hold the government to 
account, to draft and adopt laws, and to represent the electorate’s needs in the 
National Assembly. Instead, they choose to present themselves as legitimate MPs 
by emphasising their commitment to their constituency. What this indicates is on 
the one hand that MPs are fully aware of the inability of MPs or the National As-
sembly to do anything meaningful for their electorate and therefore need to pro-
vide through other mechanisms. But also, it reflects the fact that MPs, like the 
electorate, are cognitively captured in the conceptualisation of leadership and 
representation as being practiced through direct (paternal) redistribution, and not 
through representation in the legislature. A villager in Bas Congo said that ‘we 
are suffering. He (the MP) needs to help us’.20 It is these kinds of expectations 
that people in the constituencies have of their MPs, redistribution to directly re-
solve the needs of their electorate, be that access to clean water, electricity, 
health care, education, transport, jobs, help in legal matters, food supplies and 
money, or the setting up of NGO-type development projects in the village. Rep-
resentation does not concern speaking on behalf of a constituency in the political 
debate, but rather bringing some of the spoils of power back to the constituency. 
Members of the general public have no knowledge of – and as it appeared also 
little interest in – the parliamentary tasks of MPs. Instead, their only interest con-
cerns what MPs have done for their constituency, or whether they have done any-
thing at all. The constituency work is thus in the eyes of the general public much 
privileged above other core tasks of MPs. Whether somebody is an effective and 
good MP is measured by his work for the constituency. MPs know that this is 
how their credibility as an MP is assessed.21  
This may be partly due to the fact that legal change may mean little to no 
change on the ground in the Congo. Laws are often not implemented, local gov-
ernance structures are weak and dysfunctional and there are no funds to deliver 
                                                          
20  Discussion with villager, Bas Congo province, 02 December 2009. 
21  Interviews with MP 4, Kinshasa 04 November 2009, MP 8, Kinshasa 08 December 2009, Mwami 1, 
Bukavu 17 March 2010, Mwami 2, Bukavu 20 March 2010, Civil society representative 1, Boma 30 
November 2009, Focus group 1, civil society representatives, Bukavu 16 March 2010, Focus Group 2, 
civil society representatives, Bukavu 19 March 2010, Filed notes, Bas Congo, December 2009. 
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what has been promised. However, what the expectations of the general elec-
torate also express is a conceptualisation of leadership and political representa-
tion that does not coincide with the roles and functions of MPs as conceptualised 
in the notion of representative democratic politics. It confirms Lindberg’s argu-
ment that clientelist practices undermine horizontal accountability. In other 
words, holding the executive to account is less of a priority for MPs (Lindberg 
2003, 128). Consequently, they push towards a delegative form of democracy, in 
which those elected are entitled to do as they see fit without any horizontal ac-
countability (O’Donnell 1994, 59).  
However, despite this delegative democratic tendencies people also have a 
certain expectation of constituency representation by MPs and feel MPs fail to 
speak up for their interests in Parliament. The follow-up on the massacre of Jan-
uary-February 2007 in Bas Congo is an interesting example in this regard. On 31 
January and 1 February 2007, police and armed forces launched a violent cam-
paign against the politico-religious movement Bunda-dia-Kongo (BdK), claiming 
it was a response against an armed movement that sought to overthrow the gov-
ernment (Human Rights Watch 2008, 72, Tull 2010, 649-51). Apart from the 
founder of the BdK, who is also an MP, none of the Bas Congo MPs visited their 
constituencies in the aftermath of the violence. People concluded that their MPs 
do not care, or that they are unable to speak up for their constituency because 
they fear that this would be interpreted as critique on governmental actions, 
which would harm their personal position.22 However, an MP from Bas Congo 
did ask questions with debate in the Plenary to the Minister of Interior and the 
Minister of Defence on 12 February 2007, in which explanations on the recent 
events in Bas Congo province were demanded. The MP’s request for a commis-
sion of inquiry was adopted by a parliamentary majority. When the state security 
forces responded violently to the BdK again a year later, another MP for Bas 
Congo province responded with parliamentary questions to the Minister of Inte-
rior (Assemblée Nationale and Direction des Séances 2009).   
The National Assembly conducted a parliamentary inquiry into the events in 
February 2007. The report was presented by the inquiry commission and dis-
cussed during three days in the Plenary in May and June 2007 (Basabe and 
Ngokoso 2007).23 This was completely unknown to the people and many civil 
society organisations in Bas Congo who criticise their MPs for not responding to 
the events or caring about the people in their constituency.24 Although the in-
quiry can be criticised on many accounts (Human Rights Watch 2008, 73), the 
                                                          
22  Interview with Bunda dia Kongo representatives, Boma 30 November 2009. 
23  Log book of Bureau des Annales, session ordinaires Mars 2007. 
24  Interview with Bunda dia Kongo representatives, Boma, 30 November 2009, interview with civil 
society representative 1, Boma 30 November  
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population of Bas Congo has little knowledge of the fact that MPs have under-
taken an inquiry into state sponsored violent actions against the BdK.  
The case of for former Speaker of Parliament, Vital Kamerhe, shows a similar 
tendency. Although as Speaker he was no longer part of the actual Assembly 
(and thus not representing a constituency), he did speak up for his fellow South 
Kivutians when he criticised the President for inviting Rwandan troops in the 
country to partake in joint Rwandan-Congolese military intervention against 
FDLR. In the past, South Kivu has been one of the regions that has suffered se-
verely from Rwandan military intervention and warfare between foreign military 
and rebel militias. Instead of having won political credibility for this critique in 
defence of the interest of his constituency, Kamerhe has lost much political sup-
port because he has since left the country and is therefore no longer visible nor 
able to directly redistribute. He is considered a traitor by some people in South 
Kivu, and has lost much of his political credibility.25  
What counts for people is when they see concrete action, when they see their 
MP, and when they can directly speak to him and receive from him. The only 
way in which an MP can show that he acts in the interest of his constituency, is 
through his presence in and direct distribution to his constituency. For the con-
stituency invisible actions such as parliamentary questions and parliamentary 
enquiries or executive oversight actions mean little or nothing. A father-chief is 
member of a community, and thus needs to be visible and present. Representa-
tion work in the National Assembly does not fulfil this need of a father-chief. 
Local agencies are more responsive to local needs and people’s wellbeing 
(Richmond 2009b, 561) and much less with questions of good or democratic 
governance. Contrary to the assumptions underlying democratisation, people do 
not claim their democratic rights nor pursue their democratic obligations of hold-
ing their representatives to account (Bratton and Logan 2006). It means that good 
or democratic governance in contexts such as the Congo is not necessarily re-
sponsive to local needs. If people seek to resolve their needs through practices 
that do not fit in the liberal democratic framework, it makes it questionable 
whether citizens will, or can, actually be a driving force for democratic govern-
ance in contexts such as the Congo.  
Formal and informal constituency work 
The framing of voter-MP relations in paternalistic terms and the subsequential 
emphasis on clientelist practices of accountability stresses a tension between 
formal and informal practices of accountability. In his study about accountability 
                                                          
25  Focus Group 1, civil society representatives, Bukavu 16 March 2010, Focus Group 2, civil society 
representatives, Bukavu, 19 March 2010. 
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pressures of Ghanaian MPs, Lindberg shows that because the office of the MP is 
infused with paternal notions of the MP as head of a family, the MP is therefore 
subject to formal as well as informal accountability pressures (2010c, 126). That 
politics in Africa takes place beyond the scope of the formal state structures has 
for long been recognised. Chabal & Daloz argue that the political realm in Africa 
is more often than not informal and that the usefulness of the African state, for 
political elites, lies in the fact that it is weakly- or non-institutionalised (1999, 
14). Power relies on (informal) personal relations as much as occupying an office 
(Hydén 2007, 16754). But as Bayart has argued, it is not merely political elites 
that prefer a weakly institutionalised state, civil society and the population in 
general often actively evade and undermine the state too (Bayart 1986).  
Work of Trefon and MacGaffey has shown that the preference for the informal 
in the Congo has an additional dimension related to the collapse of the economy 
and the failure of the state, which forces people to seek informal alternatives 
(MacGaffey 1991, Trefon 2004, Trefon 2009). The implicit argument of these 
studies is that the choice to opt for the informal instead of the formal is due to the 
failure of the formal. In other words, the informal is a second choice (Helmke 
and Levitsky 2004, 730). Similarly to the argument that clientelist practices are 
merely a response to the lack of other sources of credibility, this suggests that the 
privileging of the informal is a temporary solution which will disappear when 
formal institutions will function again. This is a rationale underlying state build-
ing programmes. However, when observing practices of constituency work and 
constituency representation in the First Legislature of the Congo’s Third Repub-
lic, we observe not only a coexistence of formal and informal institutions of con-
stituency work and –representation (both forms are not mutually exclusive), but 
also that the formal is, as Bayart argued, actively undermined by both MPs and 
electorate.  
Constituency work of Congolese MPs is formalised in the procedures of the 
Vacances Parlementaires.  In the months in between the (ordinary) parliamentary 
sessions MPs are expected to travel back to their constituencies to do constituen-
cy work and engage with their electorate about their concerns and needs. MPs are 
to hand in a report on their findings at the beginning of the next parliamentary 
session, which are used as a basis for parliamentary questions to Ministers and 
committee work (Assemblée Nationale 2007, Art. 113). Based on these individu-
al reports a synthesis report is made per province. A second synthesis report is 
made per ministry, which is sent to the ministry concerned for follow-up action, 
and which is discussed between the Minister and the respective parliamentary 
committee. When observing how the process functions in practice, it becomes 
clear that the process itself is not taken seriously, nor considered useful, by MPs 
and ministers alike. It may on paper appear to be a good system it is in practice 
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totally unsuccessful. Although practically all MPs eventually hand in a report,26 
most of these reports are superficial. Little exchange with the constituency is 
necessary to draw-up such recommendations, and few MPs actually do so. Many 
MPs just state the obvious (such as a need for jobs, security, development), and 
others use locally based assistants to write-up a report. The preparation of the 
Vacance Parlementaire reports thus fails to be a momentum for exchange be-
tween MPs and their constituencies.  
It takes a long time before the synthesis reports are put together and before 
they are even discussed in the parliamentary committees. The synthesis reports of 
the period July-September 2008 were sent to the Assembly and stamp dated for 
reception in January 2009 (Assemblée Nationale 2009c, Assemblée Nationale 
2009d, Assemblée Nationale 2009e).27 They were discussed in the plenary only 
on 12 December 2009 (i.e. a year and a half after the period concerned in the re-
port), together with the synthesis reports of the vacance parlementaire of Janu-
ary-March 2009.28 Although the reports mention evident structural problems of 
insecurity, lack of infrastructure, jobs, ill-functioning local authorities, and the 
need for basic things such as health care, education, electricity and clean water, 
many of the problems mentioned in the reports are issues that require direct re-
sponse, or concern police and law and order action, rather than issues that can be 
dealt with at the level of the National Assembly. For example illegal road blocks 
and harassment by local police and military, or the presence of illegal squatters 
on private land (Assemblée Nationale 2009e), a need for more banking facilities 
and football stadiums locally and illegal taxation for market salesmen 
(Assemblée Nationale 2009c). However, the responsibility to respond to such 
local needs of a more law and order, or needs of a more civil legal nature, is al-
ways referred to a ministry, never to local authorities. Often the (by the MP) sug-
gested action to be taken is left blank in the report, and never is the allocation of 
means to the local authorities to take action a suggested response.29 
Follow-up action in response to the MPs reports does not take place, and nei-
ther do the MPs question the respective Ministers for not doing so. The follow-up 
                                                          
26  Interview with political advisor to the Office of the Speaker of Parliament, responsible for collecting 
the Vacance Parlementaire reports of the MPs and for making the synthesis reports, 24 March 2010. 
27  The reports were stamp-dated for receipt by the National Assembly on 10 January 2009, 10 January 
2009 and 11 January 2009 respectively.  
28  Log book of Bureau des Annales, session ordinaires Mars 2007. 
29  Decentralisation of power and state funds is a political hot potato, so much so, that it is not spoken 
about. Congolese speak about ’le fameux 40%’, thereby referring to it as a myth, something that eve-
rybody talks about but is not expected to ever materialize. According to the constitution 40% of na-
tional budget should be allocated to the provincial authorities. It is generally understood that decen-
tralisation is blocked by the central government, despite many promises from the regime and efforts to 
push the issue from the international community in DRC. Despite being considered one of the most 
important issues on the political agenda since the end of the war (even dating back to the CNS), it has 
in effect been removed from the political agenda and is no longer debated, not even when the national 
budget is being debated in Parliament.  
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of problems and needs noted in the MPs reports is further complicated because 
many of the issues stated are not issues of the National level, but instead issues 
that are the responsibility of the local or provincial authorities. Instead of MPs 
sharing their reports with the authorities concerned directly, all goes to Kinshasa, 
only to be sent back via provincial synthesis reports to the respective local au-
thorities. The centralisation of governance and the bureaucracy of the process 
paralyses a response from the authorities concerned, and the net effect is that lit-
tle to nothing is being achieved through the formal procedures of MPs constitu-
ency work.  
The failing practice of formalised constituency work and the inability to actu-
ally bring MPs and their electorate together in a meaningful discussion shows 
there is a lack of formalised rapport between MPs and their constituency. They 
appear out of touch and disengaged. But also, members of the general public ap-
pear confused over the different responsibilities of the national and the local au-
thorities, and they appear equally out of touch with the national representatives as 
with their local representatives. MPs may not take the formalised procedures of 
the Vacance Parlementaire too seriously, knowing that the procedures will have 
little result, and if there is any result it will be late as well as not directly his do-
ing. The Vacance Parlementaire procedures thus fail on different levels. Not on-
ly does the process not contribute to improvement of conditions or the solving of 
problems in the constituency. Because the process is centrally organised, the MP 
loses his visibility in the process, and therefore his political gain from any out-
come. Parliamentary action and its outcomes do not fit within the exchange be-
tween the father-chief and his family, it is not a form of redistribution that is rec-
ognised, because it is abstract, formal and intangible. MPs therefore resort to in-
formal practices, recognising that formal practices and institutions do not work 
sufficiently or adequately enough to guarantee their political survival and victory 
at the next elections. The formalised procedures do not respond to the political 
needs (of both the constituency and the MP) of their relationship, whereas infor-
mal practices of direct action by the MP that fit within the notion of paternal re-
distribution, do. In such actions local needs are directly met (e.g. the building of 
a school, the provision of electricity in a community, the reconstruction of a 
bridge, or the example refurbishment of a marketplace). The visibility of the MP 
in such actions is high, because it was his personal action, which was not ob-
scured through state bureaucracy.  
This direct visibility and action is more valued than political representation at 
the Assembly is not surprising or specific only for the Congo. What is relevant is 
the response to it by MPs as well as members of the electorate. Instead of seeking 
to be better informed, or to better inform the public about parliamentary actions, 
and instead of striving to make formal procedures respond better to the needs of 
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the general public, both electorate and MPs prefer to resort to the informal, thus 
continuing these informal practices in parallel to the new and ill-functioning 
practices of democratic governance and democratic representation. The privileg-
ing of informal practices over formal practices is thus not a reaction to the failure 
of the formal procedures as such. Even if the formal procedures would function, 
they would still not deliver the desired results of the visibility of the MP and his 
actions of direct and personal redistribution. These informal practices then substi-
tute the formal procedures because they deliver what the formal practices fail to 
deliver (Helmke and Levitsky 2004, 729, Lauth 2000, 25). The formal proce-
dures are nevertheless nominally maintained to keep up the infrastructural and 
institutional framework of democratic governance. But mutual preference does 
not lie in the improvement of formal relations and state-society relations, nor in 
the improvement of formal procedures and practices, or in state building. Alt-
hough the intended outcomes of state building processes may be responsive to 
the needs of both the electorate and the MPs, and the hoped for effects may be 
pursued in what international policy makers perceive to be the best interests of 
both, in their preferred practices neither is interested in such state building pro-
jects or improvement of state-society relations. What both MPs and electorate 
pursue is an informal and personal relation of direct redistribution and direct po-
litical gain. Formalising and abstractifying this relation by building in bureaucra-
cy and the state only reduces its desired effect for both and makes it less effec-
tive. What we see here are local convivial agencies that avoid formal democratic 
procedures to maintain informal practices within the framework of democratic 
governance and democratic representation. The assumption that the preference 
for informal practices will diminish when formal practices become more effec-
tive is thus flawed which has far-reaching consequences for the possibility of 
state building and institution building.  
‘We see his jeep drive past our village regularly, but it never 
stops’30  
Although both electorate and MPs are participating in practices of redistribution 
that resist democracy, that does not mean that no tension between MPs and their 
constituencies over these practices exists. The basic principle of the practices of 
redistribution and representation are agreed upon, namely that they should be 
informal, personal, direct and highly visible. However, MPs feel too much is ex-
pected or demanded from them. Members of the electorate, on the other hand, 
feel forgotten and abandoned and are disappointed that the expectations of de-
mocracy have remained unfulfilled. This tension is the basis of a process of ne-
                                                          
30  Comment made by a villager, Bas Congo, field notes December 2009. 
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gotiation and renegotiation over the terms of the exchange of loyalty for redistri-
bution; whether an MP provides ‘enough’ and whether people’s expectations are 
reasonable. The liberal peace has created new expectations which enable a rene-
gotiation of existing practices of redistribution.  
People had high expectations of democracy. They expected that democracy 
would deliver something in terms of development and improvement of their daily 
lives. In other words, they expected that democracy would mean more redistribu-
tion, the trickling down of wealth to their communities. However, they complain 
that they see little of their MPs after the election campaign, and that little to noth-
ing is being delivered. During campaign time MPs were present in their constitu-
ency, with radio- and tv, journalists and money and gifts to distribute. They have 
made many promises, mainly in terms of development for the region. In my in-
terviews people told me they did believe the promises of the candidate MPs. But 
now they know better. ‘During the campaign they came to flatter us. But after the 
elections they have abandoned us’, said one of my respondents.31 An MP of Bo-
ma argued that ‘he has already paid’ during the election campaign, and that peo-
ple should therefore not expect anything from him anymore. According to my 
respondents, his comments infuriated the population of Boma.32 Overall, people 
are very disappointed with the results of three years of democracy. They argue 
that none of the promises have been delivered, and that those with a political job 
profit from the new system while they have disappeared from the vision of their 
electorate. A village chief of a village in Bas Congo told me that he has helped to 
get an MP elected by telling the people in the village to vote for him. But since 
then, the MP has disappeared. Now the people of the village complain to the 
chief and ask him why none of the promises have been delivered.33 Even political 
party representatives have the same experience. ‘We have campaigned for days, 
and did not even receive a coke’, says a PPRD (Parti du Peuple pour la Recon-
struction et la Démocratie, the party of President Kabila) representative. Not on-
ly were they not rewarded for their efforts, they have since lost all contact with 
the local MP. The party representatives have subsequently even sent a formal 
request to the party to ask for a visit of the MP to his constituency, to which there 
has been no response.34 People feel neglected and forgotten, while it had been the 
expectation that with democracy this would all be different. They tell stories of 
MPs driving past in their fancy cars, hiding behind tinted windows and that many 
have changed their phone numbers after having been elected. Being a politician 
                                                          
31  Focus Group 3, Students at Institut Supérieur Technique, 01 December 2009. 
32  Interviews with civil society representative 1, Boma, 30 November 2009, with former MP 3,2, Boma 
01 December 2009, Author in conversation with members of population of Boma, field notes Novem-
ber 2009. 
33  Focus Group 4, Village in Bas Congo Province, 03 December 2009. 
34  Focus Group 4, Village in Bas Congo Province, 03 December 2009.  
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has become synonymous with being a liar, and doing politics refers to lying or 
‘faire la farce’.  
What we see here is a practice of the distributing of clientelist goods which are 
typically redistributed beforehand (Lindberg 2003, 127). The MP that argued that 
he ‘had already paid’ refers to this logic. The rewards for campaigning for a can-
didate, as well as the distribution of gifts during the campaign period are typical 
clientelist goods. However, people also expect redistribution after the elections, 
in terms of a straightforward redistribution of wealth or in terms development 
projects for the community or a delivery of promises made.  The liberal peace 
and the long awaited promise of democracy have created new expectations which 
have not been fulfilled. This creates new tensions between MPs and their elec-
torate a source for renegotiation of practices of redistribution.  
In the Congo it is generally assumed that MPs are more concerned with their 
own interests than with those of their electorate or the general population. MPs 
themselves are aware that they can indeed not live up to the expectations of peo-
ple. Some recognise that they and their colleagues have made promises they 
could not deliver. Often because they had expected that people would forget, or 
they had hoped that they would understand that this was rhetoric. Sometimes, 
because they made promises because they were themselves politically inexperi-
enced and naive, and believed that they could achieve much more than they man-
aged in reality. Being faced with an unwilling government, and the complexity 
and indirectness of the political process, some have been very disappointed 
themselves.35 Many also argue that they do simply not have the means to deliver 
what people ask of them. An MP explained to me that they (like all people in 
service of the state) are being paid in US dollars on paper, but in reality they re-
ceive Congolese Francs. However, an old exchange rate is being used, which 
means that MPs now receive ca Fc500 per dollar instead of the current rate of 
Fc900, a significant loss.36 He continues to explain that the majority of his in-
come is being used for his house in Kinshasa, his car, his assistants, and that only 
a small part of his personal salary remains. The state does not provide funding 
for his constituency work, and even the allocated funding to pay for the transport 
to and from the constituency in the Vacance Parlementaire (Assemblée 
Nationale 2007, Art. 112) has never been made available. A return flight between 
Kinshasa and Bukavu costs around US$1,000. ‘But when people see us, they 
think we are rich’, and expect us to pay for everything – health care costs, school 
fees, provide everybody with food and drinks.’37   
                                                          
35  Interviews with former MP 3, Bukavu, 19 March 2010, and MP 9, Bukavu 18 March 2010. 
36  Exchange rate of late 2009. 
37  Interview with MP 8, Kinshasa, 08 December 2009. 
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MPs feel put under pressure by their electorate while they realise they cannot 
deliver what is expected of them. MPs are often criticised for earning too much 
without doing anything for their constituency. It is a sensitive subject. In May 
2009 a motion of no-confidence was launched against Minister of Foreign Af-
fairs Alexis Thambwe Mwamba because of his statements concerning MPs sala-
ries which implicated that MPs earn too much. It was felt by MPs that these 
statements put the institution of the National Parliament in discredit. The motion 
was rejected (albeit marginally, 199 against, 194 votes for) (Assemblée Nationale 
2009b).38 In a seminar on democratic parliamentarianism a Congolese researcher 
at the Centre for Political Studies in Kinshasa (CEP) spoke about the relations 
between the MPs and their electorate. His critique was (untypically) very direct. 
He criticised the MPs, accused them of corruption and serving the regime and the 
President rather than their electorate. He quotes members of the electorate saying 
that  
‘Parliament only acts in response to the interests of the government and at the expense of the 
interest of the people. Democracy is the rule of the majority. Instead of serving the interest of 
the population, this majority uses it weight to remove from the agenda any item relating to 
the improvement of the daily life of the population. (..) this majority thinks of nothing else 
than its own interests and that of its leaders.’ (Kabungulu Ngoy-Kangoy 2009, Author’s 
translation from French)  
The MPs and Senators present responded with much anger towards the cri-
tique and instead of a discussion on Parliamentarianism the debate became an 
agitated and emotional one on salary figures and expenses.  An MP said to me 
that ‘[the researcher’s] text will be on the internet in no time, and then what will 
people in Europe think about us?’ The critique expressed by the researcher of 
CEP is commonly heard in Kinshasa, as I experienced in my conversations, in-
terviews and heard in public transport and the political discussions of the Street 
Parliamentarians. What was interesting in this seminar in Kinshasa was therefore 
not so much the criticism itself, but rather the MPs reactions to it. It is obviously 
a sensitive issue, and I had the impression that MPs feel criticised from all direc-
tions for ‘not doing it right’ according to the formal liberal democratic behav-
ioural norms for MPs or according to the expectations of local political practices. 
This explains the MPs concerns about what people in Europe would think about 
them when reading the presented text.  
But while being confronted with this criticism, they also know that the more 
pressing reality they face is that of direct redistribution as part of their paternal 
relationship with their electorate. In the straddling between the liberal and the 
local, local practices are evidently more pressing than those of the liberal. This is 
                                                          
38  ‘Annales Parlementaires de la Séance Plénière du jeudi 21 mai 2009’, hand written transcript by Bu-
reau des Annales of audio recording, 184 pages ; ’Annales Parlementaires de la Séance Plénière du 
vendredi 22 mai 2009’, type written transcripts by Bureau des Annales of audio recording, 46 pages. 
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despite the fact that these local practices take place within a framework provided 
by the liberal peace, that is, the election of community representatives to the po-
litical institutions.  
Realising they cannot deliver what it expected of them in terms of either for-
mal or informal constituency work and – representation, MPs hide from their 
constituencies and try to minimise contact. The case of so-called replacement 
MPs provides a good illustration of how MPs try to hide from their constituen-
cies. When MPs give up or lose their seat in parliament (e.g. because they step 
down or have accepted a position which is incompatible with that of a parliamen-
tarian, such as member of the Government (Electoral Law 2006b, Art.77), no by-
elections are held. Instead, the seat is passed to the first (of two) substitutes, that 
the MP had declared when he/she registered as a candidate (Electoral Law 
2006b, Art. 116).39 However, these substitutes are not mentioned on the ballot 
paper. Their names are known by the electoral committee, but not by the general 
public. In many cases, the electorate does not know whether the MP concerned 
has given up his seat, or who his replacement is. This is a real problem in South 
Kivu, where many MPs have been replaced by their anonymous replacements.40 
It is generally unknown who the MPs are, and they can therefore not easily be 
held to account.41 In my encounters with members of the general public, commu-
nity organisations and civil society organisations in Kinshasa, Bas Congo and 
South Kivu, in all occasions where an MP had been replaced, nobody knew who 
the replacement MP was, and neither had he been seen in his constituency. One 
replacement MP from South Kivu said that he does not need to engage with the 
population of his constituency and be held to account. After all, he has not been 
elected himself, he only replaces somebody. In anonymity he takes distance from 
the parliamentary majority that he is part of, thereby also rejecting responsibility 
for its failures and the disappointments people may feel towards the regime. He 
can walk anonymously through Bukavu, and nobody will ask him anything. He is 
more concerned with preparing for the next elections.42 The feeling that it is 
about a personal relation, not a matter of an institutional relation between mem-
ber of the electorate and MP (which can be transferred to replacement MPs) is 
shared by the electorate. People feel that if they have not voted for them, they 
                                                          
39  In the revised Electoral Law of 2011 some slight amendments are made on this issue. When for an 
electoral seat there are no more replacements available, by-elections will be organised in this specific 
constituency. 
40  The presence lists of April 2010 show that 13 of the 32 MPs that had in 2006 been elected for South 
Kivu have been replaced. Four of the five MPs for the constituency of Bukavu have been replaced. Of 
the 500 MPs a total of 81 had been replaced by substitute MPs (‘Liste de présence des Députés, 
Séance Plénière du Jeudi 15 Avril 2010’). 
41  Focus Group 2, civil society representatives, Bukavu 19 March 2010, interviews with civil society 
representative 5, Bukavu 19 March 2010, Mwami 3, Bukavu 21 March 2010. 
42  Interview with MP 9, Bukavu 18 March 2010. 
134 
 
cannot hold the MP in question to account, or even that they themselves and their 
interests are not represented in Parliament because the candidate of their choice 
has lost.43  
In this process of straddling and the (re-)negotiation of the relation between 
MPs and their constituencies civil society and local and traditional authorities 
take up a role of mediators that facilitate this negotiation. Local authorities are 
important for MPs.44 On some occasions political parties can facilitate contact by 
either organising meetings, or by channelling information between MPs and their 
constituencies, and vice versa.45 Traditional leaders fulfil a particularly special 
role in this regard, particularly the Mwami’s (Kings) of South Kivu province.46 
Some of them have been elected as provincial MPs, and thus already have a dou-
ble function. But others that have not are important contact persons for MPs, in 
election time as well as after that. Throughout Africa, traditional leaders such as 
the Mwami’s continue to play an important role, despite the setting up of modern 
institutions of governance (Logan 2008). When an MP has a bad relationship 
with the Mwami from his constituency, this affects his legitimacy very badly. As 
has been observed in other countries as well (Englebert 2002, Oomen 2000, 63, 
West and Kloek-Jenson 1999, 121, Williams 2004), Mwami’s thus have an im-
portant role in mediating between the people and their MPs.47  
So do civil society organisations, although their involvement and role varies 
widely in different parts of the country. Contrary to their colleagues in Bas Con-
go, civil society organisations in South Kivu see it as an important role for civil 
society to bring MPs and the electorate together, to facilitate this rapport and or-
ganise public debates, discussion and meetings with MPs.48 Such engagements 
can sometimes go quite far, for example the case of an NGO that receives fund-
ing from MPs to visit their constituency and engage with the people on his be-
half.49 Although members of CSOs accept that they may facilitate the legitima-
tion of MPs there is a general feeling that it is important to bring MPs and their 
electorate together, and to facilitate mutual engagement and discussion rather 
than limiting the relation between the two to redistribution, social assistance and 
                                                          
43  Congolese journalist in conversation with author, Kinshasa, field notes, November 2009.  
44  Interviews with deputy bourgmestre, Boma city ditrict, Boma 30 November 2009, and with Adminis-
trateur du Territoire in Bas Congo province, 03 December 2009. 
45  Interview with MP 9, Bukavu 18 March 2010.  
46  Traditional leaders in North- & South Kivu have traditionally had and have maintained a much 
stronger position than their counterparts in other parts of the country. Whereas chiefs in most parts of 
the country have become marginalised, the Mwami’s of North- and South Kivu have maintained a 
strong and influential position.   
47  Interviews with Mwami 1, Bukavu 17 March 2010, Mwami 2, Bukavu 20 March 2010, Mwami 3, 
Bukavu 21 Marc 2010. 
48  Interviews with civil society representative 2, Bukavu 16 March 2010, civil society representative 3, 
Bukavu 18 March 2010, civil society representative 4, Bukavu 18 March 2010, civil society repre-
sentative 5, Bukavu 19 March 2010, Mwami 1, Bukavu 17 March 2010.  
49  Interview with civil society representative 4, Bukavu, 18 March 2010. 
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election campaigning strategies. For example, the Institute Congolaise pour la 
Justice et Paix (ICJP) has placed suggestion boxes in towns and villages in 
which people can put their comments and questions anonymously. During the 
Vacance Parlementaire they invite the respective MP and the population to open 
these boxes and discuss the matters on the notes. Although the MPs hardly ever 
show up for such meetings, the sessions continue for the sake of voter educa-
tion.50 Local NGO representatives think that MPs are afraid to meet their elec-
torate, because they fear that they will be attacked and criticized,51 or sanctioned 
through informal practices such as harassment and loss of prestige and status lo-
cally (Lindberg 2010c, 136).  
What we see is a process of the redefinition of the relation between MPs and 
their constituencies. In this process of redefinition, local political practices and 
new opportunities of democracy are being negotiated and renegotiated. Liberal 
democracy brought new expectations with Congolese people. However, these 
expectations were not in terms of the delivery of public goods and parliamentary 
tasks of representation, legislation and executive oversight, but rather in terms of 
an intensification of the interaction between electorate and MPs and the redistri-
bution of goods and services to the constituency directly. These practices were 
still expected to be direct, personal and informal. MPs however feel they cannot 
respond to this expectation. 
What is interesting to note is that in the cases some other African countries, 
where MPs are subject to similar expectations and pressures from their elec-
torate, MPs respond much more favourably than in the DRC (Adamolekun and 
Laleye 2009, 127, Kasfir and Twebaze 2009, 101-2, Lindberg 2010b, Lindberg 
2010c, Lindberg and Zhou 2009, 168). This may be so because the cases men-
tioned, Uganda, Ghana and Benin, have a much longer experience with repre-
sentative democracy and practices of managing expectations and obligations 
have settled more than in the much younger democracy of the DRC. But despite 
this longer experience with democratically elected and representative govern-
ance, MPs are still expected to deliver private and club goods and the rules of the 
interaction between MPs and their electorate is still very much defined in terms 
of personal interaction, visibility and redistribution.  
MPs and their constituencies contest not so much the principle of redistribu-
tion, but rather the terms and extent of these practices of redistribution. People 
complain about the lack of rapport with their MPs, that they are hardly visible in 
the community, and that they have abandoned and forgotten the people in the 
constituency. In response to this gap between expectations and ability to deliver, 
                                                          
50  Interview with civil society representative 2, ICJP, Bukavu, 16 March 2010. 
51  Interviews with civil society representative 2, Bukavu 16 March 2010, civil society representative 3, 
Bukavu 18 March 2010, MP 3, now civil society representative, 18 March 2010, civil society repre-
sentative 6, Boma 30 November 2011. 
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they hide away from their constituencies, they deliver as much private and club 
goods as they can from private means as well as through NGO type practices, 
and use CSOs and traditional authorities to mediate the interaction with their 
constituencies. But simultaneously, they hold on to socio-cultural expectation 
such as ostentation, the performance of their socio-economic position, and the 
privatised nature of the relation with their constituencies.  
The local needs and aspirations, customs and culture, that agencies of MPs 
and their constituencies respond to is one that prefers a clientelist relationship 
which is practiced through informal institutions. The local agencies seek to nego-
tiate practices of liberal democracy so that it can respond to these local prefer-
ences. This is a worrying conclusion for state builders and democratisers in the 
Congo, because there is little sign that local actors, MPs nor their electorate, will 
shift their preferences to formal and institutionalised practices of representation. 
The fact that both the electorate as well as MPs each from their own angle strive 
to maintain these informal practices makes it hard for outsiders to interfere in and 
manipulate these agencies. Moreover, state builders and democratisers often see 
an ally in ‘the people’ and assume that once they have the freedom to follow rea-
son, ‘irrational’ practices such as clientelism will come to an end (Jahn 2007a, 
92). As this chapter has shown, this assumption fails to take into consideration 
that citizens may be as little interested in the institutionalisation of governance, 
each for their own reasons, as elites are. As Bratton and Logan have identified, 
people do not claim democracy and their democratic rights and obligation, in-
stead they claim rights that are part of a clientelist relation (Bratton and Logan 
2006) while they use the freedoms of liberal democracy to renegotiate these. 
  
7 
Consuming democracy at  
the national assembly 
The previous chapter has discussed the practices through which MPs and their 
constituencies consume democracy. MPs claim an elite status that defines them-
selves as father-chiefs in their relations with their electorate. MPs are expected to 
redistribute based on their adopted and given social position. As we will see in 
this chapter, the engagements between MPs and between MPs and le pouvoir 
enable different agencies and their interaction with the liberal peace. 
The first part of the chapter discusses how the highly fragmented Parliament is 
being organised as a de facto two-party Parliament in which the Opposition and 
Majority are organised in terms of political families. The chapter then continues 
with an analysis of how these political families function within a liberal demo-
cratic institutional framework. I will use case material to discuss political prac-
tices defined by the rights and responsibilities of the political family that pro-
vides a way to understand occurring political practices in the National Assembly 
and its rapports with the Executive. A central case in this analysis is that of the 
2009 Parliamentary crisis, which provides a wealth of material about the negotia-
tion between liberal democracy and local political practices and their consump-
tion by local agencies. The analysis focuses on political leadership or the role of 
the political father within a political family, and secondly on practices of ac-
countability. The final section of the chapter discusses the interaction between 
the liberal and the local in terms of a renegotiation of local practices as a process 
of renegotiation of the self rather than a negotiation of the liberal. I will mainly 
focus on the ruling coalition because practices of political familyhood are more 
evident and more observable in a political group that is in the centre of power 
and attention. Nevertheless, the opposition practices similar notions of political 
familyhood. I will therefore occasionally refer to the opposition as well. 
138 
 
Majority and opposition in the national assembly 
The Congo has an extremely large number of political parties. The Congo is not 
the only African country with a high number of registered political parties and 
independent candidates participating in elections (Rakner and Van de Walle 
2009, 111).  But it is nevertheless an extreme case, with no other African democ-
racy coming even close this level of fragmentation.1 In the Congolese 2006 elec-
tions, a total of 269 parties participated in the parliamentary elections, together 
with numerous independents, together counting almost 9700 candidates for 500 
parliamentary seats (Anstey 2006, 50-51). The Congolese political party system 
may be described as pulverised (Erdmann & Basedau 2007, 8, Sartori 1976, 125, 
260) or fragmented (Van de Walle 2003, 309). In the brief periods when political 
parties were allowed, extreme numbers of parties mushroomed. For the 1965 
elections 227 political parties registered (Carey 2002, 59). Shortly after his coup 
d’état in November of that year Mobutu disbanded Parliament and banned politi-
cal parties (Kabungulu Ngoy-Kangoy 2006, 20). When Mobutu announced a 
transition to democracy in 1991 the ban on political parties was lifted. Around 
440 political parties registered, characterised by weak internal structure, lack of 
ideology and/or political programme, and many were regionally or ethnically 
based. After Laurent Kabila’s take-over of power political parties were banned 
again. When after the war the transitional constitution came into force in 2003 
which allowed for political parties again, a multitude of political parties mush-
roomed as in the early 1990s (Kabungulu Ngoy-Kangoy 2006, 16-34). This trend 
continued in 2011, when 445 political parties and 542 independent candidates 
participated for the legislative elections, together registering 19.006 candidates 
(almost twice as many candidates as in 2006!) (Commission Electorale Nationale 
Indépendante 2011, www.cei-rdc.cd/partispolitiques, accessed 12/11/2011). 
An extreme number of political parties and candidates is perhaps nothing new 
in the Congo, but what was new is that they participated in elections – the first 
elections held after Mobutu’s political opening of the early 1990s, were those of 
2006. This extreme number of political parties and independent candidates that 
participated in the legislative elections resulted in a ballot paper that in some vot-
ing districts was three A3 size papers long, and the election of an extremely 
fragmented legislature. 68 parties and 63 independent candidates won parliamen-
tary representation in the July 2006 elections, of which only two parties managed 
to win more than 10% of the vote: Kabila’s PPRD2 won 22,2% and Bemba’s 
MLC won 12,8% of the votes (Vander Weyden 2007, 210-11) (See annex 1). 
                                                          
1  Lindberg (2006) notes 100 parties for the 2002 ballot in the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville), 61 for 
the 2001 ballot in Senegal, and 50 for the 2000 ballot in Ethiopia. 
2  The PPRD was founded during the Inter-Congolese Dialogue from the remnants of Laurent-Désiré 
Kabila’s AFDL that remained loyal to the regime. 
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The 131 political entities in the National Assembly in 2006 would, however, rap-
idly congeal into two seemingly homogenous political blocs: the majority, or 
those that support the government, and the opposition, or those that do not sup-
port the government. The country now appears to be ruled by what is in effect a 
dominant party that is perhaps instable internally, but that controls power in an 
according to some almost dictatorial manner (Dizolele 2010).  
This pre-electoral fragmentation of the political party spectrum and the post-
electoral alignment with the winning camp is locally referred to as vagabondage 
politique or as transhumance politique in other African countries. Vagabondage 
politique, or political vagrancy, is generally understood in negative terms as ‘the 
shameless shifting from one camp to another’ (Nzongola-Ntalaja 1998)  or a 
‘search for the highest bidder’ (Wamba-dia-Wamba quoted in Taylor and 
Williams 2001, 272). MPs themselves often agree that politicians tend to go 
where the grass is greenest and where money is to be gained.3 Being an inde-
pendent politician or representative of a small or 1-member party provides flexi-
bility to align with those in power without having to convince party members and 
the party structure. It can thus be understood as primarily election strategic 
(Rakner and Van de Walle 2009, 112).  
After the elections and the installation of Parliament, this fragmented political 
landscape would rapidly congeal into two blocs, the opposition and the majority.  
The origins of these two alliances lie in the pre-electoral period, when legislative 
candidates and parties participating in the elections joined alliances in support of 
specific Presidential candidate without giving up their own position as independ-
ent candidate or member of a political party – to support both his as well as their 
own political ambitions. Candidates that aligned themselves with a presidential 
candidate before the elections would in their region campaign for their chosen 
presidential candidate while campaigning for themselves as candidates for the 
legislature. In return, these candidates would be given funds for the campaign, 
and promises of profitable positions such as a Ministerial post or directorship of 
a state agency should they be successful.4 Besides uniting in support of a presi-
dential candidate, the formation of these alliances thus also meant the formation 
of a pre-electoral power-sharing agreement (for the AMP see AMP 2006a, Art. 
4.2). The political alliance of political parties and independent politicians in sup-
port of Kabila was the Alliance for Presidential Majority (AMP) (AMP 2006a), 
that of his main opponent Jean-Pierre Bemba was called the Union for the Nation 
(UpN). Several others were formed as well, such as ‘Everything But Kabila’ (Le 
Potentiel 2006a, Le Potentiel 2006b). The AMP (officially) holds a 66% majority 
                                                          
3  Interview with MP 2, Kinshasa 21 October 2009. 
4  Interviews with MP 5, Kinshasa 13 November 2009, MP 7, Kinshasa, 21 November 2009, MP 10, 
Kinshasa 20 April 2010. 
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in Parliament (332/500) and a 52% majority in the Senate (56/108) (Booysen 
2007, 13). 
Because run-off elections were required, the AMP formed a pre-electoral coa-
lition with other parties (AMP 2006a, Art. 30). In the run-up to the second round, 
the scramble for powerful political allies (with a proven support base) became an 
important electoral strategy. After the legislative elections and the first round of 
the presidential elections (July 2006) Kabila has formed an alliance with PALU 
and UDEMO (Union des Démocrates Mobutistes)5 to secure a parliamentary ma-
jority and guarantee the victory of the presidential elections in the second round 
in October.6 These two parties had been unsuccessful in the presidential elec-
tions, but aimed to turn their electoral loss into an electoral success by aligning 
with Kabila. For these parties, their participation in the presidential elections was 
perhaps never expected to be successful in the sense of winning the Presidency, 
but rather aimed to position themselves in the political spectrum, and elaborate 
their political relevance based on electoral results.7 Because they had a proved 
support base (albeit small, 6.8% and 1.8% respectively8) in the western part of 
the country (where Kabila did not), PALU and UDEMO thus became strategic 
partners for Kabila (AMP 2006b, Art. 1, Préambule). 
In this pre-electoral deal, PALU was promised the post of Prime Minister 
(AMP 2006b, Art. 3), the proportionally much smaller UDEMO was granted the 
post of deputy Prime Minister. The divisions of Ministerial seats and even the 
formation of the parliamentary bureau would be organised based on the number 
of seats of each member of the coalition and ‘... the contribution of each (of the 
significant organisations that form the parliamentary coalition) in terms of the 
votes contributed to the second round in favour of candidate Joseph Kabila 
Kabange’ (AMP 2006b, Art. 5. Author’s translation from French). 
The AMP as a structure and its coalition with other parties is a strategic alli-
ance to gain control over the political institutions by the President and his fol-
                                                          
5  PALU (Parti Lumumbiste Unifié) is a political party lead by Antoine Gizenga and has its stronghold 
in Bandundu province. It was founded in 1987 and is one of the older political parties in the country. 
Gizenga was Vice-Prime Minister in the Government of Patrice Lumumba. The party is one of many 
that claim the heritage of Lumumba. It is often described as almost sectarian in the way the person of 
Gizenga is seen by his followers. UDEMO is lead by Nzanga Mobutu, son of Mobutu, and has its 
support base in Equateur province.  
6  Interview with MP 7, Kinshasa 21 November 2009, Groep interview with PALU representatives, 
Kinshasa 06 March 2010. 
7  Unsuccessful electoral candidates in the legislative elections explained to me that although they did 
not expect to win, their candidature was a strategic effort to advertise themselves as a relevant actor in 
politics. 
8  Despite these small percentages, PALU is with its 6.8% the third largest party (after PPRD and MLC) 
and UDEMO is the 9th largest party. Of the other 10 largest parties MSR, Forces du Renouveau, and 
CODECO have joined the majority, while CDC and Camp de la Patrie have joined MLC in the oppo-
sition. RCD has not officially joined either camp. The majority has 207 seats from these largest 10 
parties, whereas the opposition has 107 seats. See annex 1. 
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lowers. As a power sharing structure it thus has little to do with power sharing as 
a conflict management or conflict resolution mechanism (Hartzell and Hoddie 
2003, Hoddie and Hartzell 2005, Sisk 1996, Sisk and Reynolds 1998, Spears 
1999, Spears 2000, Spears 2002, Walter 1997). Instead, it is a form of elite ap-
peasement. The coalition is a combination of unlikely bed-fellows: the son of the 
former dictator Mobutu has formed a coalition with the son of the rebel leader 
that ousted Mobutu in 1997 and a politician that has been on the scene for half a 
century. The AMP and its allies speak of a political coalition that was necessary 
to build a majority to rule the country. It is evident that this coalition is also stra-
tegic and follows in Congolese politics important east-west logics, similar to the 
Lumumba-Kasavubu alliance of 1960. President Kabila is an Easterner; his sup-
port base is in the east of the country. To establish a stable political coalition, his 
allies should therefore be westerners and have a support base in the west. Despite 
the relatively small electoral support of both PALU and UDEMO, their main ad-
dition to the AMP was the fact that they were Western based. It is this east-west 
dynamics which play such an important role in Congolese politics that primarily 
explain the odd coalition, rather than more general coalition politics based on 
ideological like-mindedness or search for a broad coalition to pursue extremist 
policies, as has been suggested for coalitions in other African countries (Oyugi 
2006, 55). 
From this perspective of an east-west coalition to enable stable governance 
and broad support it is tempting to see the AMP and its allies in terms of conso-
ciational democracy (Lijphart 1969, Lijphart 2008). However, although the coali-
tion might be organised around the cooperation of elites and the proportional 
power-sharing and division of posts, it is difficult to see the coalition in terms of 
a strategy to overcome societal divisions and guarantee minority interests. A sec-
ond aspect of the AMP and its coalition with PALU and UDEMO is what Bayart 
has called the reciprocal assimilation of elites, similar to that of predecessors in 
the post-independence era. With the reciprocal assimilation of elites Bayart refers 
to the production of a relatively homogenous social group, a dominant class, 
from potentially competing elites around the central pole of state power (1993, 
163). As Bayart suggest, rather than being a mechanism of political competition, 
universal suffrage (i.e. elections) is in this logic of reciprocal assimilation of 
elites a mechanism of political compromise, in which ‘electoral losers’ are ap-
peased and awarded posts ‘in the spirit of unity’. It is an ‘elite bargain’ 
(Lindemann 2008) or a ‘fusion of elites’ (Boone 1994). It is a form of securing 
control over power through co-optation and appeasement (Lustick 1979).  Alt-
hough it is unlikely to support democratisation, elite cohesion is an important 
factor in stability of governance (Cheeseman 2011, 359). Like in the case of the 
AMP coalition such elite bargains are often formed around a dominant party, or 
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even take the form of a dominant party (Lindemann 2008, 20-21). However, 
these practices of appeasement and co-optation are exclusive. People that have 
neither the means to participate in the game nor the right connections to the dom-
inant class are excluded (Mehler 2009). The National Assembly is thus little 
more than a ‘privileged zone of unification in the quest for hegemony’ (Bayart 
1993, 166-67). As we have seen in the previous chapter, MPs and the political 
elite claim this elitist identity and present themselves as being distinct. It is this 
distance that is so clearly apparent when observing the political class in Congo-
lese. 
Once Parliament was installed, efforts were made to institutionalise the split 
between those that support President Kabila (majority), and those that do not 
(opposition). A key instrument in this process is the Statut de l’Opposition, 
which was initiated by an opposition MP in an attempt to institutionalise opposi-
tion, protect the rights and obligations of opposition, and recognise its signifi-
cance for the functioning of democracy (2007c, Exposé des motifs). In response 
to the formation of the powerful bloc of supporters of the President, it aimed to 
create and guarantee a space for the opposition that has never existed in the Con-
go.9 To further emphasise itself as a voice and counter force in Parliament, the 
opposition announced a ‘Gouvernement de fantôme’, a shadow cabinet in June 
2010 (Le Potentiel 2010c, Le Potentiel 2010d). 
In order to create recognised space for the opposition the initiators of the law 
have looked at the Westminster model, a system in which the role, position and 
rights of the opposition are more formalised and defined than in a French-
continental parliamentary system (which the DRC has adopted) (Punnett 1973, 
10). The law does in effect organise the Assembly in two clearly defined camps 
from the moment it takes office:  
‘The political parties and political groups in the different assemblies make a declaration at 
the respective Office of the National Assembly, the Senate, the Provincial Assemblies, the 
City Councils, the Municipality, a sector or chieftaincy, of membership of the majority or the 
opposition.’ (2007c, Art.3, Author’s translation from French) 
Although the formation of coalitions is a logic consequence of the fragmenta-
tion of Parliament, this article expresses a desire to think of Parliament in terms 
of a contradiction between opposition and majority, rather than a space of a mul-
titude of political voices of 131 political entities. This ‘obligation to declare’ 
makes the alignment with either the opposition or the majority visible for actors 
within the National Assembly and Government. Although the initiative for the 
law came from an opposition MP, it is interesting to note that there seemed to 
have been a general consensus of members of the majority and opposition in the 
                                                          
9  Interview with MP 12, Hon. Delly Sesanga, initiator of the Loi portant Statut de l’Opposition Poli-
tique, Kinshasa, 30 April 2010; Speech by Hon. Delly Sesanga in Plenary Session National Assembly, 
13 June 2007, audio tape recording. 
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Assembly that a Statut de l’Opposition would be essential.10 The quoted article, 
neither it’s phrasing nor its purpose, has been subject of discussion in the PAJ 
Committee,11 nor in the plenary session in which the report of the PAJ was dis-
cussed,12 nor in the process of the harmonisation of the versions of Senate and 
National Assembly (Assemblée Nationale and Sénat 2007). What this tells us is 
that there was a widely shared consensus that there was a need for the National 
Assembly to be organised in a clear majority and a clear opposition. As soon as 
Parliament has been installed, there has been no more reference to this independ-
ence of parties. Instead, as the process of the adoption of the law on opposition 
reveals, there was no concern over giving individual or party political identity in 
order to reshape Parliament in a majority-opposition dialectic.13 However, these 
coalitions of opposition and majority are only temporary, limited by the time 
frame of the first legislative. Discussions have been held mid-2010 within the 
AMP about the transformation of the alliance into a political party as a strategy 
for the upcoming presidential elections of 2011. However, the suggestion was 
rejected by the members of the Alliance.14 It is relevant in this sense that in the 
preparation for the 2011 presidential and legislative elections the AMP has in-
deed not been turned into a political party but has been disbanded. A new coali-
tion has been formed in its place, the Majorité Présidentielle (MP).  
In the Congo these two political blocs are conceptualised as political families. 
The concept of political family is often used by Congolese politicians to describe 
the relations between themselves and the alliance they are part of. The discourse 
of the political family unites the loose coalition of AMP members and its part-
ners in the ruling coalition. It emphasises a relationship that cannot be broken as 
easily as a coalition based on political programmes. The notion of a political 
family captures practices that define the ways in which a variety of diverse polit-
ical actors come together and the ways in which leadership and power are prac-
ticed and performed. Familial references to political parties are common in Afri-
ca, especially in the case of state parties such as Mobutu’s MPR (Schatzberg 
2001, 16). However, while familial references to the MPR referred to the politi-
                                                          
10  Plenary Session National Assembly, 13 June 2007, audio tape recording. 
11  The PAJ is the Parliamentary committee to which the discussion of the proposed law was referred to. 
Plenary Session National Assembly, 15 May 2007, audio tape recording. 
12  Plenary Session National Assembly, 13 June 2007, audio tape recording. 
13  Only one MP, Hon. Idambituo of the Renaissance-PE party (opposition), was concerned over the need 
to declare and align with one leader of the opposition. He argued that ’to make the opposition chose a 
coordinator means to put other parties subordinate to this leader. We need pluralism in the opposition’ 
(Author’s translation from French). The response of the initiator of the law Hon. Sesanga (MLC, Op-
position) was simply that the law did not concern the issues of multi-partyism itself, and that this is 
protected in the constitution, and there was no further debate on the issue. Plenary Session National 
Assembly, 13 June 2007, audio tape recording. 
14  Interviews with the Chargé d’organisation of the AMP, Kinshasa 28 May 2010, and MP 14, Kinshasa 
31 August 2010. 
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cal organisation of the population, the use of the family analogy in the case of the 
AMP does not concern the population and its relation to their political leaders, 
but the formation of a ruling coalition from a fragmented political sphere under 
the leadership of the President as the political father-chief. Members of the AMP 
often refer to the AMP as their political family, and similar terms are frequently 
used in the media. In doing so they articulate loyalty, accountability and leader-
ship, core concepts that form the moral logic of family. The AMP is constructed 
as a political family centered around the leadership of the political father-chief, 
i.e. President Kabila. This leadership comes with rights and responsibilities, 
which define the relations between the members of the family (MPs) and the fa-
ther-chief (le pouvoir).  
The case of the 2009 parliamentary crisis 
The functioning of the AMP as a political family was perhaps most clearly visi-
ble during the parliamentary crisis of 2009. In January 2009, a disagreement be-
tween President Kabila and the Speaker of Parliament Vital Kamerhe resulted in 
a political crisis that was finally resolved with the stepping down of Vital Ka-
merhe as Speaker in March 2009. Kamerhe’s downfall was because he had open-
ly criticised the head of the political family Kabila instead of keeping his con-
cerns within the relative privacy of the political family.  
In January-February 2009, a joint military operation between the Rwandan na-
tional army RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front) and FARDC was employed to deal 
with the ongoing problem with FDLR, a shared problem of both Rwanda and 
DRC, in eastern Congo.15 However, the joint military operation that followed 
was not welcomed by many Congolese, who, after having been invaded by 
Rwandese troops several times since 1994, feared a repetition of the past. In the 
forefront of this public critique towards the joint military operation (commonly 
perceived or referred to as ‘Rwandan intervention’) was Vital Kamerhe, Speaker 
                                                          
15  This decision should be seen in the context of shifting power politics between Rwanda, DRC, and 
CNDP in the political complexity of Eastern Congo. While negotiations between the Congolese gov-
ernment and CNDP were taking place in Nairobi, simultaneous talks between government representa-
tives and a CNDP faction under the leadership of Bosco Ntangana (a.k.a. ’the Terminator’, whose ar-
rest is warranted by the ICC) were held. Bosco claimed that Nkunda had been dismissed as leader of 
the CNDP for bad leadership and that he was the new CNDP leader. The Nairobi talks had been sus-
pended from the 15th to the 25th, but they would never resume. On 16 January 2001, the Bosco faction 
of CNDP declared a unilateral ceasefire in a meeting with RPF representative James Kaberebe and 
DRC minister of Interior Celestin Mbuya. At the heart of these events was in fact Kigali. It appeared 
as if Kigali had decided to get closer to Kinshasa, and therefore drop Nkunda. It engineered a split 
within the CNDP to enable a deal between the two, in which Rwanda itself was centre. Bosco’s 
CNDP would be integrated in FARDC, Nkunda would be arrested by Rwanda. Rwanda would be al-
lowed to intervene militarily to deal with the FDLR. The bargain combined two core issues of the 
problem in the East: FDLR for Rwanda and Nkunda for DRC (Africa Confidential 2009a, 2009b). 
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of Parliament.16 Kamerhe, from South Kivu himself, referred to the human suf-
fering in east Congo in relation to Rwandese interventions, and that with the 
people’s trauma an invitation from the government for the RPF to intervene is 
not a good idea. Although the issue of concern was the actual military interven-
tion, the political crisis developed over a statement by Kamerhe in an interview 
with Radio Okapi,17 in which he stated: 
‘I have never been informed about the possible entry of Rwandan troops on Congolese terri-
tory. (...) If you tell me now that Rwandan troops have entered DRC, I prefer to believe this 
is not true. If it is true, it is simply terrible!’ (Radio Okapi 21 January 2009, quoted in 
Kibungu et al. 2009, . Author’s translation from French)  
The issue was that Kamerhe criticised Kabila for organising this joint military 
operation without informing Parliament. Insiders argue that the statements made 
by Kamerhe on Radio Okapi were only a trigger, but that it had nothing to do 
with the real issue between Kabila and Kamerhe, which was about leadership, 
prestige and power. MPs and party members close to Kamerhe said that, alt-
hough Kamerhe and Kabila used to be close, Kabila had come to see Kamerhe as 
a threat. Not only was Kamerhe a very good Speaker, who was respected by ma-
jority and opposition, he was also a respected politician popular with the donor 
community and had a strong support base in the eastern part of the country. Ka-
merhe wanted the National Assembly to be independent from the Executive, 
seeking to let the Assembly play its proper role. He allowed the Opposition to 
speak and debate and did not necessarily use his position as Speaker to enforce 
certain objectives.18 Kamerhe, being popular and too independent in a powerful 
position, became too much of a nuisance for le pouvoir.  
Kamerhe refused to follow presidential orders to resign and argued that if he 
was to step down it should be via proper parliamentary procedures, not a resigna-
tion when Parliament was not in session (Kamerhe 2009, 4). Being put under 
pressure by the President and AMP and after bribes being paid, the Parliamentary 
Majority issued a declaration on 16 March 2009, the opening of the parliamen-
tary session, in which they demanded Kamerhe to resign. In this declaration, the 
authors clearly sided with the President, despite their appreciation of Kamerhe as 
Speaker. They argue that handling the security issues in the east is a core respon-
                                                          
16  Although other MPs of the majority also questioned the decisions taken and launched a petition in 
which they asked for clarification, without directly attacking the President or criticising his decisions. 
L'AVENIR. 2009. Parlement: une session extraordinaire. L'Avenir, 31 January 2009, LE POTENTIEL. 
2009. Accord RDC-Rwanda contre les FDLR: le député Kyaviro: “l'opération encours doit être 
clarifiée et corigée pour éviter tout contentieux de futur. Le Potentiel, 09 February 2009. 
17  The radio station Radio Okapi was set up by the UN peacekeeping mission MONUC in cooperation 
with the Fondation Hirondelle in 2002. It broadcasts nationally, and is one of the most widely listened 
to radio stations in the DRC. See www.radiookapi.net 
18  Interviews with MP 1, Kinshasa, 20 October 2009, MP 3, 27 October 2009, MP 10, Kinshasa, 20 
April 2009. 
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sibility of the President, and that the President did not do wrong in attempting to 
solve matters.  
Although it was one of the biggest political events since the elections, which 
has without doubt altered the National Assembly and relations between the As-
sembly and le pouvoir, the issue was never debated in Parliament itself. It had 
risen when Parliament was not in session, and although Kamerhe had refused to 
resign before Parliament would reconvene (i.e. he forced his resignation to take 
place during parliamentary session), he also asked the house to accept his resig-
nation without vote or debate (Kamerhe 2009). He opted for the less bloody exit.  
The case of the 2009 Parliamentary crisis provides insightful information 
about how the Majority – and as we will see also the Opposition – are organised 
as political families. In the remainder of this chapter I will analyse political prac-
tices of MPs and le pouvoir in terms of a political family, drawing extensively on 
the above described case as well additional material. These practices determined 
by the organisation of the majority and opposition as two political families have 
a significant impact on how parliamentary democracy is organised within the 
institutions. The notion of political family is evidently not an institutionalised 
aspect of the institutional organisation of democracy in Congo. Local agencies 
enabled by the relations between MPs and le pouvoir nevertheless reshape the 
institutional organisation of democracy in the Congo following the logic of a po-
litical family. I will discuss this by focusing on three aspects. Firstly, the concept 
of political fatherhood as an organising principle for both the majority and the 
opposition. Secondly, I will focus on how accountability is being practiced with-
in the political family by looking at rules of political punishment and reward. 
Finally, I will focus on the political family as a private space, which relocates the 
political debate from the National Assembly to the political family.  
Political family and fatherhood 
Political fatherhood is a central notion for the understanding of political alliances 
as political families. The 2009 parliamentary crisis was a contestation over the 
rules and leadership of the political family. With his statements and his acts, 
Kamerhe challenged Kabila’s political fatherhood and threatened the political 
family. Although the official arguments used concern procedural and legal mat-
ters (whether the President should inform parliament or seek parliamentary sup-
port for his decisions), the language used by participants in this crisis makes clear 
that it is a matter protecting the political family.  
In his resignation speech Kamerhe himself speaks of the event in terms of the 
political family of the AMP.  He emphasises that he feels part of the political 
family. He speaks about his statements on Radio Okapi which were not appreci-
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ated by his political family nor by the head of his political family (Kamerhe 
2009). 
The figure of the political father functions as the organising principle for the 
alliance, for both the AMP as well as the opposition. The AMP has as its core not 
a socio-economic ideology but the person of Joseph Kabila, who assumes a posi-
tion of father-chief in this alliance. The personalisation of power and politics is 
common in Africa, often referred to as ‘Big Men politics’ (Daloz 2003a, Hydén 
2006, 94-115, Russell 1999) or personalised rule (Jackson and Rosberg 1982). It 
is also persistent, as various analysts have argued that despite democratic transi-
tions politics and power remain personalised in many African countries (Van de 
Walle 2003, 310). Personalised rule is not only about the leaders, but also about 
how those that follow him participate in this system (Quantin 2005, 47). In the 
process of the formation of the AMP and other coalitions in support of a Presi-
dential candidate we see how potential clients chose their Big Man. In the same 
way as clients will move away from a Big Man when they feel he is losing his 
power, people will join a new leader when they feel he will be the new Big Man. 
Personal rule is indeed very opportunistic and calculative (Hydén 2006, 102). A 
broad support base is thus an expression of power (Hydén 2006, 103). The AMP 
functioned as a platform on which the hegemony of Kabila is expressed. The 
openness with which pre-electoral agreements on power-sharing were shared 
aimed to make use of this logic. In the run-up to the run-off presidential elec-
tions, the scramble for powerful political allies (with a proven support base) be-
came an important electoral strategy. The fragmented political arena thus became 
de facto divided between those that supported Kabila in the run-off elections and 
those that supported Bemba.  
The founding documents of the AMP provide important information on the 
conceptualisation of the role and position of Kabila in the alliance. As a protector 
of the well-being of the nation and its people, President Kabila elevates himself 
as a father-chief figure that will protect his people. The AMP initially presented 
itself as an alliance of true patriots that unite beyond their ideological and politi-
cal differences, to protect the people of the Congo who are and have been threat-
ened by war. They united themselves under the leadership of Joseph Kabila to 
‘rally and mobilise the Congolese to maintain the flame of patriotism and protect 
territorial integrity, unity and sovereignty of the Democratic Republic of Congo’ 
(AMP 2006a, Art. 4.1. Author’s translation from French). The leadership status 
of Kabila was thus constructed on Kabila as a unifying leader, building on his 
campaign slogan and claimed credits of the transition period that Kabila was the 
bringer of peace, whose leadership has enabled the end of the war (Booysen 
2007, 13). In 2007, the AMP was reorganised. Whereas the Charter of 2006 stat-
ed that the aim of the AMP was for Kabila to win the elections, the aim of the 
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AMP according to the new Acte Constitutif of 2007 was to promote the leader-
ship of Kabila, in terms of consolidation of his power, and the general objective 
of national coherence and institutional cohesion (AMP 2007, Art. 3). The Acte 
emphasises the formation of a political clientele of people that organise them-
selves around Kabila.  
But this form of political organisation in terms of a political family and leader-
ship in the form of a father-chief figure is not restricted to the AMP or to those in 
power. Similar tendencies are at play within the opposition. The Statut de 
l’Opposition introduces the officially recognised position of Leader of the Oppo-
sition (2007, Art. 19-21), a practice borrowed from the Westminster system. In 
the Westminster parliamentary system the Leader of the Opposition has the rec-
ognised status of an official state function, with an additional salary and privileg-
es such as a car with driver provided for by Parliament (Punnett 1973, 77-78, 98-
99). In the process of the adoption of the Statut de l’Opposition one of the more 
fiercely debated issues was that of the recognition, title and status of the Leader 
of the Opposition.19 In the context of the situation in which the assumed leader of 
the opposition, Jean-Pierre Bemba, was in exile,20 the emphasis on the recogni-
tion of a leadership position is understandable. But it also emphasises the per-
ceived need for a designated leadership figure within the opposition as a basis 
upon which to organise the political family.  
For the opposition the identification of one leader, or spokesperson, of the op-
position, is to enable the opposition to participate effectively and to negotiate at 
an equal level with the leadership of the majority.21 The opposition has, however, 
never been able to appoint a leader. For MLC the leader is naturally Jean-Pierre 
Bemba. But because he has been arrested and is on trial at the ICC he cannot as-
sume his leadership role. The opposition cannot decide whether to appoint some-
body else as its leader, and if they would decide to do so, who that would be. The 
opposition has throughout the first Legislature remained fundamentally divided 
over this issue and consequently paralysed.22 An initiative for a motion of no-
confidence by an MP of MLC illustrates this. The motion was not supported by 
part of the MLC faction in the National Assembly, because ‘we cannot take such 
                                                          
19  Plenary Session National Assembly, 13 June 2007, audio tape recording; Assemblée Nationale and 
Sénat 2007.  
20  Jean-Pierre Bemba, leader of MLC, lost the run-off Presidential election in October 2006, but was 
elected Senator in January 2007. After a military confrontation between Bemba’s bodyguards and 
loyal troops and FARDC in March 2007, Bemba went abroad, allegedly to seek medical treatment. In 
May 2007 the ICC issued an arrest warrant against Bemba, and in May 2008 he was arrested (Africa 
Confidential 2008, ICC-CPI 2008, MONUC/UNHCR 2007, Reuters 2008). 
21  Hon. Ramazani, Vice-President of the Parliamentary Commission PAJ, presenting the PAJ report on 
the Proposed Law to the National Assembly in Plenary Session National Assembly, 13 June 2007, 
Plenary Session National Assembly, 13 June 2007, audio tape recording.  
22  Interview with MP 13, Kinshasa 30 April 2010.  
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big decisions when Bemba is not here’.23 The figure of a leader, a political father, 
is critical for the functioning of a political family. The problems within the oppo-
sition surrounding the leadership question and the consequences it has for the 
functioning of the opposition, emphasise that the opposition, like the majority is 
conceptualised/organised as a political family that strongly relies on political fa-
ther-chief.  
A father-chief is typically elevated above politics and political differences 
(Schatzberg 2001, 158). This enables a coalition of political parties and political 
leaders that have little in common, but unite beyond their political differences 
under the leadership of Kabila. Similarly, the absence of a clear political leader 
of the opposition results in a lack of cooperation. Despite participating in the 
elections (a political practice), Kabila presented himself as such a non-political 
father-chief. He participated in the 2006 elections as an independent candidate, 
the ‘candidate of the people’, not as the presidential candidate of his own politi-
cal party (Matotu 2006, Soudan 2006, 44).24 Within the AMP he is referred to as 
the ‘Moral Authority’ (AMP 2007, Art. 5), a distinctly non-political but fatherly 
reference to somebody who ‘does not participate in the debate but dictates the 
debate’.25 
An important aspect of the conceptualisation of the power of the political fa-
ther as head of the political family is the notion that power is indivisible. All 
power resides in the hands of the political father (Schatzberg 2001, 58-9). A 
Congolese proverb says that le pouvoir se mange entier, ‘power is eaten whole’ 
(Fabian 1990). The notion of a political leader who is elevated above politics and 
who holds all power in his hands is difficult to combine with a democratic logic 
of the separation of power between institutions, as well as the sharing of power 
between different political parties. This excessive centralisation of power in the 
hands of the President is a common feature in African politics. Van de Walle 
notes that the far majority of African democracies have a Presidential constitu-
tional system, while most of them initially started with a Parliamentary constitu-
tion. The centralisation of power with the President normally means a weakened 
legislature and judiciary.  But Van de Walle also points to the fact that regardless 
of constitutional arrangements (whether Presidential or Parliamentary) power is 
in either case centralised in the person of the President, whether this is formalised 
or not (Van de Walle 2003, 309-10). This is the current situation in the Congo. 
The Congo formally has a semi-presidential system with significant powers for 
Parliament, whereas in practice much of this power is delegated to the President 
in his role as political father.  
                                                          
23  Interview with MP 13, Kinshasa, 30 April 2010. 
24  For the 2011 Presidential elections, Kabila again stood as an independent candidate, despite being the 
figurehead of the PPRD. 
25  Interview with Minister 2, Bukavu, 18 March 2010. 
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When Kamerhe criticised Kabila that he should have informed Parliament at 
least, if not seek Parliaments approval, he lays bare the tension between the divi-
sion of power between different institutions and the unification of power in the 
hands of the President. Kamerhe openly challenged Kabila’s position as political 
father. The suggestion that decision making should be passed by the legislature 
means that the legislature assumes powers that according to the moral matrix of 
the father-family lie naturally with the President. Kamerhe’s suggestion thus 
challenges Kabila’s position as political father and the unity of power in his 
hands, something which is unacceptable. His position has thus become untena-
ble.  
The MPs of the Parliamentary majority also argued in their statement that: 
‘The declarations of the Speaker of Parliament upset the mentioned dispositions and create 
a harmful tension to the harmonious functioning of the institutions of the DRC in general, 
and the National Assembly in particular.’ (Députées Nationaux de la Majorité Parlementaire 
2009, Author’s translation from French) 
The MPs emphasise the importance of harmony within and between the insti-
tutions involved, that is, unity under the leadership of the political father-chief. 
Kamerhe himself followed this line or reasoning as well. When he decided to 
step down he does so to protect the country’s unity and hard won democracy. In 
his resignation speech he also said he did not want to ‘add (his) name to the his-
tory of obstructions of the institutions that have been so dearly acquired by our 
people at the cost of their blood’ (Kamerhe 2009, 7, Author’s translation from 
French, Reuters 2009). He emphasised unity and a form of democracy that is not 
only conflict-avoiding but also debate-avoiding, while reaffirming the leadership 
of the political father-chief. As a true martyr he offers his political head in order 
to maintain unity within the political family and political consensus to prevent 
political conflict. It is a graceful exit. 
The political father is a central figure for the functioning of governance and 
politics, much more than that of a President in a semi-Presidential system such as 
that of the Congo. Because the notion that ‘power is eaten whole’ prevents a sep-
aration of power between the legislature and the executive, it has a significant 
impact on the functioning of the institutions of governance.  The following para-
graph will discuss the interaction of the notion of the political family and the 
democratic institutional framework in the practices of accountability between the 
executive and the legislative.  
Accountability in the political family 
With his statements on the radio, Kamerhe directly attacked President Kabila and 
started a row between the two which would result in Kamerhe’s political down-
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fall. Formally the row was about procedures of decision making between the ex-
ecutive and the legislature. Kamerhe emphasised on various occasions that he did 
not criticise the President but the Government whose responsibility it is to inform 
Parliament. He refers to the crisis as an issue between the Government and the 
National Assembly not as a personal row between himself and Kabila (Kamerhe 
2009, 4-6). However, the actual matter was about the public critique by a mem-
ber of the political family (Kamerhe) to the political father-chief (President). 
What was at stake was that Kamerhe breached the rules of the political family. 
The understanding the ruling majority as a political family in which the executive 
and legislative branch are united is evidently at odds with the institutional divi-
sion of powers, as mentioned before. The rules that count for the interaction be-
tween the legislative and executive are therefore not those defined by the consti-
tution but those defined by the rules of the political family. Chabal speaks of the 
‘politics of belonging’. Peoples’ relations to others define their social position 
and are an important constituent of his identity (Chabal 2009, 43). That can be an 
ethnic group, a kin group or any other ‘imagined community’ (Anderson 1983), 
such as a political family. The politics of belonging emphasise that an individual 
only belongs to the group if he participates in the system of obligations (Chabal 
2009, 48). The political family is such an ‘in-group’ to which one only belongs if 
one participates in its system of obligations.  
The fact that the executive and legislative are an in-group is important for 
practices of accountability. In a model liberal democracy the accountability prac-
tices between Parliament and the Executive are external, both institutions are in-
dependent of each other (or have a certain degree of independence). In a clien-
telist democracy (Van de Walle 2003, 313) such as the political family the ac-
countability relations between Parliament and the Executive are of an internal 
nature because it concerns a relation between a patron and his clients, or a politi-
cal father and his political family (Lindberg 2009a, 32).  There needs to be a set 
of generally understood criteria that can form the basis for the definition of ac-
countable behaviour (Lindberg 2009a, 27, Schedler 1999). In the case of the po-
litical family these obligations are largely unarticulated and informal, but they 
nevertheless exist and cannot be ignored (Schatzberg 2001, 1).  
In a very broad sense political accountability can be understood as ‘the en-
semble of formal and informal factors which impinge on the way in which rulers 
and ruled relate to each other in a political community’ (Chabal 1992, 54). Ac-
countability is primarily about answerability and sanctioning (Schedler 1999, 
14). It thus shapes a relation between the rulers and the ruled. By understanding 
accountability, and therefore power itself, as a relation between actors, this 
means that the ruled may be dependent on the rulers, but that the inverse is also 
true. Somebody does not have power, it ‘resides in the other’s dependency’. The 
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consequence is that the power holder is also dependent on those he rules for his 
hold on power (Emerson 1962, 32-3). This reciprocal relation between rulers and 
ruled is particularly significant within the political family that is situated within 
the institutional framework of the democratic state. Not only are practices of ac-
countability of prime concern for a new democracy, as we will see, it is also in 
the interaction between different political actors that local agencies shape the 
functioning of the political institution of the National Assembly. 
 
Answerability in the political family: Loyalty & redistribution 
Answerability in the political family is primarily shaped by the reciprocal rela-
tion between the father and his family. As we have seen in the previous chapter, 
this reciprocal relation is defined in terms of loyalty and redistribution. When 
making his statements on Radio Okapi, Kamerhe breached the rules of the politi-
cal family in two ways. Firstly, by expressing critique on an executive decision 
he assumed the right of the National Assembly to hold the Executive to account. 
Secondly, he used a public platform – the radio – to do so, instead of discussing 
his concerns within the private sphere of the political family. He was thus openly 
disloyal to the political father, thereby making his position untenable.  
The notion of accountability is thus turned around: instead of the executive be-
ing held to account by the legislative branch of government, the members of the 
political family (of both the executive and the legislative) are held to account by 
le pouvoir for their (dis-)loyalty. This question about whether the National As-
sembly can hold the Executive to account is an issue on which the logic of the 
political family collides with that of liberal democracy. Whereas in a liberal de-
mocracy one of the core tasks of Parliament is to oversee the Executive, within 
the political family it does not have the moral right to do so. Democracy in the 
Congo currently resembles a delegative democracy, in which the elected political 
father (the President) ‘is entitled to govern as he sees fit, constrained only by the 
hard facts of existing power relations and by a constitutionally limited term of 
office.’ The role of MPs in a delegative democracy is to be passive and support 
whatever the President decides (O’Donnell 1994, 59-60). Horizontal accountabil-
ity, or the practices of accountability between the different governing institutions, 
is weak or absent in these delegative democracies either because the institutions 
are not legally empowered, do not have the capacity or do not have the willing-
ness to take oversight actions (O’Donnell 1994, 61, O’Donnell 1998, 117). Alt-
hough it could be said that Parliament does not have the willingness to hold the 
Executive to account, it is more useful to understand this lack of willingness in 
terms of moral codes of the Political Family.  
Lindberg’s mentioned distinction between internal and external accountability 
(2009a) also draws our attention to a second aspect of Kamerhe’s aspects that 
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made his position untenable within the political family. An important obligation 
of the political family is that critique should be dealt with and kept within the 
political family. Just like any ordinary family, the political family is a private 
sphere, which is distinguished from the public sphere of politics. The problem 
was not that Kamerhe expressed critique as such, but that the stage he had chosen 
for his critique was inappropriate. Instead of expressing it privately and directly 
to the President, he chose the public stage of radio Okapi.26 
There is room for critique in the political family, but it needs to be managed in 
a safe and closed environment, that is, within the political family. The case of the 
motion of no-confidence against Prime Minister Muzito is exemplary in this re-
gard. The day after the motion of no-confidence against Muzito was delivered in 
Parliament (October 2009) a counter motion to not bring the motion of no-
confidence to the vote was adopted, and the motion of no-confidence never made 
it to the debate in the plenary.27 The National Assembly appeared farcical, a coup 
de théâtre was the judgement of a local newspaper (Le Climat Tempéré 2009). 
However, on the evening before the Prime Minister was to respond to the motion 
of no-confidence in Parliament, a hidden exchange between MPs of the AMP 
and the Prime Minister was held at the AMP headquarters. Present were de Prime 
Minister, MPs and Senators of the AMP. According to an MP present at that 
meeting, the MPs shared their widespread grievances and discontent over the 
theft and failures of the Prime Minister, ‘the Prime Minister was trembling’. MPs 
were given the opportunity to express their critique, but had also received orders 
not to take this any further than the present meeting and support the counter mo-
tion that would be brought to a vote the next day.28 
The meeting at the AMP headquarters seems a showcase rather than a genuine 
practice to hold the Prime Minister to account. However, the meeting was held 
behind closed doors in a private setting, not in Parliament. There was no media 
present, nor was there any publicity about this internal practice of answerability. 
The meeting thus could not function as a show case to show-off (or pretend) the 
National Assembly as a critical institution that responds to the widely recognised 
weakness of and corruption by the Prime Minister, because the ‘stage’ was not 
right for such a performance. Rather, what this interesting meeting reveals are the 
                                                          
26  Interview with MP 6, Kinshasa 13 November 2009. 
27  It was argued by MP Pius Mwabilu (PPRD) that a motion of no-confidence against the Prime Minister 
in effect means a motion of censure against the whole government. For the former the signatures of at 
least 50 MPs are necessary, for the latter at least 125 ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE 2007. Règlement 
Intérieur.). The motion of no-confidence (which was deposited at the Speakers office four months be-
fore it was brought to the Plenary) was signed by 51 MPs. The motion of no-confidence was thus re-
jected because of these procedural inconsistencies. Personal observation, Plenary Session National 
Assembly, 16 and 17 October 2009, Palais du Peuple, Kinshasa; Assemblée Nationale 2009, Motion 
de Défiance de l’Honorable Clément Kanku Bukasa; Le Climat Tempéré 2009. 
28  Interview with MP 1, Kinshasa, 20 October 2009. 
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parameters of the system of answerability, that is, within the political family as 
opposed to in public. And although the MPs were not in a position to take steps 
to evict the Prime Minister, measures were taken as the President has (allegedly) 
withdrawn the Prime Ministers powers to authorise government expenditures.29 
The point is that an important rule of the politics of belonging of the political 
family is that processes of accountability are kept internal and cannot take place 
in a public location such as the National Assembly.  
This strategy to keep problems within the political family is a thread in how 
current political practices respond to problems within the ruling coalition. In 
heated parliamentary debate of 21 April 2010, when a motion of censure was 
debated, the known spokes persons of the Courant de Rénovateur were denied 
speaking time for exactly this reason of not allowing internal critique to be ex-
pressed on a public space.30 As an exception, the Speaker strictly kept to the 
speaking time of each parliamentary group. The technicians at the Bureau des 
Annales were instructed to switch off the microphone after the on beforehand 
allocated speaking time was used.31 The Speaker would decide on the order in 
which speakers of different parliamentary groups would be called to the stage. In 
the case of the parliamentary group Force du Rénouveau, of which the spokes 
person of the Courant de Rénovateur that was supposed to speak is a member, 
the Speaker of Parliament had allowed to let the previous speakers of the group 
take more than their allocated time. By the time it was the turn of the spokes per-
son of the Courant de Rénovateur (who was put on the bottom of the list by the 
Speaker), the speaking time of the whole parliamentary group had been used. 
The spokes person of the Courant de Rénovateur was not able to speak in the 
parliamentary debate on the critique towards the Prime Minister.32 By preventing 
the spokespeople of the Courant de Renovateur to speak in the Plenary of the 
National Assembly, the Speaker disabled them from speaking in public about 
matters that are considered private. The Courant de Renovateur’s existence is 
                                                          
29  Interview with MP 1, Kinshasa, 20 October 2009.   
30  The Courant de Rénovateur is a group of allegedly more than 170 MPs from the majority that strive 
for change and democratic practice within Parliament (although this number is likely to be grossly ex-
aggerated). It was launched in December 2009 by two MPs of the Parliamentary Group Force du Re-
nouveau, Honorable Fabrice Puela and Honorable Gustave Omba. The PG Force du Renouveau is 
headed by Minister Olivier Kamitatu, an important partner in the AMP. The group makes it clear it 
does not campaign against the President or the regime, but against the inability of the National As-
sembly to play its role. It thus chooses to stay within the majority and not engage with the opposition. 
There are no members of the opposition within the Courant de Rénovateur. For the protection of the 
MPs that support the Courant de Rénovateur, their names are not made public (apart from the 2 lead-
ing MPs), and neither do they sign petitions of motions. Author’s interview with MP member of the 
Courant de Rénovateur, 20 April 2010; Le Potentiel 19 February 2010; Radio Okapi 2010a, 2010b.  
31  Author’s discussion with technical team at the studio of the bureau des annales of the Palais du 
Peuple, field notes 21 April 2010.  
32  Personal observations plenary session National Assembly, 21 April 2010; Interview with MP mem-
bers of Courant de Renovateur, Palais du Peuple, Kinshasa 21 April 2010.  
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tolerated but it is not allowed to use public space to destabilise the political fami-
ly.  
As a public space the Plenary or the National Assembly is the space where 
two political families can debate and criticise each other. Critique from the oppo-
sition is not at all considered a problem or threatening. But critique from within 
the political family of the majority is. The motions of no-confidence and even the 
motion of censure of April 2010 are by the ruling coalition not considered politi-
cal crises, for it would only be a crisis if such public attacks on the regime would 
come from within the coalition. 33 There is no space for critique from family 
members themselves, because ‘the majority cannot show in public that there are 
internal differences,’34 that is a matter of protecting the interests of the family.35 
The National Assembly is not the right space for such debates. Issues that con-
cern the ruling coalition, the government and the parliamentary majority are is-
sues of the political family and should thus be dealt with within the confined 
space of the political family, not on a public platform such as in the National As-
sembly. The National Assembly is public space, and therefore not a suitable loca-
tion for family matters. As long as the members of the political family act ac-
cording to their obligations, that is, be loyal, attacks from the opposition can nev-
er threaten le pouvoir. Critique from the Opposition is accepted and not consid-
ered to be of major relevance, because it is restricted to a space where no major 
decisions are being made. Opposition MPs criticise in public and in the plenary, 
whereas the political process, or the decision making process is restricted to the 
political family. These are two separated spaces.  
But loyalty does not come without redistribution. The importance of redistri-
bution to fuel loyalty in the political family can be seen in the opposition. Be-
cause there is no leader of the opposition, there is also no focal point for practices 
of the exchange of loyalty and redistribution. Because these exchanges are so 
important for the functioning of the political family, the opposition is paralysed. 
This reciprocity is a form of exchange between members of the political family 
and the father-chief. Building on the work of Marcel Mauss on the gift as a 
mechanism of obligation (Mauss 1925), social exchange theory sees social rela-
tions in terms of exchange in which power is being balanced, or negotiated 
(Baldwin 1978, Emerson 1962). Building on this idea of interdependent social 
transactions of direct reciprocity that define power relations within a group, 
Hydén speaks of the ‘economy of affection’ which prevails in political relations 
in Africa (Hydén 1980, Hydén 2006, 73-93). The exchanges within the economy 
of affection in the context of the Congolese political family do not only involve 
                                                          
33  Interviews with Speaker of Parliament, Hon. Evariste Boshab, Kinshasa 03 May 2010, and civil serv-
ant at the Ministry of Relations with Parliament, Kinshasa 07 May 2010. 
34  Interview with MP 9, Bukavu, 18 March 2010. 
35  Interview with MP 7, Kinshasa, 21November 2009. 
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material gifts, but should be understood as including symbolic exchanges as well, 
such rewards and punishment which can be expressed in material and non-
material ways (Hydén 2006, 87). In this sense we can think for example about 
loyalty, votes in Parliament, distribution of political and other profitable posi-
tions, sharing of power, but also plain material and financial payment.  
There are ample stories about practices of redistribution between le pouvoir 
and MPs. What is relevant is that these obligations of redistribution define a de-
politicized relationship between the majority and le pouvoir. The exchange of 
loyalty for redistribution emphasises that it is not a political relationship between 
the father-chief and his family, but strictly one of father-chiefly authority (in 
which the father-chief is a non-political figure). In this sense, the father-chief 
should be seen as an office. His obligations (to redistribute) and entitlements (to 
loyalty) have little to do with his person or respect and authority as a leader, nor 
with his policies. Instead they are located in the office of the father-chief. These 
entitlements and obligations are a system of legitimacy.  
Sometimes meetings in which these exchanges between MPs and the Execu-
tive take place are collective and the whole parliamentary majority is invited at 
once. More often, these meetings are organised per province – MPs of one prov-
ince are invited at the time. Occasionally, MPs of the opposition are even includ-
ed as well.36 This enables a more targeted form of redistribution, in which the 
MPs can negotiate about specific needs of their region, whereas in the collective 
exchange meetings the gifts exchanged are often of a more personal and private 
nature and directly target the MP himself (such as money or cars). But by invit-
ing the MPs per province, le pouvoir does not face the MPs per political party of 
parliamentary group.37 This is a strategy to depoliticise the exchange in line with 
the a-political character of the political father-chief.  
The demand of AMP MPs for Kamerhe to resign was therefore not an act to 
merely please the President. Rather, it falls within the clientelist logic of rights 
and responsibilities that shape the relations and engagements between MPs and 
le pouvoir. There is mention of money handed out by Kabila to engineer Kamer-
he’s resignation. It was reported that members of the Kamerhe’s parliamentary 
Office were given $200,000 each upon resignation before Parliament would re-
convene on the 16th of March (which they subsequently did). An additional $1 
million was allegedly distributed among AMP members to buy their votes 
against Kamerhe in case of a parliamentary no-confidence vote against him. Ra-
ther than interpreting this as bribes and the threat of the abuse of power, within 
the moral matrix of the father-family, it are practices of redistribution that a fa-
ther is obliged to perform.  
                                                          
36  Interview with MP 13, Kinshasa, 30 April 2010. 
37  Interviews with MP 3, Kinshasa 27 October 2009, and MP 8, Kinshasa 08 December 2009. 
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Enforcement in the political family: Sanctioning & punishment 
Loyalty is demanded (or enforced) through various practices. The most common 
practice is that of mots d’ordres, or instructions per sms on, for example, how to 
vote and whether to be present at a certain debate or not (e.g. to disable a vote 
from taking place).38 Secondly, because most of the (larger) political parties of 
the majority have their leader as a member of the Government, this control over 
Parliament takes also place through more general forms of party discipline.39 In 
addition there are certain MPs that are part of the inner circles around the Presi-
dent. These MPs are the eyes and ears of the President in Parliament, and func-
tion as the ‘whip’ by ‘reminding’ MPs or whole parliamentary groups of their 
obligations when necessary. When the vote or debate is of little concern, these 
particular MPs are generally not present. When they are present, other MPs know 
that the President is symbolically present and is watching them.40 The events in 
the earlier mentioned Plenary of 21 April 2010 are an illustrative example of the 
importance of such MPs. The Prime Minister was heavily criticised by the Oppo-
sition and was called to the Plenary for a debate – itself a rare event. When he 
responded in Parliament to questions and accusations, the MP that had posed the 
questions rejected the answers the Prime Minister had given and announced a 
motion of censure in an inflammatory speech in which he unprecedentedly listed 
a long sequence of corrupt practices of the Prime Minister, named illegally ac-
quired properties, and gave a financial overview of the theft (allegedly) commit-
ted by the Prime Minister (Bussa Tongba 2010). 41 When the Prime Minister 
walked off the stage, he walked through the audience to take the back exit for the 
public instead of the much closer side exit for MPs and Ministers or an even qui-
eter exit through the wings of the stage.42 By doing so, he had to walk through 
the sitting area of the MPs (the audience in the theatre hall), and passed two 
powerful MPs on the back row that are known to be close confidents of the Pres-
ident. The Prime Minister stopped and shook the hands of these two MPs.43 The 
Prime Minister staged his relation with le pouvoir, despite the critique that was 
just expressed to him. Although he may behind closed doors be begging for for-
giveness and asking for support, at that moment he expressed to the supporters of 
the motion of censure that he was ‘on shaking hand terms’ with le pouvoir; he 
reconfirmed and made visible his patron-client relation with le pouvoir. It 
showed the MPs that despite the critique he had not been dismissed by le pouvoir 
                                                          
38  Interviews with MP 1 Kinshasa, 20 October 2009, MP 3 Kinshasa 08 December 2009, MP 6 Kinshasa 
13 November 2011, MP 10 Kinshasa 20 April 2010. 
39  Interview with Minister 1, Kinshasa, 18 November 2009. 
40  Interview with MP 6, Kinshasa, 13 November 2009.  
41  Personal observations and notes, Plenary Session National Assembly, 21 April 2010. 
42  The Parliament sits in a former theatre, with the Microphone on the stage, and the MPs sitting in the 
’audience’.  
43  Personal observations and notes, Plenary Session National Assembly, 21 April 2010. 
158 
 
and consequently that he was entitled to Parliamentary support. Unsurprisingly, 
the motion of censure failed when it came to a vote a few months later. 
In the political family it is the father that has the right to sanction, as well as 
the right to reward. As we have seen all power is united in his hands, and family 
members do not have the right to criticise the executive. These powers also re-
side in the hands of the father. When Kabila demanded Kamerhe’s resignation he 
used his fatherly right to sanction members of the political family. Kamerhe 
however refused to follow presidential orders to resign and argued that if he was 
to step down it should be via proper parliamentary procedures, not a resignation 
when Parliament was not in session (Kamerhe 2009, 4). Although constitutional-
ly correct, this was another provocation of the leadership of Kabila, because Ka-
merhe did not accept Kabila’s power to punish and sack disloyal subjects at will.  
It is the father who rewards and punishes. It is the President who appoints 
Ministers and other positions (a reward) (République Démocratique du Congo 
2006a, Art. 78), and it is therefore also the President who sanctions them (a pun-
ishment) (Schatzberg 2001, 160). Although it has the legal right to do so, it is 
unthinkable for the National Assembly to evict a Minister, as this is considered to 
be critique towards the President. After all, the Ministers are the President’s Min-
isters, should Parliament reject one of them, this is the rejection of a choice of the 
President. The sanctioning of a Minister by Parliament would thus weaken the 
position of the President. It is this logic that was performed by the Prime Minis-
ter when he shook the hands of the powerful MPs in Parliament in April 2010.44   
An MP from the opposition recalls a case when the opposition tried to launch 
a motion of no-confidence against the Minister of Transport, Remy Kuseyo Ga-
tanga after a crash in Kinshasa of an airplane that did not comply with the safety 
rules killed at least 50 people (Le Potentiel 2007). The then Speaker of Parlia-
ment, Vital Kamerhe, said to him ‘why do you want to sanction him? Let us ar-
range it ourselves, let the President deal with it.’45 The Minister concerned was 
fired by the President the day after the crash (Omasombo 2009, 138, République 
Démocratique du Congo 2007b). Although the Minister had been sanctioned be-
cause he was held responsible for the crash, Kabila’s act disabled Parliament to 
engage in a debate with the Minister and possibly sanction him. The National 
Assembly responded by launching a motion of no confidence against the Minister 
of State to the President of the Republic, Nkulu Kilombo, who was considered to 
be responsible too because he had allegedly instructed the Minister of Transport 
to allow this faulty Antonov plane to fly. Speakers of the Majority felt that the 
problem had been dealt with because the responsible Minister was sacked and a 
                                                          
44  Interviews with MP 6, Kinshasa 13 November 2009 and MP 13, Kinshasa 30 April 2010. 
45  Interview with MP 13, Kinshasa 30 April 2010. 
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commission of inquiry was installed. The motion was rejected by Parliament 
(252 votes against to 156 for).46   
When Ministers need to go, it is the President and not Parliament that takes 
this decision, or in other words, that has the right to punish a Minister. Although 
it may constitutionally be a power of the National Assembly, according to the 
rules of the political family, it is the father-chief only that has the power to do so, 
or not. Parliament can never sanction a Minister,47 and neither has it ever done so 
in the first legislature of the Third Republic. The Ministers that have lost their 
position have been sacked via Presidential decree (République Démocratique du 
Congo 2007a, République Démocratique du Congo 2007b, République 
Démocratique du Congo 2011b) or cabinet reshuffles orchestrated by the Presi-
dent, not by Parliamentary vote. 
Kabila chose to punish Kamerhe by forcing him to resign and go into exile, 
that is, to declare him politically dead (Schatzberg 2001, 51).48 AMP MPs are 
said to have received text messages ‘facing them with the ultimatum of dropping 
Kamerhe or provoking the dissolution of the National Assembly by the Presi-
dent’ (South Scan 2009).49 The threat of the dissolution of Parliament is a threat 
of punishment in the same sense as the punishment of Kamerhe himself. The 
chief has this power, a power which is accepted and assumed. But Kamerhe en-
forced his stepping down to take place within the parameters of the institutional 
framework of the democratic state, not within the political family. In this institu-
tional framework, Kabila needed the MPs to be loyal to him, and choose against 
Vital Kamerhe.  
MPs of the majority that have been openly disloyal – for example known 
members of the Courant de Rénovateur and MPs that have sided with Kamerhe 
in his conflict with the President –have all been excluded from the channels of 
redistribution. No longer are they invited for AMP meetings in preparation of a 
critical parliamentary debate in which funds are distributed and gifts promised in 
exchange for loyalty.50 The exclusion of these MPs is a form of political punish-
ment by le pouvoir, in the same way as Vital Kamerhe was excluded. The evic-
tion of 18 MPs in July 2007, many of which from the parliamentary majority, in 
July 2007 should be understood as such a political punishment as well. Even 
                                                          
46  Plenary Session National Assembly, 13 October 2009, audio tape recording. It is interesting to note 
that the motion was rejected by 252 votes against, whereas 251 votes are required to pass a motion. It 
alludes to manipulation.  
47  Discussion with civil servant at the Ministry of Parliamentary Relations, Kinshasa, field notes, 07 
May 2010. 
48  Kamerhe’s name was cited in the song played in the MPs car (see chapter 5). He was in this song 
cited as a deceased person.  
49  Interview with MP 1, Kinshasa 20 October 2009. 
50  Interviews with MP 1, Kinshasa 20 October 2009 and MP 10, Kinshasa 20 April 2010. 
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more so, some of these 18 MPs have been re-instated, allegedly because they 
have reconfirmed their loyalty to the President.51  
Negotiation and renegotiation 
What is evident from the above analysis is that the logic of the political family 
and the conceptualisation of power and leadership in the political family is at 
odds with some basic principles of liberal democracy. The political father holds 
all power united in his hands at the cost of the powers and independence of other 
institutions such as Parliament. The 2009 parliamentary crisis vividly shows how 
logics of the political family and the position of the father-chief dictate the way 
in which MPs and the executive relate to each other. The rules and practices of 
the liberal democratic state exist on paper but make place for practices that em-
phasise the political leadership of the father-chief and the unification of power in 
his hands, and practices of a political family. These notions of the father-chief 
and the unity of powers in the hands of the father-chief determine political prac-
tices in the consumption of democracy by the MPs and their engagements with le 
pouvoir.   
This in itself is nothing new. What is, however, interesting to observe in the 
above described events is that we can also see that these practices are subject to 
negotiation. Much like the processes that Vansina (1990) describes which took 
place since the early days of colonial encounters, local agencies renegotiate local 
political traditions and customs for which they use means provided by the liberal 
peace. The organisation of the political according to the moral matrix of the fa-
ther-family is from this point of view then not a re-traditionalisation of politics in 
which liberal democracy is being Africanised. Instead, it is a negotiation of local 
politics in which the liberal peace is a resource that provides opportunities for the 
renegotiation of local political practices. This means that ‘the local’ is not static 
and does not only negotiate the liberal peace by influencing it. The local itself is 
also a dynamic site which is being renegotiated by local agencies that use their 
needs, aspirations, customs and culture, as well as the liberal peace, as resources 
to do so.  
The in this chapter discussed practices are practices that occur in the negotia-
tion between the practices, norms and institutions of the father-family moral ma-
trix, and the norms and institutions of the recently installed democratic political 
organisation of the state’s institutions. The democratic institutional framework 
provides new opportunities for a renegotiation and for bargaining, because it has 
altered the interdependence and power relations within the political family. 
Whereas in a politically stable situation in which the political family functions 
                                                          
51  Interview with former MP 4, and one of the 18 evicted MPs, Kinshasa 26 April 2010.  
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these unarticulated obligations may be stable and non-negotiable (Hydén 2006, 
Schatzberg 2001, 1), what seems to be the essence of the settlement of the moral 
matrix of the political family in the institutional framework of liberal democracy, 
is that these obligations are now open for renegotiation and the formation of a 
new system of obligations.  
With elections, the ability to sanction ministers or the whole government, their 
own voting power in the National Assembly, and threats of motions of no confi-
dence, MPs now have new tools through which power relations and exchange 
can be renegotiated with le pouvoir. At the site of the National Assembly we can 
see several cases of such negotiation and renegotiation concerning the cases and 
events discussed earlier in this chapter.  
The described practices to enforce loyalty of the parliamentary majority itself 
indicate that loyalty to the political father cannot be taken for granted. The mere 
fact that it needs to be enforced through mots d’ordres, reminders by certain 
MPs, fuelled by payments and gifts, means that the loyalty to the political father 
is subject to constant negotiation. In a conversation in the corridors of Parliament 
an MP complained to me that they were only offered US$ 500 for a certain vote. 
He argued that $500 was an unreasonably low amount, which does not enable 
them to do anything. After some negotiation, more material benefits were added 
to the exchange and the MP agreed to vote as requested.52  
The case of a petition by the South Kivutian MPs is illustrative of this renego-
tiation of the terms of loyalty and redistribution. In May 2010 28 of the 32 MPs 
of South Kivu wrote and signed a petition to the Prime Minister, and by exten-
sion to the President. The petition was published in full in the Congolese news-
papers. In the petition, they reminded the Government that 96% of the electorate 
of South Kivu has voted for President Kabila and that none of the South Kivutian 
MPs is a member of the opposition. In other words, South Kivu and its represent-
atives in the National Assembly are unquestionably loyal to the President. They 
complain about the ‘ingratitude’ of the regime for the loyalty of South Kivu. The 
elite of South Kivu has, according to the MPs, been excluded and paralysed. A 
number of South Kivutian high profile politicians have been removed from the 
scene,53 and according to the petitioners South Kivutians are nearly absent from 
high-ranking posts within public administration. The MPs quote another MP and 
close confident of the President saying that ‘we will finally govern without South 
                                                          
52  Conversation with MP of the majority, April 2010. 
53  Such as the former Minister Mushi Bonane; the former Speaker of Parliament Vital Kamerhe; Minis-
ters Kyamusoke Bamusulanga, Essambo and Bitijula, who were Minister in Gizenga’s first govern-
ment but did not survive the cabinet reshuffles of (respectively) November 2007, November 2007 and 
October 2008; and Hon Bahati, who lost his post as Questor of the National Assembly (Member of the 
Office of the Speaker, responsible for the internal administration of the National Assembly) as a result 
of the crisis around Vital Kamerhe. These names are listed in the petition (Le Potentiel, 08 May 
2010).  
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Kivu’, which confirms their suspicion of being deliberately excluded. In addi-
tion, projects of the Cinq Chantiers54 are, according to the petitioners, close to 
non-existent in South Kivu, while the province continues to be victim of insecu-
rity, instability and conflict (Le Potentiel 2010e).  
The South Kivutian MPs claim what they are (in their eyes) entitled to based 
on their loyalty and support to the President, namely more high profile positions 
for themselves and fellow politicians from South Kivu, and more development 
projects and support for the problems of the people in South Kivu. This petition 
is a practice of negotiation. Redistribution apparently did not take place satisfac-
torily in the normal channels of the political family. The MPs have opted to make 
a public statement, thereby publicly embarrassing the regime for its failures to 
deliver its end of the exchange. The petition is therefore formally addressed to 
the Prime Minister, even though it discusses the exchange between the people 
and representatives of South Kivu and the President, not the Prime Minister (the 
MPs have joined the Presidential majority and not the Prime Minister’s majority, 
and the people of South Kivu have voted for Kabila in 2006, not for PALU).  
The petitioners ask ‘do you really not want to see us again in the next Assem-
bly?’, suggesting that these specific MPs will not get re-elected if there is no in-
creased redistribution to South Kivu. But the statements also suggests that le 
pouvoir risks losing the loyalty of the of the MPs from South Kivu (Le Potentiel 
2010b). It shows that the power holder is indeed also dependent on those that are 
dependent of him (Baldwin 1978, Emerson 1962). Kabila is dependent on his 
support base in the eastern part of the country. And the not so subtle hint that 
they might not support him anymore in the future is a reminder of the reciprocal 
character of the dependency relationship between them. The MPs practice a form 
of ‘blackmail of the ruled’ (Chabal & Daloz 1999, 38), which is a form of the 
negotiation over de obligations in the political family.  
The negotiation over the levels of reasonability and material and symbolic 
weight of these exchanges, the bargaining itself, is a consequence of the discur-
sive negotiation between the moral matrix of the father-family and that of liberal 
democracy. MPs are very well aware that le pouvoir needs Parliament to pursue 
its policies, or generally get approval of its practices. Within the framework of 
liberal democracy which includes elections and a formal role of Parliament to 
approve government policy, MPs have a certain power to bargain. They know 
that they are indeed expected to vote according to the mots d’ordres, but they 
will only do so if they feel that the political leader has lived up to his moral obli-
                                                          
54  The Cinq Chantiers (five worksites) is the reconstruction programme of President Kabila, focussing 
on employment, infrastructure, housing, water and electricity, and education and health care. See 
www.cinqchantiers-rdc.com. It should be mentioned that complaints that ’there are no cinq chantiers 
in our region while other parts of the country are being privileged’, are complaints expressed in prac-
tically all parts of the country. 
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gations in the sense of redistribution. What is at stake is a contestation over the 
‘unarticulated conceptualisation of the distribution of rights and responsibilities’ 
(Schatzberg 2001, 1) between the father-chief and the political family. Conse-
quently, every vote in the assembly needs to be negotiated.  
The case of the Courant de Rénovateur is another interesting way of how po-
litical practices of the political family are renegotiated within the framework of 
liberal democracy. Because the opposition has very little influence in Parliament 
due to the fact that arrangements are made within the majority outside the Plena-
ry, the members of the Courant de Rénovateur feel that change and reform can 
only come from within the ruling majority. It is therefore important that critical 
voices stay within the political family.55 They thus practice a strategy of being 
an’inside-outsider’ – they choose to stay within the in-group of the political fami-
ly, while challenging it by negotiating the limits of critique. At the same time, 
they are very careful not to over step the line and risk being evicted from the in-
group. This would silence them as well as cut them out of redistribution channels 
which they need to fuel their own clientelist relations with their constituencies. 
They therefore always criticise the Prime Minister and never directly the Presi-
dent, but they do chose to use the Plenary for their critique (when given the 
chance) as well as open platforms such as the media.  
Like the practices of loyalty and redistribution, practices of sanctioning and 
political punishment are renegotiated as well. The case of the crisis around Vital 
Kamerhe is an interesting example. Rather than a political gamble by Kamerhe to 
gain political support at the expense of Kabila as has been suggested (South Scan 
2009), the case of the parliamentary crisis highlights a clash between a liberal 
democracy and the moral matrix of the political family. Kamerhe constructed his 
acts and argument within a democratic logic in which powers are separated be-
tween the legislature and the executive, and where the Assembly has the obliga-
tion to inform Parliament as the assembly of representatives of the population. 
His critique was that Parliament had not been consulted nor informed by the ex-
ecutive about these important decisions. In addition, he argued that he should 
only leave his office as Speaker if the National Assembly – which had elected 
him –would demand his departure. Kabila, on the other hand, constructed his acts 
and argument within the moral matrix of the father and family, in which powers 
are not separated but united within the political father and the acts of the political 
father cannot be publicly questioned by a member of the family without being 
punished. The public critique of a member of the family to the political father is a 
faux-pas which requires political punishment by the father to restore his authori-
                                                          
55  Interviews with members of the Courant de Rénovateur, Kinshasa, 21 April 2010 and with MP 10, 20 
April 2010.  
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ty. In this logic the President, and only the President, has the right to sanction 
people.  
Kamerhe rejected this power of the father-chief. Kamerhe presented himself as 
a respectful politician that adheres to the law and regulations of parliamentary 
procedures, and he also tapped into existing anti-Rwandese popular sentiments, 
knowing that the military operation would be ill received by the population. Alt-
hough he may have won support from the parliamentary opposition and the 
population, trying to win political support at the cost of the President is unac-
ceptable within the family of the Kabila regime. However, as a consequence of 
his political downfall, he has gone de facto into exile (i.e. his ‘political death’), 
which has cost him much of his popularity.56 His defence is that he acted in ac-
cordance to the law, although he does accept that he has done wrong and did not 
act in accordance to the code of conduct of the political family. It is this duality 
expressed in the headline of the Journal du Citoyen saying that Kamerhe is ‘split 
between the law and loyalty’ (Kibungu et al. 2009). Although Kamerhe may 
have had the legal right to criticise the President, he did not have the moral right 
to do so. Kamerhe describes how he is torn between the demands of his political 
family and the Congolese people, who expect of him, as a politician, to uphold 
institutional and democratic integrity to make an end to the years of political in-
fighting that has affected the functioning of political institutions since 1960. 
However, although Kamerhe acknowledges that his political family may perceive 
his statements as a crime, he takes up the role of political victim of the ‘hazards 
of politics in our country’. He emphasises this implicit accusation later in his 
speech when he implies that there is more going on than is visible: ‘I know that 
many among you (…) are not convinced about the true reasons of my resigna-
tion. But, it is like it is said that politics has reasons that reason ignores’ 
(Kamerhe 2009, 3, 7. Author’s translation from French).  
Kamerhe eventually had to give in to the rules of the political family and ac-
cept his defeat. His attempt to renegotiate the rules of the political family by 
stretching up the possibilities of critique failed. In this sense it was perhaps a 
miscalculation of the possibilities provided by the liberal democratic framework 
and an underestimation of the strength of the rule of the political family. The 
failure of this renegotiation does nevertheless show that certain aspects, such as 
the position of the father-chief, are currently not negotiable. Whether he partici-
pates in elections, a political process, or not, the President is as the father-chief a 
non-political figure that is elevated above political differences. Criticising him 
publicly is politically dangerous. Power is unified in this figure. This enables a 
broad majority of strange bedfellows that based on their backgrounds and politi-
                                                          
56  Focus Group 1, civil society representatives, Bukavu, 16 March 2010, Focus Group 2, civil society 
representatives, Bukavu, 19 March 2010. 
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cal interests may not be suitable partners, but that can unite under the leadership 
of such a non-political father-chief. This has implications for the concept of pres-
idential elections. Elections politicise the position of a political leader, whereas in 
the political father-chief is not political. These conceptual notions may have far 
reaching implications for issues such as the turn-over of power, or the relevance 
of elections as a mechanism to appoint a political leadership figure. However, the 
Courant de Rénovateur is also an interesting phenomenon in this respect. As we 
have seen, the notion of the political family and its practices depoliticises the in-
stitutions of legislature and executive. Not only is the President a non-political 
figure elevated above the political debate, the interaction between le pouvoir and 
the Assembly is turned into an exchange of loyalty and clientelist goods and the 
conceptualisation of the political family as a private sphere disables the National 
Assembly to be a platform for political debate. The Courant de Rénovateur is 
renegotiating this depoliticised space. If they would leave the majority they 
would be silenced. The only way to bring back political debate within the Na-
tional Assembly is from within the circles of the majority. 
 
  
8 
Conclusions: Local agencies  
consuming democracy 
In the previous chapters I have analysed peace building in the DRC through a 
perspective that emphasises local agencies that consume democracy. This is not 
an attempt for a creative approach. It is an approach that aims to respond to a 
lack of appropriate engagements, understanding and insights with the local con-
text in which liberal peace building is contextualised. It is an approach to find 
ways to capture and understand the local consumption of the liberal peace by 
approaching it from a people’s instead of an institutional perspective. This focus 
on people that operate within the institution as opposed to institutions themselves 
emphasises identity and cultural practices and lays bare insights that are often 
ignored by mainstream approaches.  
Although it is often argued that higher context sensitivity is necessary to make 
peace building practices better adapted to the specific context concerned, few 
analyses actually make the effort to engage with local agencies in a meaningful 
way. Critically engaging with local agencies means that the local should not mis-
takenly be idealised. The ‘evil white westerner’ should not simply be replaced by 
the ‘good black local’. Such inversion would ignore diversity, and would be 
guilty of the same lack of critical reflection that the liberal peace is accused of 
(MacGinty 2011, 51, Slater 2004, 198). Engaging with local agencies in peace 
building processes in a meaningful way means looking at the interaction between 
liberal peace building interventions and local agencies and the way in which 
peace building processes are being shaped by this interaction. These local agen-
cies cannot be ignored in peace building processes, even if they rely on custom 
and practices which contradict liberal ideals (Richmond 2011b, 183), as for ex-
ample in the case of the co-option of warlords in peace building in Afghanistan 
(MacGinty 2011, 91-114). 
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In this thesis I have focused on local agencies at the site of the National As-
sembly and their practices of consumption of liberal democracy as a central pillar 
of the liberal peace. I have used De Certeau’s notion of consumption as the pro-
cesses through which people make hegemonic structures function in the service 
of other sets of rules and customs to capture local agencies’ engagement and in-
teraction with the structures of the liberal peace, and liberal democracy in partic-
ular (1984, 32). Although underlining the critique of liberal peace building as a 
top-down and institutionalist project I have not moved away from the institutions 
and their elites on which liberal peace building relies and moved to the local-
local and everyday of the ordinary citizen, as suggested by Richmond (2009a, 
2009b). Instead, I have used Richmond’s critique and brought it back to the insti-
tutions of liberal peace building by focusing on the hidden ‘local-local’ of the 
actors that make these institutions function. Focusing on MPs and their agencies 
enabled by their interaction with other actors, I have considered these agencies as 
driving an undefined dynamic of political reorganisation towards an undefined 
outcome within the context of liberal peace building. A process which is shaped 
by the needs, customs, desires, ambitions, as well as the identities and political 
culture of MPs and the people they interact with, such as their electorate and the 
executive.  
Before turning my focus to practices and local agencies, I have contextualised 
these agencies in the discursive field of the liberal peace and the discursive field 
of local experiences of the present. Experiences of the present are shaped by his-
torical experiences. I have therefore approached Congolese narratives of the pre-
sent by engaging with narratives in a Ricœurian way of a future oriented past 
which understands history as purposeful or futural. This approach has provided a 
deeper understanding of the narratives that shape the Congolese present as a dis-
cursive frame in which people exercise their existence, and in doing so engage 
with liberal peace interventions. Connecting the discourses of the present with 
mythistoric narratives has highlighted the experience of the post-war situation in 
terms of continuity (continued international interference and victimhood) and 
change (emancipation, democracy, a new impetus for resisting international in-
terference and victimhood). The peace building process is framed as an event of 
ongoing international breaching of Congolese sovereignty and a Congolese quest 
for emancipation. The mythistory that gives meaning to the present is employed 
as an emancipatory discourse that claims sovereignty, Congolese dignity and 
self-determination. This defines Congolese engagement with peace building in-
terventions in their country. The end of the war was a new beginning. The 2006 
elections launched democracy and were seen as a final victory of the quest for 
self-determination, the long-awaited second independence. Democratisation is 
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then a political project in pursuit of a peace that responds to local needs and aspi-
rations. 
However, Congolese experiences with the liberal peace are ambivalent: it is a 
means for emancipation and self-determination, while simultaneously a practice 
of continued domination and breach of this self-determination. The disappoint-
ments that followed the high expectations and the failures of liberal peace build-
ing are ascribed to western intervention. International peace building intervention 
can thus also be considered as a continuation of foreign domination in the Congo. 
Liberal peace building is simultaneously welcomed and rejected. This Congolese 
ambivalence towards liberal peace building is ill-understood by the donor com-
munity, which critiquelessly sees peace building and development as a means to 
improve the daily lives of Congolese people. Congolese narratives that reject, 
question or resist Western engagement are put aside as ‘untrue’ and are therefore 
considered irrelevant. The emancipatory objectives Congolese people may have 
are subsequently ignored. As I have discussed in chapter four, the state building 
project that aims to rebuild the National Assembly as well as other state institu-
tions follows what Chandler has called a depoliticised problem solving approach 
(Chandler 2006, 8) which is concerned with technical aspects of setting-up the 
institution without engaging with custom, political culture and practices of poli-
tics in Congo, nor its structures of power, domination and accountability. It sets 
up institutions, but does not engage with the political role these institutions play 
in governance processes. It engages with capacity building, but does not consider 
to what political end these built capacities will be used, or whether they will be 
used at all. This undermines liberal peace building as a project of discipline, be-
cause as a result of the technical approach local agencies define the way the insti-
tutions function.  
When analysing and comparing the different narratives, a disagreement about 
the purpose and practice of the liberal peace in the Congo emerges. I have identi-
fied three discursive clashes. Firstly, there is a clash over the emancipatory pur-
pose of peace building which reflects the critique of the liberal peace developed 
by various authors as discussed in chapter one. Where Congolese narratives ex-
plain democracy as a technology of emancipation that seeks to establish self-
determination and reject foreign tutelage, peace building itself practices Foucaul-
tian disciplining that pursues an approach which shies away from politics (even 
at the heart of political organisation of the country, such as Parliament) and aims 
to teach through technical assistance, and seeks to supervise and control a pro-
cess of democratisation. As argued by liberal peace critique, although liberal ide-
alism talks about self-determination, in practice it dispossesses. Evidently, these 
two experiences can co-exist without making a meaningful impact on each other, 
which is what has been happening.  
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Secondly, both the Congolese narratives and the liberal democratic hegemonic 
discourses narrate power and the relations of power that exist between the Congo 
and its international partners. The Congolese narratives and that of the liberal 
peace in the Congo produce different regimes of truth about the present. An im-
portant consequence of this is that these regimes of truth then perceive the self 
and the other, Congolese or international, and allocate them a role: the willing 
but unable, and the able but unwilling. Whereas the Congolese narratives de-
scribe the liberal interveners as dominating and hegemonic, seeking to subjugate 
the Congo, the liberal agents perceive the Congolese that uphold these narratives 
as obstructive, as unreasonable moaners, as liars, or simply put, as problematic 
for the liberal peace. Both perceive themselves as the willing partner that is faced 
with an unwilling other. Neither takes the other and its narratives seriously, as-
suming that they are lying, hiding something, or can just not be trusted. Both 
want the other to be something else than what he is to enable the pursuit of the 
respective objectives, be that emancipation or discipline. Evidently, this results in 
mutual frustration and disappointment.  
Agency and the lack thereof is thus an important argument that is hidden in 
Congolese and liberal discourses. Congolese perceive themselves as lacking 
agency because they are obstructed in their efforts by the internationals who seek 
to dominate the Congo and keep it poor and unstable, and without democracy. 
The agents of the liberal peace see themselves as lacking agency too, claiming 
that it cannot build a democratic state if the Congolese do not have the will. They 
perceive themselves as having the will but not the agency, whereas the Congo-
lese have the agency but not the will. What we thus see is a negotiation or a con-
testation of the purpose of the liberal peace and the meaning of democracy in the 
Congo. Whereas for the Congolese it is considered to be a project of emancipa-
tion, for the agents of liberal peace interventions it is a project of discipline to-
wards what Jabri calls ‘liberal democratic self-mastery’ (2007, 124). Whereas the 
Congolese narratives emphasise democratisation as an emancipatory project, the 
liberal peace discourse considers this can only be achieved through disciplining. 
Whereas the Congolese narratives see this emancipation as emancipation from 
foreign tutelage and democracy as self-determination, liberal peace building em-
phasises democracy as governance by popular vote that liberates the population 
from authoritarianism. These are not nuances but rather differences over the fun-
damental meaning of peace building in the Congo. 
There is thus much tension over the meaning and purpose of democratisation 
and peace building, and the role therein of the self and the other. When the other 
is seen as untrustworthy and of ill intent, its discourses are consequently delegit-
imised and thus irrelevant and negligible. The mutual disengagement that follows 
as a consequence is thus produced by the shortcomings of liberal peace building 
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itself, such as its disregard for local interests and meaning, as well as its distanc-
ing from its own disciplining practices at the heart of the institutions of liberal 
democracy. But likewise, the mutual disengagement is produced by a rejection of 
liberal peace intervention by Congolese people. Constructive partnership in 
peace building is disabled and a discursive space of mutual disengagement and 
irrelevance is shaped. Because peace building interventions shy away from local 
agencies and focus on the technical and institutional level of state building, and 
because local actors disengage from international peace building objectives, hy-
brid space in produced. Focusing on the National Assembly, this thesis has 
shown how local agencies in this hybrid space consume liberal democracy and 
make it their own. Consequently, liberal peace building lacks legitimacy with the 
donor community as well as with the local community. Neither is content with 
the way peace building has developed, and both blame the other for the peace 
building failures. For the donor community the processes of democratisation and 
state building of the liberal peace show disappointingly little structural differ-
ences in how political practices are practiced. The 2011 elections as the most re-
cent moment of ‘measurement’ which confirmed concerns about the direction the 
democratisation process is taking in the Congo. For Congolese people, however, 
the liberal peace is the latest phase in the continued western interference in Con-
golese national affairs. In the case of democratisation at the site of the National 
Assembly there is a veneer of co-operation while beneath these discourses disen-
gagement is hidden.  
The case study on the National Assembly has shown some aspects of the prob-
lematic nature of peace building in the context of mutual disengagement between 
local and international partners. Liberal peace building aims to fundamentally 
change local practices through disciplining and corrective strategies that will re-
sult in turning the Congo into a docile liberal democracy, but without actually 
touching upon these political processes. Local agencies consume liberal democ-
racy without being disciplined or tempered in their practise of consumption. This 
then draws attention to local agencies and their practices of consumption. This is 
not because the local necessarily provides a better alternative for the failing prac-
tices of the liberal peace. This is not the case. The interest in local agencies de-
rives on the one hand from the fact that they are a reality and cannot be ignored, 
and on the other hand, because they may provide the local legitimacy that the 
liberal peace intervention is missing in the Congo. Currently, instead, the disci-
plining practices are technical and institutional and disengage from people’s 
agencies, their identities and the socio-political and socio-cultural context in 
which they are located. It is evident that such interventions are meaningless be-
cause the real process of shaping the political takes place in this negotiation by 
local agencies.  
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As the case study on the National Assembly has shown, local agencies are 
tremendously important and influential in determining how political processes 
function and how political institutions are being enabled to function. The focus 
on local agencies at the site of the National Assembly has emphasised that the 
building of an institution such as Parliament does not merely concern the institu-
tion itself, nor only MPs and their capacities. Meaningful parliament building 
programmes will have to engage with the actors involved, but not just with MPs. 
Focusing on convivial agencies, I have shown how local agencies at the site of 
the National Assembly are enabled by relations with others. Because MP’s agen-
cies’ are relational and enabled by their relations with le pouvoir and the elec-
torate, donor engagement needs to take these relations into account and recognise 
their significance for the functioning of Parliament. As shown in this thesis, the 
ways in which MPs relate to their electorate and the ways in which they engage 
with le pouvoir are different from the way these political relations are envisaged 
by liberal democracy.  
Being grounded in local custom and political culture, and being responsive to 
(certain) local needs and expectations, these local political practices add local 
legitimacy for democratisation. However, the way in which these local practices 
are being renegotiated by MPs and members of the electorate in response to the 
new framework of liberal democracy and the tools it provides, shows that the 
local needs are not uncontested themselves. The local and its needs and expecta-
tions are not stable, particularly not in the post-war as a time of redefinition, in 
which people expect change. Local needs and local custom are instable, contest-
ed and ambivalent. Engaging with local agencies that are grounded in these local 
needs and customs in peace building and democratisation is valid, and necessary, 
but it is also likely to encounter ambivalence and local contestation.  
I have used Schatzberg’s (2001) frame of the moral matrix of the father-family 
as a frame to capture the political practices as performed by MPs. The moral ma-
trix of the father-family organises the political sphere in several in-groups, such 
as the majority and the opposition as political families. Within the in-group of the 
political family, there are important rules which determine the way in which the 
political game is being played in the Congo. Father and family members have 
rights and obligations. Using the analogy of the moral matrix of the father-family 
provides a frame of understanding for the impact of MP’s identities on his prac-
tices and the ways in which democracy is consumed by the political family, be-
cause the rules, rights and obligations of the political family need to be respected, 
even within the institutional framework of liberal democracy.  
Importantly, using the concept of the moral matrix of the father-family also 
emphasises the significance of identity, and the fact that locally constructed iden-
tities differ from those assumed by the framework of liberal democracy. Rich-
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mond mentions identity as one of many aspects in which post-liberal peace build-
ing should be grounded, but the concept remains undefined and ill-contextualised 
(2011a, 8). My research on local agencies at the site of the National Assembly 
has shown how actors’ identities shape their behaviour and enable as well as dis-
able their agencies. But it has also shown that locally constructed identities of 
MPs do not correspond to the identity liberal democracy applies to and MP. Iden-
tity in the African context is often taken as ethnic identity, but I refer here to 
identity in terms of a constructed role, a position, a social status and the expecta-
tion, rights and obligations that come with this identity. The liberal peace as-
sumes roles and identities of local actors in peace building processes, and hence 
the way in which they relate to each other. At the site of the National Assembly, 
these assumed identities are fundamentally flawed. MPs do not perform the iden-
tity of an MP in a liberal democracy, instead, they perform the identity of a polit-
ical father or a member of the political family. As we have seen, the identities of 
father-provider or family member are more relevant for the dictating of MPs acts 
than the formal rules of liberal democracy and the assumed identities of its ac-
tors. MPs perform an identity which does not conform to the liberal democratic 
ideal typical MP, nor does he practice the cultural practices liberal democracy 
expects of him. Instead, the identity he performs conforms to the cultural and 
customary practices of a political family.  
Acts such as dress code, use of language, or showing off material wealth are 
codes that perform an elite identity. MPs present themselves as providers (fa-
thers) that take care of their people (family). The performance of a different iden-
tity than that expected of MPs according to the liberal democratic norm is a form 
of De Certeau’s anti-discipline (De Certeau 1984, xv), practiced in the MPs eve-
ryday life. It is a practice of anti-discipline because it fundamentally undermines 
the shaping of the political process according to the liberal democratic norm. In 
doing so, they enable different interaction with the electorate and le pouvoir 
which is shaped by these performed identities. Identity in the sense of the self in 
the context of the institutions and practices of governance comes with rights and 
obligations in terms of how to behave and act in this context. As this study about 
MPs and their agencies has shown, identity is an aspect of vital importance in 
addition to rights, needs, custom and culture, when considering local agencies’ 
interaction with the liberal peace. The complexity of local actors’ identities is an 
overlooked aspect by liberal peace interventions, as it is an issue which is seldom 
spoken about beyond ethnicity, gender and cultural identity.  
In chapters five and six I have focused on MPs political practices in relation to 
the electorate and le pouvoir respectively. In their relations with the electorate, 
MPs perform the identity of political father who provides for his political family 
in exchange for loyalty, support and respect. This identity defines practices 
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through which MPs and the electorate engage with each other and which enables 
agencies that negotiate the liberal peace. The MP is expected to provide for his 
constituency by redistributing part of the spoils of his position. This concerns 
primarily material benefits such as the direct redistribution of money, funding 
schools and hospitals, setting-up and funding local development NGOs, or other 
forms of material benefit for the constituency. For both the electorate and the 
MP, this redistribution needs to be material, direct, personal and the MP needs to 
be visible as the provider. Direct constituency work is by the electorate highly 
privileged above other parliamentary tasks of legislation, representation and ex-
ecutive oversight. Consequently, MPs privilege their constituency work above 
their other tasks as well, because their re-election depends on it. Congolese peo-
ple thus do not claim their democratic rights (Bratton and Logan 2006). Instead, 
they claim their rights as loyal family members. 
In this father-family relation between MPs and the electorate, the formalised 
practices of constituency work are considered irrelevant while parallel informal 
practices are pursued. The practice of the Vacance Parlementaire aims to institu-
tionalise constituency work, and provide a mechanism that connects constituency 
work to other parliamentary tasks, such as executive oversight and legislation. 
However, these formalised practices fail to respond to the basic demands of con-
stituency work as defined by the father-family relation between the MP and his 
constituency. It depersonalises the interaction and thus makes the MP invisible as 
provider. By bringing the issues that are brought up to Parliament to be respond-
ed to through Parliamentary oversight and legislation, the potential outcome of 
any action is no longer a matter of direct material benefits. Even more so, by 
bringing the issues concerned to the national level, the potential goods delivered 
are no longer targeted at specific constituencies. They are no longer club goods, 
but become public goods. The state building objectives to establish effective and 
transparent structures and institutions is thus not what local agencies seek in 
democratic practices. Mutual interest does not lie in the improvement of state 
society relations through the establishment of formal, impersonal structures, nor 
in ‘state building’ as such. Consequently, the formal structure of constituency 
representation is avoided. It exists on paper, by law and in practice. MPs write 
their reports of their Vacance Parlementaire, the reports are processed through 
the political mill accordingly, but fail to respond adequately to needs. A system 
that does respond to the demands of direct personal relations functions in parallel 
and ignores the formalised structures that have been put in place. 
This is important because the preference for the informal directly contradicts 
the idea of state building, which emphasises institutionalisation, or the formalisa-
tion and de-personalisation of the functioning of the state and its governance sys-
tem. Instead, local agencies try to keep it informal and particular. The preference 
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for the informal negotiates the liberal peace. MPs as well as the electorate prefer 
the informal and avoid or reject formalised practices and procedures. Instead, 
parallel practices of direct material and personal redistribution are put in place 
that substitute the failing practices developed in the framework of liberal democ-
racy.  
When merely approaching the concern about MPs and their constituency work 
on a technical level, efforts to improve it are likely to aim at speeding up the re-
porting process, emphasising the need for more policy response to the needs 
identified by the MPs, or establishing additional structures to communicate the 
follow-up back to the constituencies. This, however, fails to connect with local 
agencies’ interests, which emphasises direct, personal and visible forms of con-
sumption of the relation between MPs and their electorate. Such technical efforts 
to discipline will only face anti-disciplinary tactics of rejection, avoidance and 
the use of alternative practices that do respond to local expectations. These prac-
tices of anti-discipline do indeed occur, in the form of deeming the structure and 
process irrelevant and pursuing personal and informal means to practice forms of 
representation and redistribution. 
The liberal peace thus in practice fails on various levels to respond to the 
needs of the people concerned. Good governance, which emphasises transparent, 
formalised and depersonalised practices of governance, is not responsive to the 
needs and demands expressed in the informal practices and the everyday en-
gagement between MPs and their constituencies. Because both MPs and their 
electorate have an interest in maintaining their informal practices of constituency 
work, the practices of liberal democracy are made irrelevant, and substituted for 
other practices. The assumption underlying state building interventions is that 
liberal democratic practices of good governance will replace informal practices 
when institutions are strengthened to take up these tasks. The evidence from the 
case of MPs constituency work does not support this assumption. Neither is this 
merely an issue related to the relative short experience with democracy in the 
Congo. Countries with longer established democracies in Africa, such as Benin, 
Ghana and Uganda, also show little progress in the replacement of current cus-
toms of constituency work which relies on direct and personal redistribution for 
more formalised, impersonal and indirect forms of constituency work 
(Adamolekun & Laleye 2009, 127, Kasfir & Twebaze 2009, 101-02, Lindberg 
2010b, Lindberg 2010c, Lindberg & Zhou 2009, 168). 
In his relations to le pouvoir and other MPs in the National Assembly, the 
MP’s identity is that of a member of the political family, whereas the President, 
or le pouvoir, is the political father. Practices are still dictated by the moral ma-
trix of the father-family, but the MP plays a different role and different agencies 
are enabled. Although these agencies are both contextualised in the father-family 
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logic, they are clearly distinct: an MP cannot act as a father-chief in his relations 
with le pouvoir, just as he cannot act as family member in his constituency.  
A first important practice of MPs and le pouvoir driven by the moral matrix of 
the father-family is that the political arena is redefined and reorganised. Instead 
of defining the National Assembly and the executive as independent and distinct 
institutions, the moral matrix of the father family defines the ruling majority and 
the opposition as two political families. This means that, in the case of the ruling 
majority, the executive, the parliamentary majority and the presidency all belong 
to the same unit. This redefinition of the political arena seriously undermines 
horizontal accountability, the separation of powers between the legislative and 
the executive, and the independence of Parliament. These foundational principles 
of liberal democracy are made irrelevant by the moral matrix of the father-family 
and substituted for an alternative organisational logic, that of the political family. 
The political family is considered to be private space, whereas the National As-
sembly is for the political family a public space. Opposition and Majority con-
front each other in this public space, but critique from members of the political 
family cannot be expressed in this public space. This stifles debate and critique, 
as the example of the inability for the Courant de Rénovateur to speak has 
shown. By denying the National Assembly to be a space for critical debate, the 
Assembly is undermined in playing its fundamental roles. Parliamentary over-
sight is made impossible, and representation of the interests of the electorate is 
denied.  
Instead of using the stage of the National Assembly as a platform for political 
debate and critique, MPs of the majority are expected to conform to a fundamen-
tal rule of the political family: loyalty to the political father. Loyalty means vot-
ing according to instructions and not to criticise the political father in public 
(such as within the media or the National Assembly). Doing so guarantees an in-
group status and participation in redistribution practices. This undermines hori-
zontal accountability (O’Donnell 1994, 61, O’Donnell 1998, 117), but also turns 
it around. Instead of Parliament holding the executive to account through practic-
es and procedures of parliamentary oversight, le pouvoir holds the parliamentary 
majority to account for its obligations of loyalty and support to the political fa-
ther. The case of the Parliamentary crisis of 2009 is an illustrative example of 
how these rules of the political family work. Kamerhe criticised the President in 
public which made his position as speaker unsustainable. Although according to 
the constitution the President cannot dismiss MPs directly, he can punish them 
for their disloyalty by enforcing their dismissal, as in the case of Vital Kamerhe, 
by dismissing Ministers through Governmental reshuffles or by cutting them out 
of the channels of redistribution. The right to sanction lies with the political fa-
ther and with the political father only, thereby taking away a fundamental role of 
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the National Assembly. Formally the institutional framework is left intact – the 
constitution does not give the President the power to dismiss MPs or ministers. 
However, in practice the rules of the political family are privileged and consid-
ered more relevant than those of the Congolese formal legal framework.  
The position of the political father is central in the political family, and for the 
political practices performed by MPs. In the case of the opposition this is illus-
trated by the fact that because of the absence of a political leader the opposition 
finds itself unorganised, paralysed and incapable, and some members of the op-
position have on occasion even refused to take position on certain issues because 
of a lack of direction from the political father. As the political father the Presi-
dent is elevated above political squabbles and the political process. As a father he 
is a non-political figure and his position is therefore unquestioned and he is con-
sidered irreplaceable. This practice is at odds with liberal democracy, which as-
sumes the President as an electable, replaceable, and a political head of state. Be-
cause the President takes office through elections the office becomes a political 
office. The conceptualisation of the political father as a non-political figure 
which occupies a political office affects electoral democracy as a concept, pro-
cess and as a possibility. The partaking in the political process of elections to 
acquire a non-political function is an example of the instrumentalisation of the 
liberal peace which emphasises the tension between the liberal peace and politi-
cal culture in a host society. 
Another tension between the liberal democratic model and the moral matrix of 
the father family is that liberal democracy assumes that power can both be divid-
ed (executive, legislative and juridical) and shared (if necessary) between differ-
ent parties in a governing coalition. This is radically opposed to the notion that 
power is united in the hand of the political father, and ‘eaten as whole’ (Fabian 
1990). My research did not extend to the juridical institutions. On the matter of 
the divisibility of powers I can therefore only refer to the separation of powers 
between the legislature and the executive. This separation of power exists ac-
cording to the legal framework in the Congo but is in practice not adhered to. 
According to the logic of the division of power between the legislature and the 
executive the National Assembly has powers which are at odds with the assump-
tion of the unification of powers in the hands of the political father. The inde-
pendence of the National Assembly is at odds with the unwritten rule of loyalty 
to the political father. It is therefore unthinkable for the National Assembly to 
undertake actions as an independent body, such as sanctioning a Minister, criti-
cising government’s performance, or not following instructions on how to vote. 
But the indivisibility of power also concerns sharing power with other political 
actors and parties. The AMP is an interesting case which appears to be a form of 
power sharing between different parties in a ruling coalition in which political 
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positions are divided. However, it is in effect far from a form of power sharing 
because the different members of the AMP all unite under the leadership of Jo-
seph Kabila. In return for their support (loyalty), they acquire political positions, 
but that does not mean that there is a form of negotiation over government poli-
cies, as power sharing assumes. They are co-opted in Kabila’s rule, not sharing 
it.  
When we bring together the two identities of the MP as a father or provider in 
his relations with his electorate, and as a family member in his relations with le 
pouvoir we see that these two family structures in which the MP participates are 
disconnected. The performance of these two identities is in this sense a tactic of 
anti-discipline in itself because it disabled the system of democratic representa-
tion to function. The performance of two distinct identities separates the MPs 
relations with his electorate from his relations with le pouvoir. This manipulates 
the fundamental assumption of liberal democracy that the population and the po-
litical decision making process can be connected with each other through elected 
representation. The double identity of the MP as a family member and the MP as 
a father, and the practices and agencies this enables and disables, is an obstacle 
for the assumed trickling up and down of representation and accountability be-
tween electorate, Parliament and Executive.  
MPs do represent their constituency in Kinshasa, but not to defend the elec-
torate’s interest at the political decision making level. Instead, they are there to 
get access to spoils, tap into the redistributive system to bring something back to 
the constituency – funds, projects, development assistance, electricity, etc. The 
only way in which an MP as a family member can achieve something for his 
constituency as a provider is by being a family member loyal to his father-chief 
to be entitled to redistribution. Co-optation with le pouvoir thus becomes a form 
of constituency service. But paradoxically, it means not speaking up for the con-
stituency in Parliament and not holding the executive to account for its policy 
failures and malgovernance. Rather, representing the constituency is played in 
terms of bringing back part of the spoils of their access to the circles of power 
and redistribute them. Constituency service and constituency representation in 
liberal democratic terms can thus in the way in which Congolese parliamentary 
politics work be paradoxically mutually exclusive – representing constituency 
interests in Parliament by not holding the executive to account may prevent the 
access to spoils which is a constituency service. This is a fundamental negotia-
tion of the terms of representative democracy. Constituencies elect their repre-
sentatives in Parliament, but the terms and purposes of accountability are very 
different. It is a form of the co-optation of the father-family logic within the lib-
eral democratic institutional framework.  
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Enabled by identities and interaction with others, local agencies at the site of 
the National Assembly do not passively accept liberal peace building, but active-
ly engage with the hegemonic structures of liberal democracy. It is a process of 
the consumption of democracy, a process which negotiates liberal democracy. 
While certain aspects of liberal democracy are formally left intact (such as elect-
ed representation, a two house parliament, separation of powers) the rules that 
come with the liberal democratic framework are considered irrelevant and are 
ignored, sidelined, and substituted. Instead, the rules of local political practices 
define the way in which the National Assembly functions within the institutional 
outer framework. The moral matrix of the father-family is, evidently, at odds 
with the liberal peace and liberal democracy. It conceptualises leadership and 
subjection within the political family, which dictates loyalty and redistribution in 
terms of rights and responsibilities. The liberal democratic institutional frame-
work – itself a moral matrix – does not replace the moral matrix of the father-
family. Instead, they are competing institutional logics (Englebert & Tull 2008, 
125-27, Hesselbein 2007, 12). This is a situation in which parliamentary capacity 
building fails to connect with the actively functioning structures, and, failing to 
replace it, is therefore irrelevant.  
On the other hand, in a distinct set of practices of consumption a process of 
the renegotiation of the self takes place, in which liberal democracy functions as 
a resource. Rules and practices of liberal democracy are paradoxically again 
picked up and used to renegotiate local political practices. The liberal democratic 
framework has brought new tools, such as elections and the parliamentary vote, 
that are used to renegotiate these local practices and their unwritten rules. As dis-
cussed in chapter three, such renegotiation also takes place in appropriation of 
meaning to the concept of liberal democracy as an emancipatory discourse that 
seeks emancipation from the most visible agent of the liberal peace, ‘the West’. 
The notion of democracy thus becomes instrumentalised in pursuit of political 
objectives that are not necessarily ‘democracy’ or part of the liberal peace. As 
discussed in chapter four, democracy has thus acquired a meaning in the pursuit 
of political objectives that differ from the orthodox liberal peace objectives that 
the donor community pursues in the Congo.  
At the site of the National Assembly, local agencies instrumentalise the liberal 
peace to challenge the terms of rules of the moral matrix of the father-family, 
while its mere existence as a defining framework is maintained. When Congolese 
politicians use elements of the liberal democratic discourse they are not neces-
sarily a converted or co-opted liberal agent. They are more likely to be cleverly 
using tools provided by the liberal peace to renegotiate better terms of the system 
he partakes in. The liberal democratic institutional and legal framework has ena-
bled the re-negotiation of the modalities through which politics in the father-
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family matrix is practiced. In the case of the parliamentary crisis around Vital 
Kamerhe we see a struggle between the moral matrix of the father-family and 
that of liberal democracy. Kamerhe uses liberal democracy in an attempt to rene-
gotiate the terms between Parliament and le pouvoir. Kamerhe’s narrative re-
flects a discussion between the liberal democratic discourse and that of the fa-
ther-family. He used the terms of liberal democracy (implicitly criticising the 
political father in public media, and refusing to step down when being told to do 
so) but also admits that he has lost this negotiation when he finally asks Parlia-
ment to accept his resignation without vote or debate. Another example of the 
renegotiation of local practices is that of the courant de renovateur. Its members 
challenge the rules of the political family but referring to parliamentary freedom 
and the Plenary as a platform for political debate. In doing so, they challenge the 
rules of the family that dictate that critique is to be kept away from the public 
space while renegotiating the de-politicised space of the National Assembly.  
The liberal democratic system provides powerful new tools for the renegotia-
tion of practices of redistribution. MPs negotiate the payments for a vote in Par-
liament when what was offered by le pouvoir was considered too little. The 
South Kivutian MPs challenged the practices of redistribution with their threat to 
withdraw their support in Parliament, or the threat of not getting re-elected in 
2011 and risking to leave the parliamentary seats to opposition MPs. A similar 
renegotiation takes place in the relations between MPs and their constituencies. 
People had high expectations of democracy. However, of their MPs they ex-
pected not so much the delivery of public goods and their parliamentary tasks of 
legislation, representation and parliamentary oversight, but rather an intensifica-
tion of the redistribution of direct, personal and material benefits. Like the South 
Kivutian MPs, and the MPs that negotiate the ‘price’ for their vote, they do not 
so much challenge the principle of such clientelist exchanges, but use the means 
provided by the democratic framework (elections, parliamentary vote) to renego-
tiate the extent of these redistributions and the reasonable expectations.  
These cases all show an engagement with the discourse of liberal democracy 
to construct an argument in a contestation with le pouvoir over the terms of their 
relations. In doing so, they turn the argument into a discursive argument about 
the moral-matrix of liberal democracy and the moral-matrix of the political fami-
ly. People engage with the liberal democratic discourse to win their moral right. 
But it is also a form of straddling. They use it strategically, when it is useful, and 
engage with the father-family discourse when that is more useful. Liberal democ-
racy thus provides tools to renegotiate a system that is being maintained through 
this renegotiation instead of being fundamentally challenged. While negotiating 
the liberal through practices of consumption, local agencies thus also use the lib-
eral to negotiate these practices. This is not a process of local appropriation or 
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domestication of democracy or a process of grafting, in which local custom, cul-
ture and practices gives new meaning democracy. Instead, the liberal peace itself 
is the resource that enables a renegotiation of local custom and practices, a 
source of self-rectification (Shih 2011, 538). However, as the cases that emerged 
in the case study have shown, this process of renegotiation of the self is not very 
successful at the site of the political practices. Nevertheless, using the liberal 
peace as a resource for a renegotiation of the self is potentially a more sustaina-
ble process of changing political practices than through disciplining.  
The post-war is then indeed a time of redefinition in which people exercise 
their existence (Mbembe 2001b, 15). The way in which local agencies engage 
with the liberal peace and make it their own in response to local needs, custom 
and people’s identities emphasises that people do not necessarily need others to 
tell them how to exercise their existence, but that they can reinvent it themselves. 
This conclusion directly confronts the institutionalist focus of state building, for 
it shows that institutional frameworks themselves do not define how politics is 
being practiced. Practices implicitly associated with the liberal institutional dem-
ocratic framework are substituted, diverted and rejected. Local agencies are thus 
undeniable. But this thesis has challenged the assumption common in critical 
peace studies that the local is located in grassroots, in the subaltern. This thesis 
has emphasised that the local does not necessarily have a location either in spe-
cial or sociological terms, but rather resides in practices, in identities and in the 
cultural domain, which is shared by different people, elites and non-elites. As 
politique par le bas argues (Bayart et al. 2008), this thesis has emphasised that 
local agencies also reside in peoples engagements with others. Engaging with 
local agencies in peace building processes can thus not be limited only by focus-
ing on the local at a grass roots level. This thesis has shown how different social 
groups interact and enable agencies through this interaction, thereby overcoming 
assumed elite-mass binaries that often do not reflect practices on the ground.  
If liberal peace building is to regain legitimacy locally, as well as internation-
ally with its donors, it may have to find ways to meaningfully engage with the 
local in a peace building practice. Richmond calls for a peace building practice 
that is receptive to these interactions of local-liberal negotiations and that can be 
legitimate for both, a post-liberal peace. A post-liberal peace 
‘implies a contextual approach to peacebuilding, where the context is local, 
state, regional, international, transnational, and transversal. It represents a praxis 
which occurs with its subjects in order to produce a synthesis, not for its subjects 
(or international actors) in order to produce an invasive form of peace’. 
(Richmond 2011b, 198) 
This is perhaps a new idealism in peace building which requires deep levels of 
mutual engagement and interaction, respect and cooperation. As this thesis has 
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shown, the peace building process in the DRC has developed into the opposite of 
a peace building process founded on a contextual approach and mutual engage-
ment and cooperation. The peace building process in the DRC is characterised by 
mutual disengagement, mutual distrust, and a deeming irrelevant of the other’s 
perspective. The moral-matrix that defines political practices in the Congo clash-
es with liberal democracy on a fundamental level. If a post-liberal peace is to 
emerge, it would require for this clash to be resolved, rather than being ignored 
as is currently the case. A post-liberal peace may offer a way forward out of the 
current non-constructive form of partnership, but it would require a different atti-
tude towards the other by both Congolese and intervening actors before such a 
post-liberal peace could emerge in the Congo. Post-liberal peace building as con-
ceptualised by Richmond does not emerge naturally, but requires effort and a 
fundamental change in attitude from both international and Congolese partners. It 
would require a deep level of engagement, interaction and understanding, which 
would require a fundamental level of mutual trust as well as a mutual willingness 
for this form of cooperation. This is currently not existent in the Congo, and con-
sidering the discursive clashes as discussed in chapter four, it is idealistic to ex-
pect that forms of post-liberal peace building can emerge in the short- or medium 
term future in the Congo.  
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Table 1 Results legislative elections 2006 
 Party % Seats Maj/Opp 
  vote 
 1 Parti du Peuple pour la Reconstruction et la Démocratie  22,2% 111 Majority 
  (PPRD)  
 2 Mouvement pour la Libération du Congo (MLC) 12,8% 64 Opposition 
 3 Parti Lumumbiste Unifié (PALU) 6,8% 34 Majority 
 4 Mouvement Social pour le Renouveau (MSR) 5,4% 27 Majority 
 5 Forces du Renouveau 5,2% 26 Majority 
 6 Rassemblement Congolais pour la démocratie (RCD) 3,0% 15 Opp/Non- 
     Inscrits 
 7 Coalition des Démocrates Congolais (CODECO) 2,0% 10 Opp/Maj/Non- 
     instricts 
 8 Convention des Démocrates Chrétiens (CDC) 2,0% 10 Opposition 
 9 Union des Démocrates Mobutistes (UDEMO) 1,8% 9 Majority 
 10 Camp de la Patrie (CP) 1,6% 8 Opposition 
 11 Démocratie Chrétienne Fédéraliste - Convention des  1,6% 8 Maj/non- 
  Fédéralistes pour la Démocratie Chrétienne    inscrits 
  (DCF-COFEDEC)  
 12 Parti des Démocrates Chrétiens) 1,6% 8 Majority 
 13 Union des Nationalistes Fédéralistes du Congo (UNAFEC) 1,4% 7 Majority 
 14 Alliance Congolaise des Démocrats Chrétiens (ACDC) 0,8% 4 Majority 
  Intégral (UPERDI) 
 15 Alliance des Démocrats Congolais (ADECO) 0,8% 4 Majority 
 16 Convention des Congolais Unis (CCU) 0,8% 4 Majority 
 17 Patriotes Résistants Maï Maï (PRM) 0,8% 4 Majority 
 18 Rassemblement des Congolais Démocrates (RCD-N) 0,8% 4 Opposition 
 19 Union du Peuple pour la République et le Développement 0,8% 4 Majority 
 20 Alliance des Batisseurs du Congo (ABAKO) 0,6% 3 Majority 
 21 Convention Démocrate pour le Développement (CDD) 0,6% 3 Majority 
 22 Convention pour la République et la Démocratie (CRD) 0,6% 3 Majority 
 23 Parti des Nationalistes pour le Développement Intégral 0,6% 3 Majority 
  (PANADI) 
 24 Parti de l’Alliance Nationale pour l’Unité (PANU) 0,6% 3 Maj/opp 
 25 Union Nationale des Démocrates Fédéralistes (UNADEF) 0,6% 3 Majority 
 26 Union des Patriotes Congolais (UPC) 0,6% 3 Non-Inscrits 
 27 Alliance des Nationalistes Croyants Congolais (ANCC) 0,4% 2 Majority 
 28 Alliance pour le Renouveau au Congo (ARC) 0,4% 2 Majority 
 29 Forces Novatrices pour l’Union et la Solidarité (FONUS) 0,4% 2 Opposition 
 30 Mouvement pour la Démocratie et le Développement  0,4% 2 Opposition 
  (MDD)  
 31 Parti Congolais pour la Bonne Gouvernance (PCBG)  0,4% 2 Majority 
 32 Parti Démocrate et Social Chrétien (PDSC) 0,4% 2 Majority 
 33 Parti de la Révolution du Peuple (PRP) 0,4% 2 Majority 
 34 Renaissance Plate Forme Electorale (Renaissance-PE) 0,4% 2 Opposition 
 35 Rassemblement des Forces Sociales et Fédéralistes (RSF) 0,4% 2 Opposition 
183 
 
Table 1 Results legislative elections 2006 (continued) 
 Party % Seats Maj/Opp 
  vote 
 36 Solidarité pour le Développement National (SODENA) 0,4% 2 Majority 
 37 Union pour la Majorité Républicaine (UMR)  0,4% 2 Maj/opp 
 38 Union Nationalistes des Démocrates Chrétiens (UNADEC) 0,4% 2 Majority 
 39 (ANC/PF) 0,2% 1 Majority 
 40 Action de Rassemblement de pour le Reconstruction et  0,2% 1 Unknown 
  l’Edification Nationale (ARREN)  
 41 Convention Chrétienne pour la Démocratie (CCD) 0,2% 1 Opposition 
 42 Convention Nationale d’Action Politique (CNAP) 0,2% 1 Majority 
 43 Convention Nationale pour la République et le Progrès 0,2% 1 Opposition 
  (CNRP) 
 44 Conscience et Volonté du Peuple (CVP) 0,2% 1 Majority 
 45 Démocratie Chrétienne (DC) 0,2% 1 Opposition 
 46 Front pour l’Intégration Sociale (FIS) 0,2% 1 Majority 
 47 Front des Démocrates Congolais (FRODECO) 0,2% 1 Majority 
 48 Front des Sociaux Démocrates pour le Développement 0,2% 1 Unknown 
  (FSDD) 
 49 Front Social des Indépendants Républicains (FSIR)  0,2% 1 Majority 
 50 Générations Républicaines (GR) 0,2% 1 Opposition 
 51 Mouvement d’Auto Défense pour l’Intégrité et le Maintien 0,2% 1 Majority 
  de l’Autorité Indépendante (MAI MAI)  
 52 Mouvement d’Action pour la Résurrection du Congo,  0,2% 1 Majority 
  Parti du Travail et de la Fraternité (MARC-PTF)  
 53 Mouvement Lumumbiste (MLP) 0,2% 1 Unknown 
 54 Mouvement Maï Maï (MMM) 0,2% 1 Majority 
 55 Mouvement du Peuple Congolais pour la République  0,2% 1 Opposition 
  (MPCR)  
 56 Mouvement Populaire de la Révolution (MPR) 0,2% 1 Opposition 
 57 MSDD (lutundula) 0.2% 1 Majority 
 58 Organisation Politique des Kasavubistes et alliées 0,2% 1 Unknown  
   (OPEKA)  
 59 Parti National du Peuple (PANAP) 0,2% 1 Unknown 
 60 Parti Congolais pour le Bien-être du Peuple (PCB) 0,2% 1 Unknown  
 61 Parti d l’Unité Nationale (PUNA) 0,2% 1 Unknown  
 62 Rassemblement pour le Développement et Economique  0,2% 1 Majority 
  et Social (RADESO)  
 63 Rassemblement des Chrétiens du Congo (RCPC) 0,2% 1 Majority 
 64 Rassemblement des Ecologistes Congolais- Le Verts  0,2% 1 Opposition 
  (REC-VERTS)  
 65 Union Congolaise pour le Changement (UCC) 0,2% 1 Majority 
 66 Union Chrétien pour le Renouveau (UCR) 0,2% 1 Majority 
 67  (UDR) 0,2% 1 Unknown  
 68 Union des Libéraux Démocrates Chrétiens  (ULDC) 0,2% 1 Majority 
 69 Union des Patriotes Nationalistes Congolais (UPNAC) 0,2% 1 Unknown  
  Independent Candidates 12,6% 63 Opp/maj 
 Total 100% 500  
(UNDP-APEC 2011, 210-11) 
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